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TOYNBEE'S IDEA OF ETHERIALIZATION
AS A CRITERION OF PROGRESS

by
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"Poetic imagination is but a fuller view of reality."

-- Henri Louis Bergson

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PREFACE

Few ideals characterize the spirit of the West as does the ideal of progress. Indeed, so closely allied to the rise of the West has been the ideal of progress that doubts about it cast a shadow on the destiny of the West itself.

These doubts have arisen. No longer does belief in progress command the prestige it once enjoyed. The assurance that "civilization has moved, is moving, and will continue to move in a desirable direction" is essentially bankrupt. In the eyes of the British historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, it is a "fallaciously comfortable doctrine," a facile belief "that Western Society could see ahead of it an unbroken vista of progress toward an Earthly Paradise."¹ One need only note the sober observation of the American sociologist Edward A. Ross who wrote at the end of World War II that,

the rosy doctrine in great favor a generation ago that man's social progress is inevitable because brought about by impersonal forces working in his interest, will go into discard.²

Belief in progress persists as popular myth, and sober thinkers retain the vague hope that in some sense progress may yet prove to be a reality. But Pandora has opened her box. In an age when optimism should abound, pessimism instead

is the order of the day. How did this come about? Western man lost confidence in his power to do good with the power he had wrested from nature. He lost confidence in his future.

The contemporary crisis is a crisis in the interpretation of history.³ A few months before Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes appeared on the bookshelves of a defeated Germany, an American sociologist could still declare that,

philosophy of history is quite out of fashion . . . and it is as much as one's scientific reputation is worth to treat it with seriousness and dignified respect.⁴

Within a few years, however, Spengler and the philosophy of history became serious subjects among intellectuals, and philosophers of history joined the ranks of the foremost minds of the twentieth century.⁵

Almost uniformly these latter-day "prophets" rejected the unilinear view of history. They examined critically the nature and meaning of progress and discovered decline as well as progress in the affairs of men. The law of progress which earlier students of society believed to exist and thought they had discovered lost its attraction. Instead cyclical views of history which had been abandoned were revived, and Western civilization was evaluated in the light of the larger perspective of world culture.⁶

The crisis in the human situation today is not only a crisis in the interpretation of history but a crisis in

axiology. No longer is it possible to establish any generally acceptable basis for values which will support a convincing theory of progress. At one time, Western man could appeal to the working of a beneficent Providence or to the working of an inner teleology in the affairs of man. Building on the vestigial remains of an implicit value system, the naturalists Comte and Spencer could--in their century--develop a doctrine of automatic progress--automatic because linked to the laws of nature, and progress because values still enjoyed a measure of objectivity. Today this is virtually impossible. Little of these earlier foundations remains. The ideal of progress which has been both the ground and guiding force of the Western way of life has lost its theoretical support, and no adequate alternative has been established in its place. This is the dilemma of modern man.

Formerly Western social scientists sought the general laws of progress in the belief that these laws were natural and discoverable. Today the social scientist avoids generalizations and seeks instead particular solutions to particular problems. So long as the facts are made to fit simple rubrics, so long as they are quantified, the social scientist believes that he has properly performed his task. Indeed the general belief holds that as data become quantifiable, the discipline becomes more nearly a science. Yet it is becoming clear that social science involves more than the statistical analysis of verifiable facts. The dynamics of human behavior involve

depths and complexities that defy quantitative analysis. Bold new approaches are needed. Intelligent speculation must lead the way. The scientific method must acquire new dimensions in order to cope adequately with the human situation. Values can no longer be ignored as they have been in the past.

After World War I, Western man engaged in a great masquerade. He assumed a mask of optimism to hide an inner sense of despair. There arose an "age of anxiety." Disillusioned intellectuals turned to a pessimism that permeated every aspect of Western life--a pessimism not likely to pass so long as the crisis persists. For some, life became an encounter with nothingness from which there could be no return. Others made a pilgrimage to the world of Freud. Still others revived traditional religion.

The British historian Arnold J. Toynbee symbolizes this quest. Toynbee's quest is modern man's search for reality and significance. Outstanding in the world of disenchanted intellectuals, Toynbee meets the challenge of chaos head-on. His response is the response of religion. He envisions anew a God of creation in history. From the Wilsonian liberalism of his earlier days, he returns to his ancestral religion and moves on to discover the destiny of man in the future of higher religions.

This return to religion has alienated Toynbee from the main stream of Western thought. It has placed him in opposition to naturalistic views of history at almost every

turn. Were Toynbee a lesser mind than he is, he would be swept aside by the forces of secularism or by the forces of pessimism. But Toynbee is too formidable a figure to be pushed into oblivion. His Study of History is one of the truly monumental achievements of the twentieth century, and his challenge of naturalism calls into question the whole issue of the nature, the meaning, and the purpose of history.

Before one can come to grips with any aspect of A Study of History, Toynbee's concept of the method and meaning of history must be mastered. Toynbee's "etherialization" can be understood only in the light of these larger issues. Etherialization is an idea that Toynbee works into all levels of life and history. It is, in short, his principle of progress.

Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century view of progress and the unilinear view of history that it implies. Yet in his search for a principle of growth, he develops an idea which suggests itself as the basis for a general theory of progress. Toynbee's idea of etherialization takes into account certain realities in the human situation and in history which earlier theories neglected. By so doing it suggests the means whereby the ideal of progress may be reconstructed.

To evaluate the full significance of the idea of etherialization, one must trace the development of Toynbee's own thought, his view of human nature, and his theory of

society. His debt to others is considerable. He does not hesitate to acknowledge this. In particular there is the late influence of the contemporary Swiss psychologist, Carl G. Jung.

The psychology of Jung is basic to the comprehension and the appreciation of the idea of etherialization--more so than Toynbee himself appears to realize. Toynbee utilizes the ideas of Jung in connection with his theory of higher religions but does not reformulate his idea of etherialization in these same terms. Before an adequate analysis and interpretation of etherialization can be attempted, a careful study of relevant Jungian theory is necessary.

When Toynbee's views of man, society, and social change have been accounted for--as well as key Jungian insights--it will then be possible to examine carefully the idea of etherialization itself and its counterpart, breakdown. Since etherialization is the phenomenon which characterizes man in process of civilization, it is evident that any light which reveals the fundamental nature of this phenomenon may help to clarify contemporary problems..

In his attempt to get at the heart of the growth and decline of societies, Toynbee brings to light the dramatic role of human personality and the tragic nature of the human situation. He believes that man must create or die. Break-down is the failure of creativity, and this failure is itself the greatest of the challenges that confront man.

Toynbee does not reiterate Spengler's pronouncement of doom, nor does he proclaim automatic progress. Instead he describes history and the human situation as a struggle for self-transcendence and ultimate transfiguration.

But Toynbee is not altogether free of errors and inconsistencies. He entertains an almost compulsive penchant for personification, systems, and categories. His analogies are hazardous, and he is himself uncertain whether the spiritual progress of which he speaks is really progress or merely a restoration. These and certain other objections are dealt with in a concluding critique.

The implications of Jungian psychology for the idea of etherialization must be carefully examined, for Toynbee has unequivocally affirmed the importance of depth psychology in the interpretation of history. Finally, the conditions for a satisfactory reconstruction of the ideal of progress must be enumerated, for it is the loss of confidence in this ideal that underlies contemporary disenchantment.

Failure to share all of Toynbee's views or conclusions must not be permitted to prevent a profiting from particular insights. His errors are the inescapable pitfalls of a vast effort. They do not necessarily impugn his entire work. It is some of his great ideas which the writer seeks and which the writer hopes will contribute to the interpretation of history. These ideas center in his idea of etherialization. They are articulated in terms of the various disciplines that

they touch. No attempt is made to trace their validity in terms of specific historical phenomena alone. Instead they are assessed in terms of their meaning and their implications.

PREFACE

Footnotes

¹Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, 1934-54), IX, 167, hereinafter cited A Study.

²Edward A. Ross, "The Post-War Intellectual Climate," American Sociological Review, X (October, 1945), 650.

³Even positivist Charles Frankel admits that "the crisis of our time is a crisis in our interpretation of history." (The Case for Modern Man [New York: Harper and Bros., 1955], p. 5). This view is shared by many serious students of the philosophy of history as, for example, Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, trans. C. T. Campion (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951); Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, trans. N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Reavey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950); Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936); F. C. Keller, "The Meaning of Progress," Social Studies, XLII (February, 1951), 51-7; and Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), in which Niebuhr asserts, for example, that the "refutation by contemporary history of modern man's conception of history embodies the spiritual crisis of our age." (Ibid., p. 8.)

⁴Arthur James Todd, Theories of Social Progress (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 454.

⁵In addition to Toynbee, there are Sorokin, Berdyaev, Maritain, Schweitzer, Kroeber, Northrop, et. al.

⁶Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 275-79. Cf. Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: The American Book Co., 1937-41), IV, Chaps. 2, 12, 13, and 14.

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF PROGRESS

The Idea of Progress

For many of us, wrote Gilbert Murray, the idea of progress "is a truth that lies somewhere near the roots of our religion."¹ Indeed so persuasive was the idea for many that at one time it was accepted as a final truth. Whatever once may have been this persuasiveness, however, the idea of progress no longer commands the prestige it once enjoyed.²

Breakdown of faith in progress may be attributed to two factors: an inadequate theory of man and an inadequate theory of values. These same factors also precipitated a crisis in the interpretation of history, a crisis which provoked Toynbee to write his monumental Study of History. Before the significance of Toynbee's efforts can be evaluated, however, it is necessary to survey briefly the main streams of thought about history that preceded Toynbee and in particular to examine the idea and the belief in progress.

When belief in progress became the fundamental faith of modern Western Europe, it established itself on the conviction that the central variable in human advance is human knowledge.³ Western philosophers like René Descartes and

Francis Bacon argued that the new knowledge of the inner workings of nature which science would bring would enable man to create a new world. Later, thinkers of the Enlightenment like Perrault and Fontenelle added that the accumulation of this new knowledge was inevitable. Had not Locke shown that the mind was a repository of experience which could be passed on, as Pascal had argued, from generation to generation? The impressive fact was that this new knowledge was indeed "cumulative." There was now little reason to doubt that man could continue to climb on the shoulders of his ancestors--as the "Moderns" argued--and see a little further with each new generation. It was not at all surprising, therefore, that in 1740 the Abbé Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1753) could convincingly propose a new dogma of the inevitability of progress, and the Marquis de Condorcet could with irrepressible optimism pronounce that "the perfectibility of man is absolutely certain."⁴

But this new idea of progress became many different things to many different people. To the central variable of knowledge was added the idea of the advance of economic liberalism, of industrialism, of constitutional democracy, or of human happiness. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the notion had grown that history was itself a self-redemptive process that assured a rosy future for mankind. Thus at the very threshold of "the age of anxiety," an optimistic Spencer could write that "progress is a necessity," and that "it is certain that man must become perfect."⁵

To be sure, there were those like Jacob Burckhardt and Alexis de Tocqueville in Western Europe or the gloomy Adams brothers, Henry and Brooks, in the United States, who refused to be impressed by the onrush of technology and bourgeois culture. In France, Sorel wrote of The Illusions of Progress (1908), and in Germany, Nietzsche grimly warned that "everything bows before the coming barbarism."⁶

Yet in Western Europe, and particularly in the United States, an increasingly popular belief in progress gave wings to the idea of progress. It assumed the form of various ideals--such as manifest destiny, increase in the standard of living, or the dissemination of democratic government throughout the world.⁷

Whatever its particular expression, progress was interpreted in terms of Western touchstones of value. These were essentially materialistic because observed progress was essentially material and because the arts and religion had lost their central significance in Western life.

Belief in spiritual progress captured less critical minds who thought that somehow it followed in the wake of material progress. In general, however, observed progress was material while belief became spiritual. The idea grew that civilization itself was a unilinear process moving with time in a desirable direction. In short, the ideal of progress--idea or belief--displayed a curious mixture of hopes and wishful thinking sustained by an expanding material economy and an increasing world power. Progress was here to

stay. It was a natural law. Were not the steady advances in human science and institutions convincing evidence? Had not Darwin demonstrated convincingly that men had "progressed" from a lower form of life and would continue to "progress?" So grossly misinterpreted was Darwin that he himself was obliged to remind his admirers that regress as well as progress was the product of evolution. Biological evolution could not be viewed as a necessary law of progress.

Various theories arose not only with respect to the nature of progress but with respect to how it came about. Spencer spoke of the survival of the fittest in a brutal world of laissez-faire competition that would end in a remarkably peaceful world of industrial societies. Kropotkin, on the other hand, spoke of progress through mutual aid--through cooperation rather than competition. Spencer believed that progress was best achieved by leaving nature to her own devices whereas his opponents of varying degrees of violent intention and good will argued that progress had to be brought about by intelligent intervention.⁸

Few theories of progress were as ambiguous and inconsistent as that of Rousseau's. Rousseau called for a repudiation of the progress of civilization and a return to primitivism. On the one hand he spoke of the "perfectibility of man" while on the other he condemned "civilization" as an intolerable perversion of the noble savage.⁹ Rousseau's romantic disciples perpetuated his longing for a return to a primitive barbarism that would purge civilization of its

decadent elements.

For some the goal of progress became the organized depersonalization of man in some beehive utopia. It is not surprising, therefore, that shortly after World War I, at the dawn of the "age of anxiety," the disenchanted and thoroughly pungent Dean Inge could write that,

the whole structure of our social order encouraged the measurement of everything by quantitative standards. Everyone could understand that a generation which travels sixty miles per hour must be five times as civilized as one which only travelled twelve. Thus the beneficent "law of progress" was exemplified in that nation which had best deserved to be its exponent. The myth in question is that there is a natural law of improvement. . . . Belief in this alleged law has vitiated our natural science, our political science, our history, our philosophy, and even our religion. . . . Nature knows nothing of this precious law [of progress]. Her figure is not the vertical line, nor even the spiral, but the circle--the vicious circle. . . . "Men eat birds, birds eat worms, worms eat men again. . . ." It is not certain that there has been much change in our intellectual and moral endowment since pithecanthropus dropped the first half of his name. . . . Secularism, like other religions, needs an eschatology, and has produced one. A more energetic generation than ours looked forward to a gradual extension of busy industrialism over the whole planet. . . . The twentieth century . . . is not likely to be a pleasant time to live in.¹⁰

So confused became contemporary ideology of progress that,

it is truer of the votaries of progress than of the adherents of any of the great religions that they believe without knowing either quite what they believe or quite why they believe it.¹¹

The Meaning of Progress

To survive this bankruptcy into which it has fallen, the idea of progress needs reformulation. The major problem is the development of a satisfactory theory of man and

values.¹² Even so, a theory of progress does not necessarily command belief in progress. The conditions for progress required by a satisfactory theory may preclude belief in it. Although related, idea and belief are not identical. Survival of belief in progress depends upon a clear idea of what progress means and on a conviction that the conditions which it requires do in fact exist, are forthcoming, or are at least possible. Any belief or idea which can be embarrassed by the facts of history or psychological incongruities is bound to be discredited.

When Toynbee speaks of civilizations in growth, of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization, of the Chariot of Time moving with the rise and fall of civilizations, he has in mind a qualitative change in the processes of life itself. His is not the spatial metaphor of direction in the sense that the secularizers of Augustine interpreted progress in the eighteenth century; direction to him means only "becoming less unlike God." Hence, for Toynbee, progressive change is a distinctly qualitative phenomenon which only incidentally displays quantitative characteristics. Progress, in this sense, is therefore related to values which are in turn a function of the development of personality.

Although progress is a function of value, it cannot be interpreted to mean the mere quantitative increase of values. Progress is not essentially more or less of this or that. Unlike probability, for example, value cannot be assigned a number, for number is a kind of value itself.

Instead, progress must refer to an advance that relates to objective reality. It is not possible to demonstrate, for example, that the people of any particular age are more or less happy than those of some other age in any calculated Benthamite sense. It is not possible to speak, for example, of progress in the fine arts in the sense that Beethoven is better in some quantitative sense than Bach, or that a Renoir has "more" beauty than a Leonardo da Vinci. Indeed progress is not a matter of going anywhere or increasing anything.¹³

The quantitative or spatial criterion of progress is a crude adaptation to life as a whole by popular thought of certain "progressive" features in Western economy and science. It is patently inadequate as a general criterion because it fails to come to grips with the problem of personality and value. The concept of progress must be established on grounds that clearly possess meaning and significance for the life of man. It must be supported by an adequate theory of value and an adequate theory of human personality for which and to which value attaches significance. It can hardly be supported by any theory which does not propose to show how values are created, how they are significant, and how they persist in the enrichment of life. A theory of progress is no better than the value system that is invoked to support it.

The Ancient View of History

The ancients rejected the idea of progress on the grounds that natural events were repetitive and that change--including that which man himself effected--tended toward degeneration rather than improvement. Change was discouraged and instead stability was sought as the basis of the good life. The Greeks had no word for progress. They could not imagine that man was advancing in general or in particular. Plato, for example, spoke of the philosopher as the "spectator of time and existence," as though he could observe an endless procession of the past, present, and future. Despite their tendency to deify man and his institutions, the Greeks were restrained by an ever present Fate--moira--which limited their own as well as the creative possibilities of their anthropomorphic gods. The events of life were recurrent. They were bound to the order of nature. At best the cycles of change were identical or--on occasion--dissimilar to dispel boredom. Never were they progressive. Indeed, if any general tendency was detected, it was downward. It was not difficult to agree with Hesiod that men lived in the miserable age of iron. Plato and Aristotle both sought to forestall doom by preserving the stability of society at all costs.¹⁴

Lucretius suggested the idea of progress. But he was obliged to resign himself to the inevitable dissolution of the natural elements in man or to the inevitable corruption

and decay of human society.¹⁵ So long as nature was the final arbiter of man's fate, her way prevailed; and her way was the way of growth and decline, of the endless turning of the Wheel of Existence. Progress is not sustained, and no theory of progress can enjoy ontological status.. The Greeks and Romans recognized that the natural order is indifferent to man, that it bears no necessary relation to his aspirations.

Modern theories of progress have added little to the profound wisdom of Lucretius.¹⁶ The endless change of contemporary naturalistic theory cannot properly be termed progress. A general progress implies an advance with respect to some external and independent frame of reference. There is no such thing as a purely immanent advance--upward or downward. Without objective reference, subjective value judgments are no more than what they purport to be, i.e., matters of preference. The ancients were wise in rejecting progress because the change they discovered led to observable degeneration in terms of their values as well as to observable improvement in terms of these same values. Moreover, for them, observable improvement in technology was so negligible as to offer little inspiration for a belief in progress. The ancients erred, however, in speaking of natural degeneration for the same reasons that moderns err in speaking of natural progress. But their error was inconsequential because they actually preferred a doctrine of recurrent cycles congruent with their mythology as well as with their observations of nature.

The doctrine of recurrent cycles appeared in ancient Babylonia and in ancient Egypt. It may have been present in both Indian and Chinese thought prior to 1000 B.C. Plato and the Chaldean priest, Berossus (ca. 250 B.C.), spoke of a Great Year during which all heavenly bodies return to their former position.. The idea of the Great Year is also found in the philosophies of Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus of the sixth century B.C. Later, Aristotle argued that all things return to themselves and the Stoics envisioned a universal conflagration whose end would herald a new era.¹⁷

If . . . nature were in essence merely the endless and orderly repetition of cycles of change, as Aristotle suggested, then human affairs as a part of nature could manifest no permanent tendency toward either amelioration or degeneration.¹⁸

Naturalism and Progress

What the ancient world lacked that would encourage a belief in progress was a swiftly advancing technology or an eschatological mythology. Either of these might have suggested the notion of a change for the better--an improvement that was not followed by a return to the lowly state that cursed man. Lacking these, the ancient world frankly rejected progress as untenable. Contemporary naturalistic thought, on the other hand, attempts to support the idea of progress on naturalistic grounds, but fails because of inadequate axiology.

If the notion of progress is to relate to any form of change, it must invoke a system of values. This value

system must be supported by an ontology that provides for the advance of value, that is, the creation and sustenance of value. Hence values must possess objective reference. Were values purely subjective, that is, relative, or matters of mere preference, they would share the fate of their particular context or circumstances. Values must in some sense possess a life of their own. They must enjoy objective ontological status. A purely naturalistic metaphysics is not able to provide this status. Contemporary positivism, for example, teaches that values are purely subjective, that is, emotive judgments.¹⁹ As such, they have no ontological anchorage. They cannot support a doctrine of progress. To support a doctrine of progress, values must in some sense relate to an objective creative source in which they may "live and move and have their being."

Through its doctrine of meliorism, contemporary pragmatism recognizes this need to establish value on a firmer basis than positivism will allow. But pragmatism can only establish a nominal basis of value by ascribing to it qualified factual reality. The values of pragmatism still lack the ontological anchorage necessary for a theory of progress. Contemporary naturalistic theories of progress retain, therefore, the appearance of authenticity only by incorporating surreptitiously the vestigial remains of an implicit religious axiology.

If religion be broadly defined as man's relation to ultimate rather than finite or ephemeral concerns, then

value--which relates to man's ultimate interests--must be grounded in some world-view congenial to religious concerns. To be sure, not every religious world-view will support the idea of progress. Yet that view which does support it must of necessity be a religious view with an adequate axiology and an adequate theory of man.

The Greeks interpreted man in terms of nature. Supreme value was found in resignation. The good life was the cultivation of those values related to the life of resignation. Epicurus taught, for example, that there were individual values grounded in man as an individual fulfilling natural destiny. As an over-arching, on-going ideal, progress was as impossible as it was meaningless. Indeed, if this world were essentially evil or destined to degeneration and destruction, escape through withdrawal was the ideal course of action. Progress in terms of a betterment of existence could be interpreted only in terms of a renunciation of the world and of life. Even the profound humanism of Plato and Aristotle was unable to thwart the desire to escape the darkness of the cave of the everyday world and bask in the light of a contemplation of changeless eternity.²⁰

A theory of progress must point to an ideal end. Marxists, for example, attempt to meet this requirement by speaking of the ideal of the classless society, but the classless society is not a transcendent ideal. It is but a way station on the road of the materialistic dialectic.²¹ Ideals are not concrete goals. Instead they transcend the

value judgments of the moment. Nothing is quite so stultifying, so disenchanting as believing that one has arrived--than an "ideal" has been achieved. Always there is the vision, the dim apprehension of that which transcends one's power of full comprehension or communication. And this vision is essentially a religious faith.

In short, while it is true that progress in any practical sense is limited to certain immediate, specific, and finite goals, it is also true that these particular goals, insofar as they relate to a general theory of progress, must be informed by some value apart from themselves. Moreover, the increase of value--of the good--which is the general meaning of progress must be possible. A world-view which does not provide for the possibility of the creation and sustenance of values or one which renders this highly improbable is hardly capable of encouraging a theory of progress. The particular and subjective values of the relativist cannot qualify. Objective reference becomes the sine qua non of a theory of progress. Values--explicit or implicit--cannot die with the individual. They must be able to sustain themselves in some respect from generation to generation. In short, they must bear spiritual significance.

The Judeo-Christian Contribution

Historically, the possibility of progress was first suggested in the philosophies of history of the major Hebrew prophets of the eighth century B.C. "Only twice in the

history of thought," says Baillie,

has the idea arisen that history might be tracing another pattern than the circular one, and in both these cases it was . . . a non-recurrent movement towards the ultimate triumph of good. . . . It is only among the Hebrews that we find any conception of history as a significant process. Nowhere, if we except the Zend Avesta, is the sequence of historical events conceived as leading anywhere or as accomplishing anything.²²

The Hebrew possessed the unique insight of placing the source and sustainer of value within the processes of man's life and at the same time placing it beyond these processes. His eschatological concerns suggested an ideal which could infuse purpose into process--into change. He saw life not only as process and recurrence but as uniqueness as well. Unique events were the real substance of history--the deviations from an order of nature whose endless recurrences were called the "vain repetitions of the heathen." These unique occurrences were the means whereby value entered history. Karl Löwith observes that,

the two great conceptions of antiquity and [Judeo-] Christianity, cyclic motion and eschatological direction, have exhausted the basic approaches to the understanding of history. Even the most recent attempts at an interpretation of history are nothing else but variations of these two principles or a mixture of both of them.²³

It was this directional and eschatological character of Christian philosophy of history--its separation of human history from nature--that subsequently provided the basis for the emergence of the Western belief in progress. Through the Christian philosophy of history, Western historiography was able to abandon the cyclical pessimism of the ancients.

The Abortive Modern Synthesis

With the emergence of the modern world, the Judeo-Christian view of history that was given its classic expression in Augustine underwent--as did all areas of Western thought--a gradual secularization. H. Stuart Hughes, for example, believes that,

one way of characterizing the course of European historical writing from St. Augustine to the eighteenth century would be to describe it as a progressive secularization of the concept of history as eschatology. By the time of Voltaire and Gibbon . . . the consciously Christian structure remained . . . the outlook was still eschatological; the eighteenth-century historians sought out the purpose of man--and found it in his advance toward reason. . . . And it could be called apocalyptic--in the sense that the apocalypse had been moved up to the present, the age of intellectual light and harmonious reason.²⁴

In altering the Augustinian view of history, later Western thinkers tried to embrace both naturalistic and religious historiography. The former, they believed, reestablished the contact with nature which the Greeks preferred and the modern world demanded. The latter provided the axiological basis for a theory of progress which the Greeks could not provide and the modern religio-naturalistic synthesis was destined to lose. Thus in Kant, for example, history is believed to proceed as if there were in nature a mind with a plan. An inner teleology, Kant argued, served to convert irrationality into rationality in and through the actions of individuals. Nature thereby acquired a purposeful orientation.²⁵

During the Enlightenment, the idea of progress became largely an expression of confidence that responsible and intelligent individuals would work to bring it about. By the late nineteenth century, however, after Hegel and the Romantics had transformed it, progress involved nature as well as man in a gigantic and inevitable unfolding (Entwicklung) of the World Spirit.²⁶ As if assured of infallibility, Hegel gathered moral support from Darwin who was unable to prevent the misinterpretation and misapplication of his theory. In short, the predestination of Augustine became the inexorable laws of development, evolution, race, or manifest destiny.

Obvious and impressive advances of knowledge and humanitarianism during the nineteenth century tended to establish progress as a dogmatic belief. Paradoxically, however, developments in the same century tended to destroy the basis for a theory of progress. By depersonalizing all processes of life, the philosophers of the nineteenth century undermined the supporting axiology of progress and transferred the entire problem of progress from its locus in human personality to some impersonal process. They failed to account for the fact that, apart from personality, value lacks relevance.

Progress became not only naturalistic but deterministic. The optimism of eighteenth century libertarianism changed into the pessimism of Spenglerian determinism. The Christian drama of salvation and the vision of a New Earth

was transformed by secularization first into a naturalistic process of historical self-redemption and then into a historical doom no less determined than were the cycles of eternal recurrence that animated the world of history for the ancients.²⁷ The Judeo-Christian intuition of an immanent as well as transcendent "giver of life" was abandoned for a natural process sanctioned by the laws of nature instead of guided by the inscrutable will of God. Augustine's predestination was taken from a God of justice and concern and transferred to a natural order of chance and indifference. The final secularization of the Judeo-Christian view by Hegel, Marx, Comte, and Spencer clinched the bankruptcy of the idea of progress.

Earlier Augustinian predestination had precluded the development of a theory of progress. Its secular counterpart failed as well by substituting historical determinism. Determinism reduces individuals to the status of puppets subject to natural forces and removes from them participation in and resolution of the processes of history. Hegel pictured his great men as pawns in the unfolding of the Absolute, and Comte taught that progress was inevitable because men possessed the natural instincts of gregariousness and self-betterment. The possibility and contingency of progress taught by Turgot and Condorcet in the eighteenth century were set aside for the impersonal and inexorable--because natural--processes of history.

By making progress inevitable, historical determinism coalesced value and disvalue. Man no longer "learned by suffering" but "progressed by suffering." In short, the basis of value was obscured. The problem of good and evil was resolved by erasing the distinction between them, by subsuming one under the other, or by incorporating it within the other. On this basis, all events acquired value because they all served the unfolding historical process. They were necessary a priori. History could not have been other than it was. History became its own judge and its own redeemer. "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht."²⁸ It is not surprising therefore that Schopenhauer renounced the idealism of his colleagues and sought a negation of the will-to-live at the roots of existence itself..

Value cannot be limited to natural process and retain its significance. While all events may in some sense be bearers of value; value must also in some sense possess an independence that assures its survival, and it must also in some sense retain relevance to human concerns. Without these relations, there can be no progress--only process.

The Axiology of Progress

Bankruptcy of the contemporary view of progress was ensured by removing the drama of human events from the arena of human personality and decision. No longer was progress the outcome of challenges and responses but of external processes. In other words, impersonal forces such as the

historical dialectic or natural selection were advanced as the modus operandi of progressive change. By removing its contingency, progress was depersonalized. Human personality was not the central factor simply because it was itself a part of natural process. Progress was removed from the drama of free response--which no longer existed--and those factors related to the articulation of these responses in the creation of value. The human freedom offered as the ideal of historical determinism could hardly be identified as the freedom of human personalities resolving their existential situation as creative agents under the judgment of God.

By depersonalizing progress, the basis of value was undermined. Value must center in the meaning of life for the human personality in its existential situation and in its relation to historical processes in time. Apart from a consideration of human personality, value is an empty abstraction.

Weakening of theories of progress in the contemporary world also resulted from the relativization of values. But relativization cannot be absolute. The idea of progress requires an open rather than a closed future. What is needed is a transcendent ground which informs immanent process. Values relevant to particular processes thereby support progress by their relation to some transcendent and therefore ideal norm. By its very definition, this norm must be religious because it embodies ultimate concerns. The ground

of axiology and progress theory must therefore be religious.

A theory of progress must delineate the qualitative aspects of process. This axiological requirement is the Achilles heel of most modern theories of progress. While a theory of progress must embrace within its compass all aspects of life including the material, it is the qualitative rather than particular aspects of change which are significant.

Values whose increase comprises progress relate to human "good." As such they relate to the functioning of human personality as well as to ideal and objective ends. Values accrue as the ideal contents of human thought and aspiration. They challenge human personality even as human personality creates them. The highly personal nature of human creativity suggests that creativity is the outcome of optimum human functioning. This in turn suggests the crucial role of personality dynamics in an adequate theory of progress. Creative functioning of human personality vis à vis the objective elements of value permits the infusion and advance of value in cumulative human experience. This increase of value in and through the growth of human personality can be properly termed progress if the metaphysical theory invoked supports it.

The human psyche works out the significance and meaning of life in the face of ultimate and therefore religious concerns. In terms of these concerns, values are established as subjective relevants having objective reference. Although the subjective content of value may be

strictly non-religious, the objective reference which provides its meaning for progress as well as its claim to value is religious.

An axiology which supports a theory of progress must infuse all processes of life with value. Heretofore theories of progress have been limited largely to quantitative definitions and to the elaboration of evidence for or against progress in terms of the particular criterion invoked. Little attention has been devoted to the role of human personality--the actual processes by which this advance is achieved. Other than in the enumeration of the "great man" theory of history or variations thereof, the function of human personality and its dynamics has been neglected. Psychological theories of the origin and development of culture or civilization have not, in general, related a theory of personality directly to the phenomenon of the growth and decline of societies or to the general problem of human progress.²⁹

An Adequate Theory of Progress

Decline of faith in the possibility of progress must also be attributed to the fact that in the face of impressive evidence of continuing human misery, purely naturalistic accounts ring a distinctly hollow note. Western man has been led to believe that "progress" is a kind of escape from the "backwardness" of present life to the happiness of some anticipated utopia. This anticipation, however, offers little relief from the immediate realities of the human

situation. Unless meaning and value can find their way into the tragedies of the present, the idea of progress has no genuine point of departure. Progress must build from the present. If value is not created and sustained in the present, if the present loses meaning, no theory of progress will elicit conviction.

While particular advances have been made for some people in terms of materialistic standards, general progress is not certain--perhaps not possible--in terms of these standards. It cannot be argued that there is less starvation, less inhumanity to man, for example, than there was fifty or even two-hundred fifty years ago in any general sense of the term. The idea of progress as popularly conceived is therefore called into question and rightly so, for as it stands and has stood, it offers little more than an invitation to disenchantment. Indeed, for many it has become a thoroughly bankrupt--if not obsolete--idea.

Yet evidence for "progress" in some sense of the word cannot be entirely discounted. Man has risen above his tragic circumstances in genuine instances of self-transcendence. He has convincingly demonstrated that he is in some sense more than the world in which he lives and can in some sense profit by his failures as well as consolidate his gains. An adequate theory of progress must take this into account. It must discover within the mystery of human life that which can encourage a belief in progress. It must recognize that progress issues from the response of human personality to the

challenges of life. Belief in progress must recognize that the ideal world is forever in the making. "To live in an ideal world," Goethe once wrote, "is to treat the impossible as if it were possible," to construct alternatives when there are none and to seek possibility in the face of necessity. In short, a theory of progress that is to buttress belief in progress must be a theory of transfiguration, a theory of the struggle for significance, and a theory of the emergence and growth of value from a natural order which ignores value to a transcendent order that is the source and sustainer of value itself.

Humanity is part of a vast spiritual continuum--a vast environment of ideas and personality determinants as well as an environment of physical nature. The human psyche strains, as it were, between the possibilities of barbarism and sainthood. Yet in the flux of events that move the wheels of time, man appears to be progressing as personality toward a transfiguration.

So it appears to Arnold J. Toynbee. He believes that there is evidence of this in all aspects of life and in all aspects of history. Evidence of it is the etherialization of life. Etherialization, Toynbee believes, is the qualitative aspect of change that constitutes growth or progress. Its absence, on the other hand, suggests disintegration. But there are many aspects of life. When growth falters in one aspect, it continues as etherialization elsewhere. For Toynbee, therefore, etherialization is the principle of

progress--not the progress of a Condorcet or a Comte but the progress leading to ultimate transfiguration of human personality.

To qualify as a satisfactory theory of progress, however, Toynbee's doctrine of etherialization must come to terms with the problem of values. Toynbee must demonstrate that etherialization permeates all processes of life. He must show how etherialization may be said to be progressive, how it persists rather than perishes with the vicissitudes of particular situations: Some eschatological myth must hold out the hope of an ideal end, and the probability as well as the possibility of the creation and preservation of value must be demonstrated.

Toynbee's theory of progress must build on an affirmative world and life view that supports itself from within and from without--from human psychic resources within and from transcendent ideals without. Observable nature is indifferent to the fate of man, and contradictory with respect to his values. Man, therefore, must derive his values from extra-natural sources.

These sources are the creative processes of human personality and ultimate reality. The creative human personality establishes its ideals and its values in opposition to as well as in harmony with the nature from which it sprang--a nature whose regularity and necessity it transcends. It becomes a creative agent in defiance of primordial structures. It reaches for transfiguration.

To isolate the most general and most essentially qualitative elements of the creative process that is progress is a manifestly difficult task. To serve as a satisfactory general criterion of progress, Toynbee's etherialization must be able to delineate some aspect of life peculiar to growth and to growth only. Since etherialization purports to identify a qualitative phenomenon, it cannot propose to measure progress quantitatively. Hence Toynbee's etherialization can hardly be said to be a criterion in the strict sense of the word. Instead, it must be shown to serve as a heuristic device which contrasts what is believed to be progress when it occurs with what is believed to be the absence of progress.

CHAPTER I

Footnotes

¹Gilbert Murray, Religio Grammatici (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918), p. 19. Cf. John Baillie, The Belief in Progress (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 40: "The belief [in progress] has manifestly some deeper root than [an] empiric one. It is essentially a philosophy of life; and like all philosophies of life, it does duty for religion; and like all philosophies and all religions, its deepest root is in certain a priori presuppositions."

²John B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (London: Macmillan & Co., 1924), pp. 351f. Bury argues that although the idea suffers from illusion of finality no less than did the idea of the Last Judgment in the Middle Ages, it could be displaced as a directing idea even as other ideas have lost their influence. An excellent example of this is the disenchantment of H. G. Wells, The Mind at the End of Its Tether (New York: Didier Press, 1946), p. 4. Concerning the particular disenchantment of Wells, see Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 163; and Sidney B. Fay, "The Idea of Progress," American Historical Review, LII (January, 1947), 246. Cf. also Baillie, op. cit., p. 179.

³For the "modern" view of progress, "the root evil is ignorance, and the secret of salvation is knowledge." (Baillie, op. cit., p. 176.) In 1910, Max Nordau expressed an extreme rationalist view symbolic of the end of an era: "Progress is increase of knowledge. . . . Imagination . . . play[s] no direct part." (The Interpretation of History, trans. M. A. Hamilton [New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1911], p. 340.) Cf. George H. Hildebrand, The Idea of Progress (2d ed. rev.; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949), p. 4.

⁴Marquis de Condorcet, History of the Progress of the Human Spirit, Epoque I, quoted in John H. Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 383; and Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 323. In addition to these two studies of the emergence of the idea of progress, see Baillie, op. cit., Chap. III; Bury, op. cit., pp. 110-30; Fay, op. cit.; Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization: Part II, Civilization and Ethics, trans. C. T. Campion (1st American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), Chaps. XII, XIII, and XIV; Carl Becker, The Heavenly

City of the Eighteenth-Century Moral Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932); and G. S. Painter, "The Idea of Progress," The American Journal of Sociology, XXVIII (November, 1923), 257-82.

⁵Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, p. 80, quoted in Fay, op. cit., p. 238. For Spencer's elaboration of a law of necessary progress, see "Progress: Its Law and Cause," Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative (New York: 1891), I, 8-62, quoted in Hildebrand, op. cit., pp. 447ff. Spencer affirms that "progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity." (Ibid., p. 447.) Baillie, op. cit., p. 145 observes that "Spencer is more responsible than any other single writer for the tendency, so widely diffused in the closing decades of the [nineteenth] century, to convert the doctrine of evolution into an instrument of unbridled optimism." This was particularly true for the American thought of this period. Cf. Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927), III, 195-205. For an incisive study of the belief that history is self-redemptive, see Niebuhr, loc. cit.

⁶Friedrich Nietzsche, Thoughts Out of Season, trans. A. M. Ludovici and Adrian Collins (London: 1909), Part II, 136. Goethe wrote earlier that "men become cleverer and more intelligent, but not better, happier, or more effective in action." Quoted in Nordau, op. cit., p. 318. Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom, trans. and ed. James Hastings Nichols (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943), p. 56: "Neither man's spirit nor his intellect has demonstrably improved in the period known to history." It is noteworthy that the literature of Eastern Europe is generally much less optimistic. Cf. the works of the Russian literary giants, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, as well as those of Danilevsky and Berdyaev.

⁷For studies of the development of the idea of progress in the United States, see Parrington, op. cit.; and Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926).

⁸Spencer, as cited in Hildebrand, op. cit.; and Petr A. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid (London: W. Heinemann, 1904). Spencer is inconsistent, for he speaks of an ultimate cosmic senescence as well as of inevitable progress.

⁹Baillie, op. cit., pp. 92f.

¹⁰William Ralph Inge, "Our Personal Discontents," Outspoken Essays (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919).

¹¹Baillie, op. cit., p. 88.

¹²Schweitzer writes that the belief in progress, the idea of progress, and actual "progress" are closely related. "All human progress," he says, "depends on progress in its theory of the universe, whilst conversely, decadence is conditioned by a similar decadence in this theory." The Philosophy of Civilization, Part I, The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization, op. cit., p. xii.

¹³Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941-43), II, 320: "The whole of modern secular culture assumes that growth means progress. It gives the idea of growth [per se] a moral [and therefore value] connotation." Cf. also Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 401-402.

¹⁴Cf. Baillie, op. cit., p. 153: "To those whose hearts were set not on any changes the future might bring but on a changeless world above, the idea of the cyclical recurrence of temporal events even had about it a certain appropriateness and beauty. To them the circle was the perfect figure, the only line that had no beginning and no end; hence only if time were circular could it be what Plato called it, 'a moving image of eternity' Wherever the cyclical view of history appears in these cultures, some satisfying sense of its divine appropriateness is found tempering the element of pessimism." "The ancient Chinese, Babylonian, Hindu, Greek, Roman and most of the medieval thinkers," says Sorokin, "recognized this alternative [of progress] . . . but rejected it as less adequate than the conception of a movement of social process with changing direction and without perpetual tendency." Quoted in Fay, op. cit., p. 233. Cf. also the treatment of this subject in Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. with a concluding essay by James Luther Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 244-46; Robin George Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 20-29; Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), I, 8f. For classical references, see Plato, Timaeus, lines 37-38, Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937); and Aristotle, Physics, Bk. iv, Basic Works, ed. and trans. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). Plato is inconsistent. In the Laws and the Timaeus, civilization is desirable, evidence of advance. In the Politicus, civilization is a calamity.

¹⁵Cf. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, trans. and ed. H. A. J. Munro (London: G. Bell, 1913), v, lines 1452-57: "Little by little the passage of time brings one thing after another into our view, and reason lifts it . . . [to] the highest point, [but] . . . mankind ever toils vainly . . . amidst continuous strife in a world that will ultimately and naturally disintegrate."

¹⁶Baillie, op. cit., pp. 22-38, discusses in particular one of the best contemporary expressions of Lucretius--that of Vere Gordon Childe (Man Makes Himself [London: Watts & Co., 1936], and What Happened in History [Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1943]) who sets forth the Lucretian doctrine that "History . . . [is] a continuation of natural history," (What Happened in History, op. cit., p. 7) and that "it is impossible to deny the reality . . . cultural progress." (What Happened in History, op. cit., p. xvi.) But like Lucretius, Childe has in mind material culture only. Concerning "spiritual" progress, Childe appears to agree with Lucretius that it is to be found in the "progressive" elimination of religion: "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum--To so much which is evil could religion prompt men," (De Rerum Natura, op. cit., p. 101). Cf. Childe, Man Makes Himself, op. cit., p. 236: "The pursuit of the vain hopes and illusory short cuts suggested by magic and religion . . . deterred man from the harder road to the control of Nature by [scientific] understanding." Tillich has demonstrated with considerable erudition, however, that modern naturalistic theories of history are unable to establish a meaningful destiny for man. Naturalistic theories are essentially "non-historical." They cannot provide ontological anchorage for meaning or value. (Tillich, op. cit., pp. 19, 32, 43, 47, 76, 119, 135, 163, 175, 209, 216, 288, 295, 299ff., and 306.)

¹⁷Baillie, op. cit., pp. 44ff. Cf. extensive studies in Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book Co., 1937-41), II, Chap. X.

¹⁸Hildebrand, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁹Cf. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), p. 125: "The ethical use of 'good' is . . . a purely emotive use. When so used the word stands for nothing whatever." Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1946), p. 107; C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 11; and Moritz Schlick, Problems of Ethics, trans. David Rynin (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939), p. 28. For an analysis of problems posed by positivist

theories of values as applied to social theory, see William L. Kalb, "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: The Growth of a Moral Dilemma," Social Forces, XXXI (May, 1953), 305-11. Kalb argues that by denying ontic status to values, positivism introduces this dilemma in social theory: The functional theory of religion views religion as a sort of social cement whose values become social values. If values are illusory, the cement is non-existent. To urge acceptance of what is therefore in reality illusory is to deprive people of the very knowledge which is the sine qua non of human dignity for the positivist. Other studies of the consequences of the relativization of values may be found in the various works of Jacques Maritain. For the destructive implications of the absolute relativization of values in the realm of political and legal theory see John H. Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950), Chap. IX.

²⁰Cf. Baillie, op. cit., p. 52: "The secret of salvation lay in what the Stoics called . . . 'flight from the world of sense to pure being.'" Baillie's analysis of the Greek and Roman world-view may be found in Chap. II, op. cit. Cf. also Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. by R. Ashley Andra and Cloudeley Brereton with the assistance of W. H. Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 210: "Action is a weakening of contemplation," according to Plotinus, Enneads III, viii, 4, quoted in Bergson who thereupon comments that Plotinus "remains faithful to Greek intellectualism, he even sums it up in a striking formula." (Ibid.)

²¹Karl Marx observed that "the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind." Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, trans. and rev. Ernst Untermann (4th ed. rev.; C. H. Kerr Co., 1906), preface.

²²Cf. Baillie; op. cit., pp. 56ff.; Collingwood, op. cit., p. 52; H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 28f.; Albert Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, trans. Johanna Powers (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 28; Albert Schweitzer, "The Conception of the Kingdom of God in the Transformation of Eschatology," epilogue in E. N. Mozley, The Theology of Albert Schweitzer for Christian Inquirers (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951).

²³Karl Löwith, Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 221.

²⁴From Augustine, Pascal took the idea that mankind was "the whole sequence of human beings, throughout the whole course of the ages, as the same man living and learning something all the time." *Pensées*, quoted in Baillie, *op. cit.*, p. 3. "During the whole course of modern culture," writes Tillich, "philosophy maintained the belief in providence. It did not call it 'providence,' it called it 'pre-established harmony' or 'law of progress and perfectability.'" (*The Protestant Era*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.) Cf. Hughes, *op. cit.*, pp. 28f.; Hildebrand, *op. cit.*, p. 184 (re Fontenelle), p. 15 (re Turgot), and pp. 321-28 (re Condorcet); Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 110 (re Fontenelle); and Fay, *loc. cit.*

²⁵Immanuel Kant, *Principles of Politics*, trans. and ed. W. Hastie (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Pub., 1891), pp. 1-29, and 66f. Cf. Kant, *The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-Political Plan*, trans. T. DeQuincy (Hanover, 1927), *passim*. For a discussion see Baillie, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-21.

²⁶In a profound analysis of the rise of historical determinism in general and the philosophy of history of Hegel in particular, Schweitzer observes: "In Hegel's philosophy the connection between ethics and belief in progress, on which the spiritual energy of modern times has always rested, is broken, and with the separation both are ruined." *The Philosophy of Civilization*, Part II, *Civilization and Ethics*, *op. cit.*, p. 219. Schweitzer believes that Hegel is largely responsible for the bankruptcy of the modern idea of progress. Cf. his "Religion and Modern Civilization," *The Christian Century*, LI (1934), 1483f. and 1519-21. Cf. also Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 378: "There is something inexpressibly brutal in the dogma of necessary universal progress, which is simply the old dogma that this is the best of all possible worlds in a temporal form. . . . This glorification of the historical actual . . . prevents us from seeing all the finer possibilities, hopes and aspiration, at the expense of which the triumph of the actual is frequently purchased." Cf. also a similar view of Berdyaev's discussed in O. F. Clarke, *Introduction to Berdyaev* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1950); and in Baillie, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-30.

²⁷The significance of the idea of the Kingdom of God in the development of the Idea of Progress is carefully examined by Schweitzer in "The Conception," Mozley, *loc. cit.* For Augustine, man covered a fixed course in time. There is a distinct event as beginning and a distinct event as end. Christ is the central event of history. Augustine's analogy of mankind progressing as a single person to an end in Judgment could be transformed to a doctrine of simple progress

in time. Hildebrand says that "in the seventeenth century this analogy became fundamental to the formulation of the modern idea of progress." (Op. cit., p. 10.)

²⁸Schiller is said to have discovered this idea in medieval thought. For an incisive critique of the idea of the self-redemptive nature of history, see Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, loc. cit.; and Faith and History, loc. cit.

²⁹For a comprehensive and generally erudite study of "psychological" approaches to history and social theory see Pitirim A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York: Harper Bros., 1928), Chaps. XI, XII, and XIII. Sorokin believes that psychological theories constitute a variation of animism and in general fail to bridge the gap between "psychic" and material or physiological forces through which human activity must take place. He concludes, therefore, that they inhibit causal analysis of phenomena in the usual scientific sense. However, causality in a prescriptive sense is itself an anthropomorphic or animistic notion. In the descriptive sense, however, the idea of causality does not rule out psychic factors, for these become related phenomena as are all phenomena. Law becomes merely a description of recurrences, regularities, or patterns, and cause a symbol of significant relationship. On this basis, psychological studies are not as invalid as Sorokin appears to believe them to be.

CHAPTER

THE PILGRIMAGE OF ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

Toynbee's life and thought are symbolic of the crisis in Western thought: His pilgrimage from Wilsonian idealism to the mystic extravaganza of the tenth volume of his Study is symptomatic of the change in the Zeitgeist of the West. His story is the story of modern man's quest for salvation. It is the story of the profound preoccupation of many of the best minds of our age. His struggle is the struggle of Western man awakened to a tragic sense of history, a "struggle by his subconscious Magian self to overcome the Hellenic education imposed on his conscious English self."¹

In 1912, Toynbee was a thoroughgoing liberal, steadfast in a humanist faith inculcated by what he himself later described as a "post-Renaissance classical and humanist education." He was a specialist in Hellenic history. He accepted the liberal belief in progress, a progress achieved through the instrumentality of democratic nationalism. He shared most of the nobler sentiments of this nationalism. He spoke of the nation state as "the most magnificent . . . social achievement in existence." He was proud of the beneficent civilization of the West. He believed that it

should be carried to the uttermost ends of the earth. He defended the idea of the basic unity of human culture. Civilization was an evolutionary heritage of the entire human race.² In almost every respect he shared the attitudes of a confident and unskeptical Victorian era. This was to be expected, for Toynbee was an Englishman born in 1889, an Englishman who had received an education in the Greek and Latin classics at Winchester and at Balliol College and had absorbed the glory of British prestige at its zenith.

In 1912, however, Toynbee became fascinated with contemporary problems and their parallels in the past.³ While viewing the ruins of Sparta from the citadel of Mistra in Laconia, he experienced a "horrifying sense of sin manifest in the conduct of human affairs" and wondered prophetically whether "man's most damning vice was his brutality or his irrationality." This traumatic experience profoundly altered the nature and course of his thought. Toynbee was ushered into the "age of anxiety."

This was in 1912. In 1915, he was assigned to Turkish Affairs in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office. As public servant he was assigned for three or four years to a study of atrocities.⁴ For a sensitive soul like Toynbee's, this research was sufficient to erase any complacent illusions he harbored concerning the advance of human morality. He became interested in contemporary problems on a vast scale. Not only history and international affairs commanded his attention, but religion, depth psychology, and a host of other

subjects came under his scrutiny. From his study of contemporary events and depth psychology in particular he concluded that,

atrocities seem to be outbreaks of bestiality normally "suppressed" in human beings but almost automatically stimulated under certain conditions.⁵

These findings shook his confidence in nationalism and liberalism. He became convinced that a high correlation exists between the Westernization of peoples, with its corollary phenomenon of nationalism, and the incidence of atrocities.⁶

During World War I, Toynbee began to sense significant parallels between the nationalistic "war to end all wars" and the disastrous Peloponnesian and Hannibalic Wars of an earlier civilization.⁷ By 1918, he abandoned the popular doctrine of the unity of civilization for historical pluralism. He could no longer accept the popular belief in a succession of ages: Paleolithic, Neolithic, Chalcolithic, Copper, Bronze, Iron, and Machine. For him, this theory represented the patronizing and provincial outlook of a contemporary scholarship which entertained an exaggerated view of the importance of material culture. He argued that,

it is a mere accident of no scientific significance that the material tools which Man has made for himself should have a greater capacity to survive . . . than Man's psychic artifacts [sic].⁸

Man's mental apparatus is more significant than the material apparatus which happens to be at his command, Toynbee concluded. The invention of language, for example, is vastly

more significant than the invention of radio.

The homo faber criterion fails to impress Toynbee. He suspects that it reflects a prejudice arising from the influence of the spectacular material achievements of post-Renaissance Western man. It reaches its reductio ad absurdum, he believes, in application to the highly developed civilizations of the Americas. The Mayan civilization, for example, never left the "Stone Age" in material technique, yet it achieved marked excellence in astronomy and in the invention of the calendar.⁹ Toynbee finds evidence for the theory of the unity of civilization inconclusive:

In the history of Man's attempt at Civilization, there has never been any society whose progress in Civilization has gone so far that, in times of revolution or war, its members could be relied upon not to commit atrocities.¹⁰

In 1921, nine years after his traumatic experience at the site of Sparta, Toynbee outlined the main themes of his philosophy of history. During the brief period he was war correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, thirteen parts of the projected Study were formulated. By this time, Toynbee had already identified most of his civilizations. In a lecture entitled "The Tragedy of Greece," delivered at Oxford in 1920, he spoke of the "morphology of civilizations," and he began to interpret history in terms of social entities like "universal religion" and "internal proletariat."¹¹ He spoke of the latter as the chrysalis of an "affiliated civilization." He also spoke of the possibility of the new world religion--Bahai--emerging from the encounter between

Islam and the West as the chrysalis for a new civilization.¹² His experience in the Greco-Turkish War convinced him that "the real entities of human geography . . . are cultural and . . . [should be] called civilizations."¹³

During the summer of 1920, he read Spengler and wondered whether his "whole [embryonic] inquiry had been disposed of by Spengler before even the questions, not to speak of the answers, had fully taken shape."¹⁴ But he reached radically different conclusions. While he shared Spengler's tragic sense of history, he returned to the Hebraic-Christian vision of God as the foundation of the Universe. Spengler, on the other hand, expressed the poetic defiance of a skeptic for whom history was a profound and impenetrable mystery--a mere symbol of an essentially inscrutable Reality.

By 1922, Toynbee had formulated the main outlines of his monumental Study, and in 1927, after two years as Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, he began to gather his data. Notes for all ten volumes were prepared between June, 1927 and June, 1929.¹⁵

By 1939, when six volumes of the Study had been published, Toynbee had moved from the liberal-humanist outlook of his earlier period to a frank acceptance of the Christian view of life and history.¹⁶

World War II interrupted and profoundly influenced Toynbee's thought. During the period of 1939 to 1946, he served as Director of the Research Department of the Foreign Office. At the end of the war, he received the aid of the

Royal Institute, of the Council on Foreign Relations, of the Rockefeller Foundation, and of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton toward the completion of the remaining volumes of his Study.

Significant changes were effected, however, when, in 1946, Toynbee returned to his labors on the Study. Parts VII, IX, XI, and XII were radically altered in keeping with new findings. These particular parts dealt with his study of Universal Churches, of Contacts Between Civilizations in Space (Encounters Between Contemporaries), of Law and Freedom in History, and of The Prospects of Western Civilization.

These changes were related in part to the fact that by 1945, Toynbee had moved from orthodox Christianity--much to the embarrassment and chagrin of both admirers and tormentors--to a "trans-Christian" philosophy of history reflecting the insights of Vendanta Hinduism as well as those of Augustinian Christianity. Indeed, Toynbee began to refer to himself as "a Symmachan-minded disciple of C. G. Jung" and did not hesitate to be frankly critical of Orthodox Christian ideas.¹⁷ He said, for example, that he stood with "Symmachus as against St. Ambrose, with Mangu as against William of Rubrck, and with Radhakrishnan as against Karl Adam."¹⁸ His pilgrimage was reaching its destination. The quest that had begun in 1912 and had had for its goal the mystic vision of life and history sub specie aeternitatis was about to be consummated.

When completed, the ten volumes comprised over 3,150,000

words. Toynbee's claim to fame, however, is rooted in his message rather than in the sheer weight of his erudition. An eleventh volume prepared in collaboration with Professor Edward D. Myers is to appear shortly as is also a Retractationes prepared with the assistance of Mrs. Toynbee, the former Veronica M. Boulter. The eleventh volume will comprise a geographical gazetteer and consolidated index.

Throughout the ten volumes of the Study, Toynbee develops his early conviction that "the most tremendous of all the lessons of History [is] the [discovery of the] divine irony in human affairs."¹⁹ Yet Toynbee is not--as is often charged--a "prophet of doom overcome by the imagination of disaster," nor does he share Spengler's conviction that "the history of humanity has no meaning whatsoever," or the agnosticism of Schweitzer who can discover no grounds for meaning in the facts of history.²⁰ Instead, Toynbee believes that,

life on our . . . planet, [is] moving evolutionarily in a five-dimensional frame of Life-Time-Space; and . . . human souls, raised to a sixth dimension by the gift of the Spirit [are] moving, through a fateful exercise of their spiritual freedom, either towards their Creator or away from Him.²¹

History, he believes, is a vision of God's creation on the move from its source in God toward God its goal. History is not a venture into nothingness, a story "full of sound and fury signifying nothing." Behind its apparent chaos lies a meaning which reveals itself to those sincere souls who seek for it. History, says Toynbee,

is a vision, dim and partial, yet true to reality as far as it [goes]--of God revealing himself in action in souls that are sincerely seeking Him.²²

With the Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung, Toynbee believes that there is "a purposiveness out-reaching human ends [which] is the life-giving secret for man."²³ That the universe, man's origin and man's destiny, is the outcome of blind chance is--in the face of what Toynbee discovers--untenable. Chance, Toynbee asserts, explains nothing:

Chance is . . . a negative and therefore necessarily a relative [concept], and . . . to see in Chance an ultimate explanation of any phenomenon would be as naïve an error as to mistake a sign-post for the goal to which it pointed.²⁴

To speak of chance is to affirm absence of known pattern. To speak of cause by chance says nothing about cause; it merely indicates what was not a cause. To see cause in chance is to see the absence of cause. But absence cannot be seen. If we fail to detect a pattern we may deny the pattern; but we cannot see the absence of that pattern, for that is negative. We can only see the positive.²⁵

The obscurity of the meaning of history, Toynbee believes, should not be allowed to discourage us from seeking partial insight. For Toynbee, therefore, the problem of history involves religious dimensions, and because of this, it must employ as legitimate tools of understanding the means of sympathetic insight and poetic imagination.

Goethe once complained that there were few men who possessed the "imagination for the truth of reality." "Most

prefer," he lamented,

strange countries and circumstances of which they know nothing, and by which their imagination may be cultivated. . . . Then there are those who cling altogether to reality, and, as they . . . [lack] the poetic spirit are too severe in their requisitions.²⁶

"The great historians," suggests Ernst Cassirer,

avoid both [these] extremes. They are empiricists . . . but they do not lack the "poetic spirit." It is their keen sense for the empirical reality of [particular] things combined with their free gift of [poetic] imagination upon which the true historical synthesis . . . depends.²⁷

In the attempt to penetrate the formidable array of facts at his command, Toynbee seeks the aid of Goethe's Urphänomen.

His data possess a qualified empirical reality. His historiography is cautiously objectivistic, but he warns that,

The sorting out of facts is essentially one faculty of the Soul. When we think about something, we are apt also to have feelings about it, and our impulse to express our feelings is still stronger than our impulse to express our thoughts. Feelings about History . . . have . . . been expressed in imaginative words in divers genres of literature . . . a lyrical genre, an epic genre, a narrational genre and a dramatic genre; and the feeling for the poetry in the facts of History has availed itself of all of these.²⁸

Thus Toynbee restates the sentiments of the Swiss cultural historian, Jacob Burckhardt, who wrote that "history is . . . in a large measure poetry."²⁹

It is important, therefore, to recognize that Toynbee's monumental Study is not narrative history as such but a work of art, "a provocative series of judgments masterfully compounded."³⁰ It is, he hopes, a profound vision of God at work in Man and in History, a feeling for the poetry

in the facts of history which becomes,

a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his path; . . .
a path [which] ascends from a feeling for the poetry
in [the facts of] History to a [mystical] partici-
pation in Man's fellowship with Man . . . to the
threshold of the saint's [mystical] communion with
God [Himself].³¹

Toynbee's answer to his own and modern man's quest for
significance is his discovery of,

the passage of History gently flowing through him in
a mighty current, and of his own life welling like a
wave in the flow of this vast tide.³²

His vision, therefore, reflects, in part, the conviction of
the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, who believed that,

the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment
of a contact . . . with the creative effort which
life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if
it is not God Himself.³³

To portray this feeling and this vision, Toynbee is
obliged to use the language of metaphor and myth. How else
he asks, is one to "convey the soul's obscure intuition of
the mysteries of Life?"³⁴ This language, however, deeply
disturbs Toynbee's less poetic colleagues. But it does not
dampen his amazing popularity. Eleven thousand Americans
gathered at the University of Minnesota in 1955 to hear
Toynbee speak on the relatively "unsuspenseful theme of
'The New Opportunity for Historians.'"³⁵ Many "want to have
at least a glimpse of the future, some wisdom, some prophecy,"
some guide.³⁶

The Western view of history has been seriously dis-
credited, Toynbee believes. It is a view which reflects
Western dominance since the failure of the Ottoman assault

on Vienna in 1683. It is a comforting view that the Western way of life is immortal. It began to ebb in 1914 and is today in retreat.³⁷ By exposing its bankruptcy, Toynbee brings to light the crisis that confronts Western thought. He "puts an end to . . . the Hegelian naiveté, that is to say, the idea of a [rational] development of linear history."³⁸ Like Karl Jaspers, he envisions the emergence of an era of genuine world history.³⁹ "In this [particular] regard," says the French historian, Jacques Madaule, Toynbee "has achieved a veritable Copernican revolution in the field of history."⁴⁰

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Toynbee grounds his Study of History in a profound view of the human psyche and its dynamics. He believes that the depths of the human psyche are linked in common community with Life as a whole and with God. There is for Toynbee, as there was for the American mystic, Rufus Jones, a vast realm of the subconscious which borders upon the infinite Life, rises out of it, and may receive incursions from it.⁴¹

This recognition by Toynbee of the crucial role of the dynamics of human personality--however speculative, poetic, or religious--is possibly Toynbee's major contribution. Through it, Toynbee is able to affirm the reality of freedom and to replace the drama of man's destiny in the workings of his psyche. He is also able to reaffirm confidence in the genuinely creative possibilities of man. Concerning this, he says:

We shall no longer make the scientific postulate of the Uniformity of Nature, which we rightly made so long as we were thinking of our problem in scientific terms, as a function of the play of inanimate forces. We shall be prepared now to recognize, a priori, that, even if we were exactly acquainted with all racial, environmental or other data that are capable of being formulated scientifically, we should not be able to predict the outcome of the interaction between the forces which these data represent. . . . [The] unknown quantity is the reaction of the actors to the ordeal when it actually comes, . . . Psychological momenta, which are inherently impossible to weigh and measure and therefore to estimate scientifically in advance, are the very forces which actually decide the issue when the encounter takes place. . . . [This leads us to the conviction] that the outcome of an encounter cannot be predicted and has no appearance of being predetermined, but arises, in the likeness of a new creation, out of the encounter itself.⁴²

The real continuity of history does not consist in the external forms of a civilization nor in the surface flow of events, but rather in the forces that are psychologically active in the depths of the people.⁴³

For Toynbee, these forces find vent in a dialectic of rhythms. Rhythms are basic to Toynbee's philosophy of history. They are expressed in Toynbee's hosts of word-pairs. From a poem of Robert Browning, for example, Toynbee appropriates the word-pair "challenge-and-response."⁴⁴ This best known of Toynbee's word-pairs is paralleled in the word-pair rhythms of "withdrawal-and-return," "rout-and-rally," "schism-and-palingenesia" and so on. For Toynbee, these rhythms are archetypal. They are recurrent themes. Without them, Toynbee believes, there would be no life, for rhythm is the basic form of life.

It is Toynbee's revival of religious historiography, however, that is unique. The most important fact about man, he says, are his religious concerns. But these are not the

particular concerns of orthodoxy. Toynbee's search transcends orthodoxy. His universal history attempts to restore that sense of religious ultimacy which Western rationalism destroyed.. His encounter with history is an existential encounter with Reality. It is a supremely religious experience. The failure of rationalism to grapple with the existential realities that confront the Human Psyche moved Toynbee--as it did Burckhardt--to shape historiography

on the idea that the dynamic of man's inner life, his beliefs and his passions, comprise the materials for the life and death of societies.⁴⁵

Yet Toynbee's preoccupation with religion is more than the mere reassertion of the reality of psychological momenta, existential realities, or the tragic sense of life. The creative potentiality of man, he says, is rooted in the nature of God Himself. God's law is the Law of Love and Perfect Liberty, and both share jurisdiction over human affairs. "God's love is the source of Man's [potential] freedom," he says. But Man's freedom is in varying degrees encumbered by the Laws of the Subconscious which animate him. This subconscious may spawn a monster as well as "Poetry and Prophecy."⁴⁶ Moreover, the drama which unfolds within the human psyche possesses profound historical significance, for,

"The Law of God" [which is Love and Perfect Liberty] reveals the regularity of a single constant aim pursued unwaveringly in the face of all obstacles and in response to all challenges by the intelligence and will of a personality. "Laws of Nature" [and the Subconscious, on the other hand,] display the regularity of a recurrent movement.⁴⁷

These recurrent movements of Nature are vain repetitions unless

"they are pictured as being the laws of Nature, the wheels that God has fitted to His own chariot."⁴⁸

The riddle of the relation between God's law and a human soul's freedom is the . . . most difficult, and the most crucial of all questions.⁴⁹

The answer is found, Toynbee believes, in the religious doctrine of the transfiguration in which man wills God's will with a will of his own. Transfiguration is the final destiny of man. It is as if God had reached or was in the process of reaching some pinnacle and was urging the creatures of his own making to realize their own potential natures even as God Himself was working out His own destiny. Thus the drama of Man's fate is "having daily and hourly to purchase and repurchase his right to Life and Freedom by perpetually responding to repeated challenges.

Nur der verdient sich Freiheit, wie das Leben,
Der Tglich sie erobern muss.⁵⁰

Man must create or die! His destiny is to become like the Creator Himself. His fate is to share the fate of his Creator. The drama of Life to which man is a party and with which his destiny is linked works itself out through the experience of learning by suffering. The successful denouement of the encounter of human personality with reality is realized through what Toynbee calls etherialization.⁵¹ Etherialization is the index of creative existence.

When Toynbee speaks of religion he means higher religion, that is, in the formal sense, Christianity, Mahāyāna Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. These are the religions which

emerge from the traumatic experiences of an internal proletariat in some particular civilization of the secondary order. They arise as the response of the "Human Psyche" to the challenge of social breakdown and the challenge of fundamental psychological needs. Toynbee says:

Each of the higher religions . . . [is] apt to lay stress on some particular aspect of God's relation to Man, of the individual soul's relation to the religious community, or of the religious community's relation to the political.⁵²

Toynbee believes that the history of Religion, particularly as it relates to that of the four higher religions and their diverse sects, can be explained within a Jungian understanding of the basic nature of the Human Psyche:

In the Human Psyche there are diverse faculties and attitudes that are, all alike, important in seeking vent. These are all to be found in every individual human being, but this in different combinations and different relative strengths [culturally determined] which display themselves in a variety of psychological types. There is not and cannot be, any psychological type in which all the psychological elements can have full play at the conscious level: in every type there are . . . some elements that are repressed in the Subconscious, and in every type the repressed elements seize . . . every opportunity of flooding back, unbidden, into Consciousness. . . . Each of the living higher religions, and each of their principal sects, had been attuned to some particular psychological type or subtype, and each religion was ever seeking . . . to achieve the impossible feat of ministering to the whole gamut of the Psyche's elemental needs for expression.

Therefore, Toynbee cautions:

Any existing higher religion. . . . [aspiring] to become the Universal Religion [is] doomed to disappointment. . . . The heavenly music . . . [can] be heard only in a symphony . . . [and] in harmony, in order . . . [that] every human being of every psychological type . . . [can] enter into communion with God.⁵³

The four higher religions . . . [are] four variations on a single theme. . . . If all the four components of this heavenly music of the spheres could be audible on Earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find himself listening not to a discord, but to a harmony.⁵⁴

For Toynbee, therefore, there is no exclusive revelation of Spiritual Truth:

Any such claim is an error which is . . . a sin. In claiming to possess a monopoly of the Divine Light, a church . . . [is] guilty of hubris. In denying that other religions may be God's chosen and sufficient channels for revealing Himself to some human souls it seems to me to be guilty of blasphemy.⁵⁵

"The diversity of the higher religions," he continues, "is a necessary corollary of the diversity of the Human Psyche."

A Symmachan-minded disciple of C. G. Jung . . . would hold that if the revelation of the One True God is to be accessible to all men, it has to be diffracted.⁵⁶

And if the Law of God is Love, God must favor no individual or group over another. He must provide the requisite paths by which the Human Psyche in its diverse character may find its way to God.

Does this mean that Toynbee's pilgrimage ends in the belief that there must be a unification of the higher religions or that Christianity is not superior in some sense to other higher religions? Toynbee does not say this, nor does he imply it. The inherent nature of man and of society rules out the possibility of one Higher Religion, for this could be realized only in a community of Saints--individuals who have become Transfigured. Hence unity must be confined to a Kingdom of Heaven. Toynbee invokes the orthodox

formula: Man cannot become what God wills him to be unless he, that is, Man, wills God's will with a will of his own. But to will God's will as the will of his own would imply man's inability to commit sin; it would destroy his freedom as well as his humanity--unless there occurred a universal Transfiguration so that all men would freely will God's will with a will of their own.⁵⁷ This, Toynbee believes, does not appear to be possible. Certainly history does not suggest its likelihood. Because of the nature of the Human Psyche, man must struggle up his own particular Jacob's ladder to his own particular salvation. No single path suffices for all men.

Toynbee sees superior elements in Christianity. He attempts to establish them by an appeal to psychology. Christianity, he says, stresses the Feeling function ("Faculty" in Toynbee) of the four polar functions of the human psyche described by Jung.⁵⁸ The Feeling function does not have for Jung the unfortunate connotation of the English word; it is more accurately termed the evaluative function. Over against the Thinking, the Sensation, and the Intuition functions, Feeling is, for Toynbee, the superior avenue to communion with God. It plays the music of Love. It is also the function stressed by the Mahāyāna with its Bodhisattvas, and Shīah Islam.

[The] affinity [is] conspicuously close . . . between Christianity and the Mahāyāna which shares the same vision of God as a self-sacrificing saviour.⁵⁹

Hinduism's emphasis upon the Thinking function handicaps it in the introverted sphere of religion. But Hinduism has a compensating contribution which outweighs its negative aspects by its emphasis upon spontaneous charity toward all revelations--past, present, and future. This, Toynbee believes, must become "the first spiritual requirement in an age in which the whole of Mankind . . . [may be] united . . . by Western technology."⁶⁰ The spiritual union of mankind is the requisite for survival, according to Toynbee, and it is this vision which is Hinduism's major contribution.

Toynbee is convinced that each of the higher religions needs reorientation at the hands of the other three. He shares Radakrishnan's conviction that,

the West is passing through a new Renaissance due to the sudden entry into its consciousness of a whole new world of ideas [of] . . . Asia with which India is linked up. For the first time in the history of mankind, the consciousness of the unity of the world has dawned on us. Whether we like it or not, East and West have come together and can no more part.⁶¹

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Toynbee's reviewers and critics confront the reader with a veritable pot pourri of critiques ranging from the profound to the jejune. The superficiality of some generalizations about Toynbee suggests a tendency to prejudge him or to leap to unwarranted conclusions. A particularly worthwhile critique from the pen of Lewis Mumford reminds us that,

the glory of Toynbee's work--a glory that no criticism, however radical, can diminish--is that his is perhaps the first mind that has done something like justice to [the] complexity [of human history] and [its] mystery.

As master of universal history, Toynbee "breaks with many of the idola of supposedly scientific and objective thought."

"No book that deals with human affairs," Mumford continues,

has been more free from the blatant parochialisms of our age and our civilization: the obsessions of nationalism, the exaltation of Hellenic and later European civilization at the expense of nineteen other significant societies, our excessive pride in material conquests and mechanical productivity, our naïve submission to the one-eyed methodology of the physical sciences and "objective" [positivistic] scholarship; the bias of narrow specialism and egocentricity, the notion that our age is the climax of human existence and that its ephemeral values are eternal ones.⁶³

"If our world civilization survives," concludes Mumford,

"A Study of History will stand out as a landmark, perhaps even a turning point."⁶⁴

Notwithstanding his otherwise serious objections to Toynbee, Mumford continues his praise--which is more than polite--by characterizing Toynbee as honest, sincere, saintly--"witness his judgment on the consistently brutal ways of the English-speaking peoples in dealing with native populations," his affirmation of the essential dignity of human life, the importance of history, and his recognition that "a life that does not go into action is a failure." Mumford also praises Toynbee for exposing the rationalist illusion that religion is a primitive, pre-scientific superstition--hardly worthy of serious scholarly attention. He believes that Toynbee has restored the status of mythology, and has challenged the imaginative powers of contemporary scholarship.⁶⁵

Toynbee's pilgrimage has led him beyond the vision

of orthodox Christianity and the purview of contemporary scholarship. His genius does not lie in the accuracy of his particular pronouncements but in the timeliness, the clarity, and the profundity of his vision.

St. Augustine articulated the spirit of the medieval world--the world that gave birth to Western civilization. Machiavelli gave expression to the spirit that made this civilization supreme in the world. Toynbee gives voice to the new spirit of the emerging world community. He does not say that the transition to world community will be painless, for it is a great revolution in the life of man. But he points to world community as the alternative to annihilation--an annihilation which he does not believe modern man will choose.⁶⁶

CHAPTER II

Footnotes

¹F. H. Underhill, "The Toynbee of the 1950's," Canadian Historical Review, XXXVI (September, 1955), 234.

²Arnold J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1915), p. 481, et passim; Greek Policy Since 1882 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914), passim; The New Europe (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1916), passim.

³Arnold J. Toynbee, foreword, A Bibliography of the Works in English of Arnold Toynbee 1910-1954, Monica Popper (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955), p. iii.

⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities, the Murder of a Nation (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915); The Belgian Deportations (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917); The Destruction of Poland (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916); The German Terror in Belgium (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917); The German Terror in France (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917); The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917); et. al.

⁵Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (2d ed.; London: Constable & Co., 1923), p. 262.

⁶Ibid., p. 16.

⁷Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey (London: Ernest Benn, 1926), p. 3.

⁸Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 156. Toynbee further observes that "this survival of the [overweening] misconception of 'the Unity of History' is to be explained by the persistence of three underlying misconceptions: the ego-centric illusion, the catchword of 'the Unchanging East,' and the misconception of growth as a movement in a straight line [instead of rhythms]." (Ibid., p. 157.) The periodizations "Ancient," "Medieval," and "Modern" are strictly provincial concomitants of the idea of progress which developed in the early "Modern" period. Concerning this see Gustaf J. Renier, History, Its Purpose and Method (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 57: "The division into ancient, medieval, and

modern history gained currency as a result of the advocacy of Christopher Cellarius of Keller (1634-1701) of the University of Halle. He did not invent these terms which were first used by a scholar belonging to the Low Countries, Rausin, of Liège, in his book Leodium, published in 1639."

⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 158, 162.
Cf. J. L. Myers, The Cambridge Ancient History (2d ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 1925), I, 1f.

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 129.

¹¹Arnold J. Toynbee, "History," The Legacy of Greece, ed. by R. W. Livingstone (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 295ff. This essay was published separately as Arnold J. Toynbee, The Tragedy of Greece (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921).

¹²Toynbee, The Western Question, op. cit., pp. 12ff., 22f., 230ff., and 268.

¹³Ibid., p. 334.

¹⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 9f.

¹⁵Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., part vii.

¹⁶For an excellent study of the development of Toynbee's thought, see James Hastings Nichols, "Religion in Toynbee's History," Journal of Religion, XXVIII (April, 1948), 99-119.

¹⁷Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 238. Cf. p. 502 and VII, 443.

¹⁸Ibid. In addition to Toynbee's ecumenical pronouncements in Vols. VII and X, see also "I Agree With a Pagan" in This I Believe, ed. Raymond G. Swing (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954), pp. 150f. in which Toynbee endorses pagan philosopher Symmachus's plea for toleration.

¹⁹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 235.

²⁰Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), II, 44.

Cf. Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955), Chap. III; and Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization: Part I, The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization, trans. C. T. Campion (1st. American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 41: "We find nothing but discouragement for our task. Anyone who finds history speaking optimistically lends her a language which is not her own."

²¹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 2.

²²Ibid., p. 1.

²³Carl G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (Harvest Book ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1933), p. 163.

²⁴Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 378.

²⁵Ibid. Cf. A Study, V, op. cit., 419-21; VI, op. cit. 544, n. 3; and Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911), pp. 230-60.

²⁶Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Goethe to Eckermann, December 25, 1825," Conversations of Goethe With Eckermann and Soret, trans. John Oxenford (London: 1874), p. 162. The phrase was "eine Phantasie für die Wahrheit des Realen."

²⁷Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Anchor ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1953), p. 258.

²⁸Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 113.

²⁹Baseler Jahrbucher (1910), pp. 109f. quoted after Karl Jarl, Jakob Burckhardt als Geschichtsphilosoph (Basle, 1918) in Cassirer, op. cit., p. 257.

³⁰Frederick L. Schuman, "Paradoxes of Dr. Toynbee," Nation, CLXXIX (November, 1954), 405-407.

³¹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 129f.

³²Ibid., p. 139.

³³Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 209.

³⁴Toynbee, A Study, VIII, op. cit., 481.

³⁵Willmar L. Thorkelson, "Toynbee Speech Attracts 11,000," The Christian Century, LXXII (December, 1955), 1507.

³⁶Paul Tillich, "The God of History," Christianity and Crisis, May, 1944, p. 5.

³⁷Arnold J. Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I am Trying to Do," International Affairs, XXXI (January, 1955), 1-4.

³⁸Roger Caillois, "The Contribution of Arnold Toynbee," Diogenes, XIII (Spring, 1956), 4.

³⁹Cf. Jaspers' thesis that the dawn of "world history" following an era of "local histories" may have arrived. . Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

⁴⁰Jacques Madaule, "A Biological and Mystical Interpretation of History," trans. James H. Labadie, Diogenes, XIII (Spring, 1956), 30.

⁴¹Rufus Jones, Social Law in the Spiritual World (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Co., 1904).

⁴²Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 301.

⁴³Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (New York: The Julian Press, 1953), p. 17.

⁴⁴Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 231. Toynbee refers to the passage in "Master Hugues of Saxe Gotha":

O you may challenge them, not a response
Opt the church-saints on their rounds!

⁴⁵Progoff, op. cit., p. 35. For an excellent study see Richard Chase, "Toynbee: the Historian as Artist," American Scholar, XVI (July, 1947), 268-82.

⁴⁶Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 399. Concerning Toynbee's references to the laws governing the subconscious, see Vol. IX, op. cit., 336f., 377, 380f., 396, and 403-405.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 174.

⁴⁸Ibid. Cf. Vol. IV, op. cit., 34-38.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 219.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 306.

⁵¹For a detailed study of the idea of "etherialization," see Chap. VI of this dissertation, infra.

⁵²Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., p. 716.

⁵³Ibid., p. 734. For Toynbee's use of Jungian psychology in the study of religion, see pp. 555, 716, and 722-36. Tables III, VII, and VIII are also helpful. Cf. Carl G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. G. Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923), pp. 412-517; Frances Gillespy Wickes, The Inner World of Man (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), pp. 56-64; Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, trans. K. W. Bash (rev. ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), pp. 12-27.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 428, n. 2.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 443.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 528. Toynbee believes that "a proneness to sin is the spiritual price that Life . . . paid for becoming human, as mortality was the physical price that it paid for an organic evolution beyond the limitations of the amoeba." (Ibid.)

⁵⁸See note 56 supra.

⁵⁹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 425. Cf. p. 735.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 735.

⁶¹Sri Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (2d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 115. Cf. pp. 347ff.

⁶²Lewis Mumford, "Napoleon of Notting Hill," New Republic, CXXXI (November, 1954), 15.

⁶³Ibid., p. 17. There exists a strong reaction to what has been termed as "Toynbee's blasphemy against Western civilization" and particularly his dislike of nationalism. For Toynbee, the contemporary affection for nationalism constitutes a social affliction in the form of a demonic recrudescence of the Greek worship of Leviathan--the city-state now the nation-state. He severely condemns nationalism. "Man's corporate self-worship," he asserts, is "the more pernicious of two main lines of religious aberration: . . . The other type of idolatry [is the one] in which Nature . . . [is] substituted for God." (A Study, VII, op. cit., 766f.). Geyl's rejoinder is: "I feel an irrepressible urge to testify against this false witness and indeed to criticize and oppose [Toynbee's] system." (Pieter Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (April, 1955), 263.) Geyl believes that Toynbee conceals a spite against the West and its various nationalisms. "Toynbee sees Western civilization and its contemporaries . . . [as] 'vain repetitions of the heathen,'" he laments. (Ibid.) Cf. Pieter Geyl, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 69; and Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 411. Others are likewise deeply disturbed by Toynbee's anti-parochial and anti-nationalistic views. Douglass Jerrold, for example, speaks of The Lie About the West (London: Dent, 1954), and Professor Hudson asserts that "Toynbee surrenders the West." (Commentary, XV [May, 1953], 469-74.) Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban bitterly assails "The Toynbee Heresy." (An address delivered at the Israel Institute, Yeshiva University, New York, January 18, 1955.) In Toynbee, he charges: "we have an almost total negation of anything affirmative in the entire record [of Hebrew history]." (Ibid., p. 7.) Toynbee's view of Israel, he objects, stems from a negative conviction that Israel is a social "fossil," a "renaissance" of earlier creative effort. What Toynbee dislikes in Jewish nationalism, however, is what he dislikes in all forms of nationalism--Jewish or otherwise. Nationalism, Toynbee believes, is a social disease which triggers war and mass inhumanity to man. The recent victims of Hitlerian atrocities are now, he says, victimizing the Arab in the name of the false god of a recrudescence Jewish nationalism. Particularly odious to Toynbee is the Western "chosen people" complex which feeds on provincialism and fanaticism. Ambassador Eban's charge

that "never has the Hebrew tradition been discredited by any historian in terms of such profound disrespect" must therefore be taken as a partisan scream of anguish. Toynbee is as critical of English expressions of nationalism as he is of the Israeli.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 15. "In this age of specialized study," says Toynbee's colleague, British historian H. A. L. Fisher, "we are so easily tempted to become parochial in our outlook. It is refreshing to meet with an author who brings to the interpretation of universal history . . . a sensitive feeling for forms of civilization widely differing from his own." ("A Universal Historian," The 19th Century and After, CXVI [December, 1934], 673.) Other excellent analyses of Toynbee not already cited are: Lynn Thorndike, "Review of A Study of History," The Journal of Modern History, VII (September, 1935), 315-17; Edward Fliess, "Toynbee as Poet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (April, 1955), 275-80; Harris E. Harbison, "The Problem of the Christian Historian: A Critique of Arnold J. Toynbee," Theology Today, V (October, 1948), 388-405.

⁶⁵Mumford, "Napoleon of Notting Hill," op. cit., pp. 16ff.

⁶⁶This theme appears frequently in Toynbee. See particularly his recent address: "The New Opportunity for Historians," The Gideon Seymour Memorial Lecture for 1955, University of Minnesota, 1956. Unlike his precursors, however, Toynbee views history from within, from below, and from above. Augustine was a relatively poor historian who sought the meaning of history outside of history. Machiavelli revived the naturalistic pessimism of the classical world. Although a superior historian, he taught a tightly closed view of history. Toynbee, on the other hand, tries to reconcile the two. He tries to complete what Vico began in the seventeenth century. For an excellent comparative study of Toynbee, Machiavelli, and Augustine, see Harbison, op. cit. The similarity of Vico's and Toynbee's interpretations of history is also noted by H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 141.

CHAPTER III

TOYNBEE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY

In a presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1923, Edward Cheyney expressed the hope that historiography would discover the scientific "laws of history" and thereby bring history into line with the great advances of the natural scientists. Cheyney's hope characterized the general attitude of historians since 1850. During these years, many historians tried to apprentice history to the natural sciences. Their "fact-finding" objectivism did not pass unchallenged, however. By the mid-twentieth century, a romantic subjectivism had assumed the proportions of a full-scale revolt.¹

In the wake of this revolt is Arnold J. Toynbee. Toynbee calls for interpretive history in the meaning of Herodotus's historia.² Following Jacob Burckhardt, Toynbee insists that history is more than the prosaic recitation of facts.³ He believes that historiography should embrace interpretation as well as narration, and that history should provide instructive clues to the meaning of life. In this respect, Toynbee exemplifies the contemporary search for significance in life. "Seldom in history have men been as disturbed about history as we are today," writes Paul Tillich.

"We urgently want to have at least a glimpse of the future, some wisdom, some prophecy."⁴ "The destiny of mankind is involved in [this] issue about the nature of history," continues Toynbee. "We ought . . . to give far more time and far more serious and strenuous thought . . . [to this problem of] one's general ideas [about history]."⁵ Yet historiography has become the equivalent of research alone, and the gathering of facts an end in itself. Even John Dewey observed that,

piety to the past is not for its own sake nor for the sake of the past, but for the sake of a present so . . . enriched that it will create a better future.⁶

Confronting this demand for meaning is the obvious complexity of history. A discomforting suspicion persists that the facts of history may be so complex as to suggest and to support virtually any theory of history that may be advanced.⁷ Yet Toynbee does not allow this possibility to deter him from seeking a "dim and partial vision" of the forces at work in history because he believes that some insight is better than none at all and that practical guides to wisdom are desperately needed. But he is convinced that only a genuinely artistic creation can provide this vision, that unimaginative approaches to the problem will fail as they have in the past.⁸

Unfortunately Toynbee's historiography is best known through abusive evaluations by his critics. Toynbee himself is partly to blame because he has not defined his terms or his method with the precision demanded of his profession.

Like Plato, he refuses to give "a short and simple exposition of [his] philosophy in writing."⁹ He does not hesitate to explain what he is trying to do, but his historiography precludes the logic which his tormentors would impose upon him.¹⁰ It is therefore no wonder that he has aroused the indignation of his colleagues. Like the mystic, Toynbee assumes that those who understand need no explanation whereas those who do not will fail to profit from any amount of explanation. Hence Toynbee gives the appearance of unjustified license. Actually his methods and conclusions are much less presumptuous than they appear to be.

History may be approached in two general ways. First, there is the formal logic and epistemology of history, the systematic study of history as a narrative account--formal Geschichtsphilosophie as Bauer described it. The second is more nearly the French meaning of philosophie de l'histoire which in the narrower sense is the attempt to understand and to interpret the course of human events. The former deals with "methodology" or "historiography"--with what Charles Oman described as "the art of dealing on paper with past events." The latter is what has been customarily thought of as philosophy of history or universal history because of its more speculative nature. Actually both comprise the philosophy of history as such.¹¹

The Western terms "History," "Histoire," "Storia," and "Geschichte," are essentially ambiguous, argues Toynbee. They may refer to relatively subjective studies of history

or they may refer to relatively objective narration of human events on a time scale. Toynbee's monumental Study is history in the former sense.¹² It is not narrative but interpretive history. And because it is interpretive, argues Pieter Geyl, it is not history.¹³ The issue of the legitimacy of interpretive or philosophy of history is crucial. It must be examined thoroughly.

Philosophy of history has only recently commanded the grudging respect of the historian or social scientist. One reason is the sincere desire to escape the stigma of subjectivity. To accomplish this, generalizations have been scrupulously avoided. Opposition to generalization in any form is reflected in the entire field of historical sociology. Indeed this may account for the general decline of interest in this particular field since the turn of the century.¹⁴ The critical methods of contemporary social science discourage overt generalization in any form, and there is a reluctance on the part of the social scientist to accept moral responsibility for his findings. The desire to avoid generalizations--particularly those that involve value judgment--stems partly from a confidence that the scientific method and all that it implies is essentially self-correcting, and that it therefore transcends the inexactitudes of moral decision. Moreover, cultural relativism has encouraged a neglect of generalizations and value judgments. But social thinkers have never really escaped generalizations nor have they escaped value judgments. Even social scientists of the caliber of Franz

Boas, Robert Marett, Clark Wissler, Robert Lowie, Alexander Goldenweiser, Alfred Kroeber, Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead--to name but a few--have all made deliberate however cautious generalizations and have thereby engaged surreptitiously in the "philosophy" of history.¹⁵ Toynbee, to be sure, is one of the more ambitious and imaginative thinkers to enter the field of historical sociology. By yielding to the "mystical appeal of religion and legend," he has scandalized sociology from the standpoint of its purists. Yet it was an American sociologist Arthur Todd, who observed that,

the stream of history is no more vague than the stream of individual consciousness. Consciousness can be tested, measured, and compared. The history of human society should likewise yield to measurements of depth and composition, ebb and flow.¹⁶

The question, of course, is one of method.. How does Toynbee propose to deal with the depth and composition--the ebb and flow--of history?

Initially he must come to terms with three basic problems: (1) the objectivity of historical knowledge; (2) the relation of historical knowledge to science and myth; and (3) the practical significance of historical knowledge.¹⁷ Toynbee explicitly rejects both extreme objectivism and extreme subjectivism in his historical epistemology. Historical facts, he says, have a life of their own; they are discovered, but their discovery and elaboration is the effort of an involved or existentially concerned human mind whose practical search for significance takes for its point of

departure certain mythological elements. The relation of history to myth is therefore one of complementariness. Indeed, Toynbee's own thesis is a magnificent example of the employment of empirical data in the service of mythology. Toynbee has self-consciously sought to abstract the significant mythological meanings from the data which he has amassed.¹⁸ He believes that,

"History" grew out of Mythology, a primary intuitive form of apprehension and expression in which the Drama and the Novel likewise took their origin. In Mythology, the distinction between facts and fictions is left undrawn; and while "History" has differentiated itself from Mythology by making an effort to extract the facts, it has never succeeded in dispensing with fictitious elements altogether.¹⁹

In A Study of History, Toynbee proves nothing in the usual sense of the word. But he brings into focus intuitions of ultimate concern to man. Thus through his magnificent imagery, he is able to render intelligible an account of man.

In addition, Toynbee deliberately relates the insights of mythology to modern scientific attempts to explain the history of man. He shows, for example, that the scientific writer transforms the cosmic rhythms of mythology into the full dress of scientific symbols. Toynbee abstracts ideas from the verbal casings in which they are articulated and from which they must derive their measure of acceptance. He argues, like Mommsen, that history is better history if it is also a work of art, and he agrees with Croce that the writing of history is essentially an art. His imaginative insight makes it possible for him to see in Darwin's variation, for example, the Creative Spirit of God, and in Darwin's

natural selection, the Adversary. For Toynbee, the mythical beings who struggle for the mastery of human destiny are the clashing forces of the "Human Psyche." "We can [not] understand the genius of human creativity without the aid of [these] mythically conceived images," he says.²⁰ In the appeal to mythology for clues to the deepest mysteries of man, Toynbee reveals an unmistakable Romanticism. Yet "despite [his] verbal and conceptual excesses," writes H. Stuart Hughes,

the Romantic historian [such as Toynbee, is] on the track of most of the major innovations that we have learned to associate with our own time: the study of art forms as a key to the spirit of past ages, the theory of non-logical motivation, and the notion of relativism in judging moral and political behavior.²¹

Finally, for Toynbee, the practical significance of the study of history is its capacity to suggest guides for the future.

Toynbee entertains a profound dislike for mechanistic approaches to the study of man.²² His most severe criticism is directed at what he calls the apathetic fallacy--that is, the attempt to render impersonal the uniqueness of human personality. Not only does Toynbee detest mechanization of human phenomena, but he detests equally the imposition of provincial Western standards on history. The two master institutions of the West, he says, are Democracy and Industrialism.²³ The attempt to interpret history explicitly or implicitly in terms of these Western touchstones of value displays a lack of historical perspective. Western values possess no necessary ontological status or blessing of immortality. However significant they may be as human

achievements, they are nevertheless ephemeral. As a psychic epic of infinite dimensions, history knows nothing of the reassuring but fictional periodications of "Ancient," "Medieval," or "Modern." "This survival of the misconception of 'the Unity of History,'" he argues,

is to be explained by the persistence of three underlying misconceptions: the ego-centric illusion, the catchword of 'the Unchanging East,' and the misconception of growth as a movement in a straight line.²⁴

The rejection by Toynbee of the conventional Western view of history tempts his critics to associate him--too hastily--with Spengler. For Spengler the historical Weltaspekt of Civilization, that is Kulturen, or civilization in growth, is absolutely incommunicable.²⁵ Toynbee, on the other hand, speaks only of partial insularity. His civilizations maintain contact in time through renaissances as well as contact in space through physical contiguity and contemporaneity. There is not in Toynbee the absolute cultural relativism which places serious strictures on the plausibility of Spengler's theory.²⁶ Spengler's errors spring from an assumption that civilizations are tightly insulated organisms. For Toynbee, on the other hand, a psychic continuum links all mankind at the primordial level even as all men enjoy a monogenetic origin.²⁷ Spengler could not entertain a universally valid religion, science, or mathematics. His relativism and historicism is total and complete. History is the story of the individual destinies of isolated civilizations.

The controversy which rages about Toynbee's historiography far transcends attempts to identify him with Spengler. The charge is made, for example, that Toynbee's Study is a magnificent piece of imaginative literature, but that it is not history; nor is it sociology because of the "unscientific" method Toynbee employs. Professor Barnes argues, for example, that because of his "search for laws and trends in social development," Toynbee's efforts should be historical sociology rather than history, but since Toynbee ignores the methods and literature of sociology, he is obviously no sociologist.²⁸ The answer to this persistent objection to Toynbee is that,

piecemeal criticism by specialists . . . has thus far blinded us to the real character of A Study of History. In the first place, it is not a work of history [in the conventional sense]. . . . In the second place, it is, a fortiori, not a work of archaeology, sociology, philosophy, theology, or even all these combined.²⁹

It is, instead, a unique intellectual achievement in its own right.

Evaluations of Toynbee are highly contradictory. They suggest serious misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Idealist Collingwood, for example, describes Toynbee as a positivist whereas positivist Barnes views him as a mystic.³⁰ In view of Toynbee's method and the confusion it evokes, Gustaf Renier concludes that Toynbee's work must be "intellectually dangerous and totally false as a picture of the function of historical studies."³¹ Yet the error is not all Toynbee's. His categories, for example, are interpreted too literally. They should be viewed as ideal or heuristic

devices designed to penetrate human phenomena that would otherwise remain opaque. But they nevertheless disturb Toynbee's less imaginative critics; and ill-advised attempts to summarize Toynbee exaggerate their arbitrary nature. The simple fact is that few have fully understood Toynbee. Even Renier--who characterized the Study as intellectually dangerous--later confessed that he was "not competent to criticize Toynbee's philosophy of history."³²

Another common error is the tendency to permit the vastness of Toynbee's visionary hopes to discount his analysis of specific social and historical problems. Because Toynbee attempts a god-like view of history, it does not follow that all his specific analyses are necessarily invalid. Nor does Toynbee's religious interests necessarily add error to all that he says. Secular bias in many of his critics obscures many valuable insights and imposes on Toynbee a host of imagined difficulties.³³

The objection that Toynbee's work is not history stems not only from aversion to interpretive history but from confidence that facts alone comprise history and that the objectivity of these facts can be established as one might establish a natural law. Toynbee cautions, however, that,

"history" . . . does not really present the facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts in the lives of societies of this species [civilizations]. Besides presenting facts, it has recourse to fictions and it appeals to laws; and on the other hand there are certain facts which it leaves alone because they are not grist to its mill.³⁴

What are the facts ignored by contemporary historians, asks Toynbee. They are the facts concerning primitive [pre-historic] societies studied by anthropology. They are the facts related to the private lives of human beings--subconscious realities and emotional states.

The ideal of absolute historical objectivity is a useful fiction which the idealist-subjectivistic historians--rather than Toynbee--have called to question. "The reality of history," wrote Ernst Cassirer "is not a uniform sequence of events but the inner life of man."³⁵ And Collingwood adds that history is the mental reliving of the past by the historian. In rejecting positivist historiography, Collingwood said:

there is no such thing as empirical history, and there is no such thing as . . . scientific history. . . . An historical fact, once genuinely ascertained, grasped by the historian's re-enactment of the agent's thought in his own mind, is already explained.³⁶

Cycles or patterns, therefore, become functions of thought about history. They are not necessarily in history itself. The cyclical interpretation of history, for example, is but one of several possible patterns. It is a function of the limitation of historical knowledge itself.³⁷ Hence the interpretation of history--cyclical or linear--is a function of a particular common fund of knowledge or ignorance. It is therefore presentist, relative, and subjective. The realist-objectivist imagines that he discovers the facts or patterns of history, says the subjectivist. But his knowledge

of history and the assurances thereof possess no more certainty than Toynbee's. Possibly Toynbee may have relived history more fully, more empathetically.

To the idealist-subjectivist, on the other hand, Toynbee is a positivist because he believes that his facts and patterns possess a degree of objectivity. Toynbee believes that he is discovering an objectively real "God at work in Life and History." He believes that there are objective clues to objective facts in history.

Yet Toynbee recognizes that to gain access to reality, useful fictions or ideal categories must be imposed on data which mix fact and fiction, reality and myth. This is necessary in order to gain insight into what is taking place. Thus universal history is not merely another name for historiography, as Collingwood would have us believe, nor is objectivity in the study of history impossible. Toynbee does not agree with the idealist-subjectivists that the future can in no way be extrapolated from the present or the past. Although there is always the unique in human phenomena there is also the recurrent or persistent, he argues. Irrationality, for example--elements of the subconscious--persist. They are not eliminated by a growth of rationality. Subconscious elements in man account for regularities that reveal themselves on time spans exceeding the life span of a single individual. Moreover there are objective clues to these objective realities. Because the facts of history possess a degree of objective reality, they can be observed externally as well as articulated

internally and suggestive clues discovered. Re-enactment of events in the mind of the historian does not imply isolation from the realities without. We note, for example, that the present carries with it elements of the past. These are embedded in the structure of present events, the subconscious, even in the universe at large. Hence the assertion by Renier, for example, that "history cannot repeat itself. . . . The historian cannot prophesy" are strictures that Toynbee cannot accept in an absolute sense although--one must hasten to add--he does not view himself as a prophet.³⁸ Renier admits that,

the whole present . . . is a trace of the past. . . . What is the present? Is it not merely the meeting point between the past and future as, according to Montaigne, the Stoics proclaimed? Is it a line without thickness, a pure abstraction? Not entirely. The present is that portion of experienced time about which we have a feeling that it has not yet been absorbed into the past.³⁹

Skepticism in historiography is deceptive. Positivist-Realists are not skeptical about historical knowledge as such but about philosophy of history, about the meaning of history. Idealists and subjectivists, on the other hand, are generally skeptical about the objective facticity of historical knowledge, including interpretations thereof, but not about the philosophy of history as Croce, for example, developed it, nor about the pragmatic value of history for the contemporary situation as Dewey, for example, argued. Toynbee assumes a somewhat critical objectivism--an intermediate position between idealism and realism, subjectivism and objectivism. For him, there is objectivity with respect to certain aspects

of the facts and their interpretation. History is not meaningless, nor is it the subjective invention of mind. Yet myth and fiction are necessary if history is to be made intelligible or meaningful. Toynbee's historical epistemology may be illustrated as follows:

The above suggests that human experience is neither wholly conceptual nor non-conceptual.⁴⁰ Nor is human knowledge wholly fact or fiction. Mythology expresses more adequately the non-conceptual and fictional elements of human experience, history the factual and conceptual. A continuum, however, must be assumed, for these elements are never totally disjoined. Although history is the working of the mind of the historian, objective factual elements are not thereby eliminated. Nor are mythological elements eliminated by the conscious narrowing of attention to facts. Consequently the historian, Toynbee believes, must confront history in the context of the total

human situation.

In addition to the problem of objectivity, there is the problem of the nature of events themselves, and the generalizations that may be suggested by them. Toynbee believes that phenomena which are the grist of history are unique and therefore incomparable in some respects but nevertheless members of a class and therefore comparable in other respects. Relatively valid generalizations are not impossible because events are comparable as well as unique. With Freeman, he believes that,

to master analogies . . . to grasp the laws which regulate the essential likeness and not to be led away by points either of likeness or unlikeness which are merely incidental, is the true philosophy of history.⁴¹

Though relatively few in number as compared to primitive societies, societies that have left historical records also lend themselves to comparative study within limits.⁴² Toynbee argues that,

the facts encountered in the study of social life in civilizations are not unique intrinsically but only accidentally and provisionally, pending the multiplication of the data to a quantity suitable for the application of the technique in which laws are elucidated and formulated through the process of comparative study [as in the anthropological study of primitive societies]. In fine, the facts encountered in the study of social life in civilization are not incomparable essentially or a priori.⁴³

Toynbee's quarrel with historian Geyl issues partly from the latter's belief that the facts are too plentiful and therefore too complex with respect to civilized societies to yield reliable or intelligible generalizations. Toynbee, on

the other hand, argues that because of the relative scarcity of facts about civilizations, only tentative insights are possible. Yet, he continues, it is precisely this challenge of a limited knowledge about "man-in-process-of-civilization" to which the historian should respond. "Geyl, too, like Spengler and me, has a chart," he argues,

we all of us have one, whether we own up to it or not, and no chart is more than one man's shot at the truth. But surely, of those three the blank [of Geyl's] is the most useless and the most dangerous.⁴⁴

Geyl, Toynbee continues, is guilty of a serious misunderstanding of the nature of the operation of the human mind:

One cannot think without mental patterns. All historians are bound . . . to have general ideas about history. . . . Without ideas, they couldn't think a thought, speak a sentence or write a line. . . . Historians who genuinely believe they have no general ideas about history are . . . ignorant of the workings of their own minds. . . . To leave oneself . . . at the mercy of any fool ideas, if they happen to have taken possession of one's unconscious, is surely the height of intellectual irresponsibility.⁴⁵

The truth . . . is that the Human Intellect is so constituted as to be intrinsically incapable of ever thinking about anything at all except in terms of uniformities, recurrences, regularities, laws, rhythms, plot, and patterns.⁴⁶

Hence, Toynbee believes, it is the historian's responsibility--aside from the accumulation of facts--to examine and articulate his assumptions--implicit or explicit.

To do this he must come to grips with the problem of the recurrence and uniqueness of phenomena in history:

Overemphasis on recurrence in history may lead to either a mystical or a rationalistic interpretation, in which perhaps the Buddhist cycle or the Western scientific "law" is the key to understanding the

historical process. . . . [On the other hand] over-emphasis on the uniqueness of events in history may lead to one of many results: miraculous chronicle, a literalistic apocalypticism, crass predestination, or a theory of automatic linear progress.⁴⁷

Toynbee carefully avoids both mechanistic meaninglessness and unintelligible spontaneity. Thus he speaks for those aspects of human behavior subject to law--that is, regularity or pattern--and those aspects or conditions which are not. He recognizes that both the unique and the recurrent must be taken into account in any generalization. Both, he insists, are factors in the human field of action. They reveal themselves in the perennial problem of freedom vs. determinism, and since human freedom is a psychic emergent--an optimum psychic functioning of human personality--it is related to the unique, the unpredictable, and the creative. On the other hand, lower levels of psychic functioning--the more primitive patterns of behavior--in human personality exhibit recurrent elements, laws, or regularities which possess a degree of predictable uniformity and thereby give the appearance of being determined.

The laws of which Toynbee speaks are the observed patterns of regularity or recurrence which characterize the lower levels of human behavior in the human field of action. At these levels, the human field of action is more nearly that of the Subconscious Psyche or Organic Nature. It is important to note that Toynbee's laws are not prescriptive decrees of God, Nature, or a World Mechanism. They are

descriptive and relative. Toynbee cautions us that in using the term law we tend to transfer its prescriptive function in human society to the enigmatic workings of a mysterious universe and an equally mysterious human psyche. Were we to take this error seriously, freedom would vanish. Some form of determinism would be inevitable. Indeed, the failure to recognize this use by Toynbee of the term law has led some of his critics to the erroneous conclusion that Toynbee's philosophy of history is a form of spiritual determinism.⁴⁸

Transfer of the notion "law" from the human social context to the non-human realm of events led to the idea of the inexorability of the "law" or an omnipotent God of a machine-like Nature. This was encouraged by the predictability and control that could be ensured through the knowledge of these so-called "laws." Yet paradoxically the knowledge of these "laws" has by no means given Man the measure of control he has imagined should be possible.⁴⁹

For Toynbee, therefore, freedom for Man--the unique and creative aspects of his behavior--is to be found in the transfer of his field of action from the lower order of uniformity, conformity, and habit to the realm of creativity and freedom which, in its theoretical perfection, is the Law of God Himself. Law and Freedom in the ideal and ultimate sense prove, thereby, to be identical because Man's growth to Freedom through etherialization is the Law of God.

Toynbee's laws or patterns constitute a synthesis of the detection of recurrent aspects of human phenomena and the subjective sense-making function of ego-consciousness. In short, both objective and subjective elements enter the formulation of his laws and patterns. As "human psyche," the

historian joins life within to life without. He is part of his own environment and therefore in some sense runs the same "track" as his world. Insofar as he can get on this "track" he is "in the world" in the realistic sense. But the "wheels" that roll on the track are the unique functionings of the elements of his own psyche. These functionings are crucial, and the patterns they take are by no means uniform. Thus the tracks determine the movement of the "cart" no more or no less than the "cart" determines the nature of the tracks on which it must make its way..

The patterns found by the historian are not solely wishful thinking. Denial by what Toynbee calls the "post-Bossuet historians" of patterns in history reflects an intellectual dishonesty of serious consequences. These "post-Christian antinomian 'nonsense' historians," Toynbee says, lack the essential honesty of bishops Bossuet and Augustine who clearly articulated their patterns. Instead they employ patterns like the concept of "Europe" with impunity. The assumption of progress, for example, is but "the classical Jewish-Christian-Muslim [chosen people] pattern thinly disguised in secular modern dress."⁵⁰ According to Toynbee, patterns in history are psychic phenomena. They are related to the level of human psychic functioning. This is because the "human psyche" functions within a continuum of a field of action which embraces both "Laws of Inanimate Physical Nature" and the "Law of God" or "Freedom" itself.⁵¹ The Law of God, says Toynbee,

reveals the regularity of a single constant aim pursued unwaveringly, in the face of all obstacles and in response to all challenges, by the intelligence and will of a personality. "Laws of Nature" display the regularity of a recurrent movement. . . . [This is a "vain repetition" unless] they are pictured as being the laws of Nature, the wheels that God has fitted to His own chariot.⁵²

The argument of the Western antinomian historian against generalization and patterns is encouraged, says Toynbee, by a confusion arising from an identification of society during growth with its widespread differentiation of culture with the character of history in toto. Variety--uniqueness--characterizes societies in growth whereas uniformities--patterns--are more evident during disintegration when "Laws of Nature" and the "Laws of the Subconscious" tend to dominate human behavior. Influenced by belief in the essential Unity of Civilization, antinomian Western historians centered attention on the phenomena of growth and therefore wrote history in terms of the advance of Civilization as the touchstone of value.

Reluctance to seek out the patterns of history is also the outcome of a particular development in the history of historiography itself. Toynbee explains this development as follows: The historian deals with unique historical events. As unique events, these would include the miracles of the Christian tradition. But the new "post-Christian rationalist" historian did not wish to embarrass his scientific historiography with these questionable phenomena. He therefore shied away from the unique toward phenomena from which dependable

scientific laws could be deduced--particularly those that would support the idea of progress. For a time, progress became the guiding principle of historiography as well as of the social sciences. The assumption was made, Professor Teggart says,

that the scientific study of change must have for its aim the determination of the "natural" or normal course of development of social groups, abstractions being made from the "accidental" interferences or hindrances occasioned by historical "events". . . . [which were] irrelevant for the purposes of scientific inquiry in the investigation of "progress."⁵³

In short, nothing could make sense if it could not be framed in terms of Western values.

The uniqueness of historical events, however, could not be denied--even though they could not be accounted for. Accordingly the historian who aped the natural scientist in his search for facts and laws confined himself to the more secure task of simply collecting the facts alone to the exclusion of discovering patterns as well as to the exclusion of the miraculous or unnatural. This led, Toynbee believes, to the development of "nonsense" historiography which, ironically, became the most unscientific of all the sciences. By abandoning the search for patterns or laws, the embarrassing necessity of explaining facts was precluded. But then an interesting situation arose, says Toynbee, in which sociologists took over the task of trying to make sense of "man-in-process-of-civilization" while historians persisted in trying not to make sense of this phenomenon. But when the antinomian historian

boasts that,

he is unconscious of any plot, rhythm, or pattern in his panorama of the Universe, he is telling us in effect that he is at the mercy of whatever pattern, rhythm, or plot that may be in invisible occupation of his professedly empty . . . mental house.⁵⁴

And this, to be sure, Toynbee continues, is the antithesis of the scientific attitude. "One of my aims in A Study of History," he says, "has been to try out the scientific approach to human affairs and to test how far it will carry us [in the study of history]."⁵⁵ What has been advanced as the scientific attitude in historiography, Toynbee believes, has in fact been a timid and fearful caricature of it.

What one may call the nonsense view of history has been fashionable among Western historians for the last few generations. The odd thing is that some holders of this view . . . defend it principally on the ground that it is scientific. . . . But how strange to suppose that one is being scientific by despairing of making sense! For what is science? . . . The science of man [may be] . . . difficult . . . [but] "the proper study of mankind is man."⁵⁶

These antinomian Western historians, charges Toynbee, made

a still more overweening assumption that was even more unwarrantable. . . . [They] denied the validity of "laws of Nature" as well as . . . "the Law of God" in the realm of the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization.⁵⁷

In view of the dilemma in which Toynbee believes that historians had placed themselves, he sought a fresh approach that would combine the insights of mythology with the precision of the scientific method.⁵⁸ He also turned to the comparative case study method. "This comparative treatment can be extended to the whole of history," he said. "It is . . . the method of the human sciences."⁵⁹

The comparative method is not original with Toynbee. In applying it, he attempts a careful study of the specific content and conditions of a particular problem in different societies as, for example, the intensification of fratricidal conflict in a particular society. He imposes categories which serve as functional guides to the comprehension of otherwise imponderable or opaque historical configurations. An example is the idea of etherialization. Etherialization is not a physical entity or a quantifiable phenomenon as such. Yet it serves as a heuristic device for the study of growth. It becomes, in a sense, an ideal-typical generalization--an abstraction--which Max Weber (1864-1929) believed could "be made that [was] not entirely limited to specific historical complexes at specific times and places."⁶⁰ Toynbee's comparative method runs counter to the more critical methods of the social sciences because he gives a freer play to imagination and speculation and because he does not absolutize his cultural relativism.

Toynbee's generalizations follow from his conviction that as content of thought, history cannot be rendered intelligible apart from guiding ideas. Toynbee's objective, therefore, is to establish, to articulate, and to apply the most useful and most adequate of these ideas.⁶¹ They possess a qualified objective reality because they are embodied in real events as well as in thought, but they should not be taken too literally. Moreover Toynbee attempts to avoid the insularity of historicism and its absolute relativism. An

ideal-typical generalization "is never a statistical mode or mean; it is a deliberate accentuation of even distortion of empirical reality for the purpose of gaining scientific control over that reality."⁶² In other words, it is a useful device for rendering unique events amenable to constructive analysis. It is a device not unknown to the physical as well as the social sciences.

Because Toynbee uses this particular technique, Collingwood asserted that his "great Study of History represents a restatement of the positivistic view itself."⁶³ In reality, however, Toynbee's method is one of compromise. It combines the demand for an imaginative cultural relativism with the legitimate interest in the persisting or universal elements of human culture from which generalizations may be derived.⁶⁴

The so-called Toynbeean scandal and heresy turns out to be somewhat less repugnant than it is sometimes made out to be. Like most students of society, Toynbee uses a model--in his case the Hellenic civilization--to which other cases are referred. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), for example, directed attention to studies of primitive religion in Australia from which he projected generalizations, and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) and Margaret Mead (1884-) employ a similar technique. The danger, however, is that intensive specialization and lack of perspective may lead to unreliable generalization. Toynbee's work on a broad canvas may suffer from glaring inaccuracies in particular instances.

But it is a nice question as to which is the greater offense. The remedy for subjectivity as well as for the inevitable distortions of historiography, is the development of a genuine historical consciousness which can replace the provincialism of particular history and particular social studies with "the broad and salutary idea of universal history."⁶⁵

Of the objections to Toynbee's Study, the charge that he fits the facts to a preconceived pattern is the most universal and perhaps the most serious.⁶⁶ It merits careful scrutiny. The charge that Toynbee is selective is difficult to support as a legitimate objection if one is not prepared to demonstrate that Toynbee consciously and deliberately subordinates the selection of data to a dogmatically preconceived theory.

Cognitive functioning of the human psyche is a selective process from the most elemental of physical sensations to the most erudite of philosophical theory. The abstractive process of selection--to say nothing of symbol associations--is concomitant to the process of a posteriori knowledge itself. To say that the human organism learns from experience is to say, for example, that it selects or abstracts from experience. Moreover it can be said that this is the very function which distinguishes man from the lower forms of life. Man is more selective. Given the same physical or external situation, man is superior--insofar as he can be said to be superior--in that he is able to abstract and

internalize more content from the raw data of experience. Now it is said that Toynbee selects facts favorable to his theory as though he were functioning in the mechanical manner of the bee filling a honeycomb. But it is precisely the opposite that more nearly characterizes Toynbee's approach. Toynbee develops an intimate association with a mass of historical information and from the whole of this intuit patterns which--in his intellectual context--appear to make sense. The patterns may be the product of poetic insight or of any other process which characterizes human psychic functioning. The important point is that by the time the particulars are reviewed with respect to where they will fit, Toynbee has already experienced them and integrated them into the whole of his thought and feeling about history. It would appear that it may be some of Toynbee's critics rather than Toynbee who resort to the mechanical process of gathering or selecting facts on the basis of unexamined assumptions as to what is to be gathered or what is not to be gathered or the value-systems which are to be the criteria for the gathering. It is they, rather than Toynbee, who in the process of fact finding force reality into a frame of reference which may be neither their own nor derived from the facts but an unconscious participation mystique in the prevailing Zeitgeist. Actually, Toynbee's philosophy of history derives from considerable experience prior to 1921, and because of subsequent experience is later altered.

If one were to attempt to explain misinterpretations

of Toynbee--aside from analyses of his specific errors--three factors would need to be cited: the tendency to interpret him too literally in the application of his categories, a marked secular bias, and the failure to appreciate his psychological premises. Toynbee's psychology is almost entirely overlooked by his readers. Yet it is the key to the understanding of his entire philosophy of history.

For Toynbee, the subconscious is the well-spring of human drives, the "fount of Poetry, Music, and the Visual Arts, and the channel through which the Soul is in communion with God."⁶⁷ The dynamics of human personality are therefore the real contents of history, and the examination of these dynamics leads Toynbee to the conviction that religion is the central fact in the life of man.

Not since Bishop Bossuet has the Western world produced a history so committed to this conviction. In the West, the great Christian scholars have not generally been great historians as well, and Western historians have either rejected Christian hypotheses or have set them aside to write their histories. For nearly three hundred years, no Western scholar of Toynbee's caliber has so frankly sought to synthesize the two on so vast a scale. Because of this, historians have been prone to doubt whether Toynbee is really a historian, and theologians whether Toynbee is really a Christian.⁶⁸

If we examine the objections to Toynbee's religious historiography, however, we note that a marked secular bias

is the distinct and distorting factor. It is the bias that sees in Toynbee's Study a "preconceived theology which has no empirical base in the facts of history."⁶⁹ It prompts such obviously puerile charges that Toynbee believes that "Western civilization has little hope of survival except in a Second Coming of Our Lord under Anglican auspices."⁷⁰ The late Irwin Edman, for example, erred grievously when his naturalistic bias prompted him to object to Toynbee on the ground that "it is unhistorical to treat other high religions as 'inferior' forms of Christianity."⁷¹ Yet Toynbee clearly stated that,

I am not entitled to call myself a Christian: I must call myself a Symmachan [if Christian exclusiveness is inescapable]. Symmachus's confession of faith-- "It is not possible to reach to the heart of so great a mystery by one road only"--is an article in my creed which neither my head nor my heart will allow me to abandon.⁷²

Positivist antipathy to Toynbee stems from an almost automatic antipathy to any form of religious expression.⁷³ Under the sterilizing spotlight of positivist scrutiny Toynbee's Study becomes dangerous--or perhaps harmless--nonsense.

The contemporary intellectual lives in the memory of the Age of Reason. But the Age of Reason has passed. The pendulum has swung back to a new age of religious concerns. Where he has not returned to an ancestral religion, contemporary man has sought out and attached himself to new faiths. The situation is irksome to the traditional rationalist who can find no convincing answer for slave labor

and the concentration camp. Toynbee reflects the spirit of the times. His presence is as disturbing as his shortcomings are intolerable. Moreover, like Augustine who pointed to the medieval world and Machiavelli who heralded the modern age, Toynbee points to the post-modern world in the offing. This is his real offense to the rationalists, for they prefer to cling to the wishful hope that religion, irrationality and myths will be abandoned in the new anti-septic utopia of science. Instead, Toynbee points to religion and says that man cannot live by bread alone but will idolize whatever his value system sets up as ultimate.

Since the Renaissance, the Western World has tried to reconcile the classical and Christian views of history. This was achieved abortively by secularizing Augustine. The future hope and the dynamic creationism of Augustine's philosophy of history was made over into a naturalistic theory free of the pessimism of the classical world as well as Christian supernaturalism. Turgot, for example, expressed this spiritual tour de force when he described the physical universe of Newton as a natural "wheel" by which the "vain repetitions" carried the vehicle of Mankind along the road of Progress.⁷⁴

Toynbee, however, has rendered more adequately the synthesis that has been the burden of Western scholarship since the Renaissance. He has done this by invoking the realistically cyclical view of the ancients and a frankly Christian view of God, Man, and Destiny. He deliberately

circumvents the more palatable but less accurate secular view of history that includes the idea of progress. Like Jacques Maritain, he places God at the center of the historical process, and the forces which oppose God "serve the work of God despite themselves."⁷⁵ The goal of history becomes twofold: "the transfiguration of the temporal order" and a "final transfiguration" whereby the redeemed "become gods by participation in the divine life."⁷⁶ "History wins meaning and value for Man in so far as Man co-operates in History with God."⁷⁷ Toynbee's major premise is that religion is the central and determining factor in the life and destiny of Man. It is "higher religion" for which purpose Civilizations, Universal States, and Barbarian War Bands as well as Universal Churches come into existence.⁷⁸ All contribute to the religious destiny of Man. The Universal State provides the source of the Universal Church. During social disintegration, it splits into two alienated factions: an Internal Proletariat that forms the Universal Church and a Dominant Minority whose action channels creative energy to the Church. Barbarian War Bands no less contribute to the advance of higher religion:

The higher religions that . . . come to flower [are] created by the internal proletariats of civilizations of the second generation which had been affiliated with their own predecessors of the first generation through barbarian war-bands.⁷⁹

If we trace the genealogy of Christianity, for example, we note the following relations: Minoan Civilization→ post-Minoan barbarians (Philistines, Achaeans, etc.)→

Hellenic Civilization (incl. Alexander and Rome) → Christianity by the Hellenic Internal Proletariat. Broadly illustrated, this development becomes as follows:⁸⁰

CIVILIZATIONS IN GROWTH AS INTELLI- GIBLE ENTITIES	CIVILIZATIONS IN DISINTE- GRATION AS NO LONGER IN- TELLIGIBLE ENTITIES	SOCIAL ENTITY FORMED
--	--	----------------------------

Creative Minority → Dominant Minority → Universal State

Quiescent Majority → External Proletariat → Barbarian War Bands

Internal Proletariat → Universal Church

The creative phenomenon of growth--etherialization--shifts from the Creative Minority to the Internal Proletariat and then to a Universal Church. The genealogy of human societies and their relationships to each other as well as to the emergence of higher religion may be diagrammed as illustrated on the following page.

The elaboration of this genealogy transcends the scope of this particular dissertation. However the diagram serves to illustrate several important points. It is noted, for example, that the Universal Church is identified with Higher Religion. This identification is somewhat confusing because one is never quite sure whether Toynbee is referring to the Universal Church as a higher species of human society as such or to the Universal Church as higher religion--the mystical goal of life. One should also observe that the chrysalis-church function of producing civilizations applies only to tertiary civilizations. Moreover, it should be observed that Universal Churches are not necessary for the emergence of

primary civilizations. Neither are they necessary for the emergence of secondary civilizations. Furthermore there is no indication that they will perform the chrysalis-function for any fourth generation civilizations.⁸² As early as the fifth volume of A Study, Toynbee observed that,

when we examine the universal churches we shall find ourselves led to raise the question whether the churches can really be comprehended in their entirety in the framework of the histories of civilizations, within which they make their first historical appearances or whether, we have not to regard them as representatives of another species "Civilization" as the civilizations are distinct from primitive societies.⁸³

Moreover:

Instead of seeing some new church spring from the ploughed-up soil of an internal proletariat [of Western civilization] in order to serve as the executor and residuary legatee of a civilization that has broken down and gone into disintegration [assuming ex hypothesi that it has], we may yet live to see a civilization which has tried and failed to stand alone, being saved, in spite of itself, from a fatal fall by being caught in the arms of an ancestral church which it has vainly striven to push away and keep at arms' length.⁸⁴

In Toynbee's later pronouncements (1955) the ancestral church--that is Christianity--is chastened by its encounter with the other higher religions. It is thereby transformed by this encounter into what this writer has taken the liberty to describe as a "trans-Christian" society. This new "religious" society may exhibit characteristics not yet clearly discernible. It may--and Toynbee hopes that it will--exhibit a spiritual unity comparable to the technological unity which Western science has imposed on the world. It may, for example, revive the spirit of cosmopolitanism enjoyed by the Western world

after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) until the French Revolution when the West gradually returned to the fanaticism of the earlier Wars of Religion and suffered the terrible events of the twentieth century. All this, of course, is not clear, nor can it be, for no one can predict which of several possible alternatives contemporary man will take.

Returning to the genealogy, it is noted that Primary Civilizations are the response in special instances of Primitive Societies to physical challenges such as desiccation, floods, etc. as they are found, for example, in the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates, and Yellow River Valleys. Secondary civilizations like the Hellenic are formed by either a Dominant Minority or, in the case of the Hellenic itself, by Barbarian War Bands comprising the External Proletariat of an earlier Primary Civilization. The fact that in four cases higher religions as universal churches performed the chrysalis function and in four cases only suggests to Toynbee that this may not be as significant as he had earlier thought it to be. Toynbee's uncertainty on this point was resolved by a major reorientation of his theory from the position that higher religions perform the chrysalis function for civilizations to the position that, on the contrary, the significance of civilizations stems from the fact that they are the vehicles for the advance of religion.⁸⁵ "The history of Religion," he says, "appears to be unitary and progressive by contrast with the multiplicity and repetitiveness of the histories of civilizations."⁸⁶ "Religion is the true end of Man, and . . .

civilizations have their raison d'être in ministering to spiritual progress."⁸⁷

The function of secondary and tertiary civilizations in ministering to the advance of religion is clear: the secondary civilizations--in four instances--produced genuine higher religions through the spiritual trauma of their respective internal proletariats and the tertiary civilizations have all yielded to one tertiary civilization--the West--whose technology has made possible--if not necessary--a greater spiritual unity of man in the ending of war even as slavery was earlier abolished. In contrast to the apparently increasing importance of the contribution of later civilizations to religion, Primary Civilizations played a lesser role. They arose as responses to physical challenges. They were the first accomplishments of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization. Their function in Toynbee's scheme is to prepare the way for greater things to come by providing the rudimentary experiments in higher religion which through the Internal Proletariat of the next generation of Civilizations become genuine Higher Religions. No longer is religion--as Toynbee earlier viewed it--a mere cultural plane within civilizations. That the secular serves the higher end of religion suggests itself to Toynbee by virtue of the fact that Western Civilization is becoming increasingly ecumenical--particularly in its economic and political planes. Its cultural aspects are in dynamic encounter with the surviving remnants of other civilizations all of which are in

disintegration. The outcome that suggests itself to Toynbee is an order of society which transcends both Higher Religion and Civilization as they are known today. This is the immediate destiny of Man--if he survives his present crisis--and Toynbee rather thinks that he will.⁸⁸ In short, Toynbee does not believe that the pattern of the fall of the West and the rise of a new civilization after the manner of the fall of the Hellenic and the rise of the West will be repeated. A new phenomenon is in the making.

Toynbee's historiography is unique. It is geared to the data with which he comes to grips and the purposes for which his study of history is made. When prosaic methods fail, he does not hesitate to turn to poetry and myth. Yet he strives to be scrupulously empirical. The insuperable task of charting events, "the intolerable wrestle with words and meanings" do not discourage him.

The price of greatness is the risk of offense and error. No worthwhile venture is sure. Its failures are but invitations to greater effort. Toynbee's offense is that he has ventured into the unknown. He has risked error in order that he might gain wisdom. His conclusions are not final, nor is his method infallible. No one is more aware of this than Toynbee himself. Whatever may be his wrongs, his monumental Study has challenged the modern scholar to plumb for new depths and to reach for new horizons in grappling with the mystery of man.

CHAPTER III

Footnotes

¹Maurice Mandelbaum, "Concerning Recent Trends in the Theory of Historiography," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (October, 1955), 506-17; Chester Arthur Destler, "Some Observations on Contemporary Historical Theory," American Historical Review, LV (April, 1950), 503-29; H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).

²Gustaf J. Renier, History, Its Purpose and Method (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p. 84: "The Greek word historia meant investigation."

³Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom, trans. J. H. Nichols (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943). Burckhardt placed the "elements of [both] fact and spirit at the center of his outlook on history." Cf. Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toynbee's Approach to History Reviewed," Ethics, LXV (1955), 291.

⁴Paul Tillich, "The God of History," Christianity and Crisis, May, 1944, p. 5.

⁵Pieter Geyl, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), pp. 75, 90.

⁶John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1922), p. 21.

⁷"Human freedom," says Reinhold Niebuhr, "creates a tremendous variety of dramatic patterns which render all [historical] analogies inexact and all recurrences scientifically dubious." ("Limitations of the Scientific Method: An Answer to Pierre Auger," Bulletin of Atomic Science, March, 1955, p. 87.) See also an excellent treatment of this problem in William A. Meuller, "Approaches to History," Theology Today, I (October, 1944), 300. Professor Sorokin laments that "all attempts to establish the existence of a definite historical tendency, as permanent and eternal, have failed. . . . Theories of progress or regress . . . are 'judgments of evaluation' . . . subjective and . . . never can be scientific statements." (Contemporary Sociological Theories [New York: Harper and Bros., 1928], p. 739.)

⁸Carl G. Jung speaks of the visionary mode of artistic creation which appears to properly describe Toynbee's efforts as a creative thinker. (Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes [London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1934], Chap. 8.)

⁹"All such claimants," warned Plato, "stand convicted of charlatanism. . . . I do not consider that the study of my philosophy is good for people with the exception of a few who are capable of discovering it for themselves. . . . As for the rest, I fancy that some would be filled perversely with a misguided contempt and others with a soaring, windy expectation--in the belief that they had learnt something tremendous." Quoted in Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 245. Nevertheless "a long [and] profitable study could be made of the key terms in Toynbee's vocabulary [including "etherialization"]. Some of them, never defined too precisely, acquire their meaning through the accretion of successive contexts." (Edward Fliess, "Toynbee as Poet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI [April, 1955], 278. Cf. James K. Feibleman's objection: "What is culture? We are never told by Toynbee." The Revival of Realism [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946], p. 200.)

¹⁰See particularly, Arnold Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I am Trying to Do," International Affairs, XXXI (January, 1955), 1-4.

¹¹Renier, op. cit., p. 84. Renier quotes Charles Oman, The Writing of History, p. 187.

¹²Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 339.

¹³Pieter Geyl, "Toynbee the Prophet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI (April, 1955), 260-74. Because Geyl cannot accept "interpretive" history as legitimate history, he scornfully contends that "A Study of History is not history . . . [and] Toynbee is no historian." Historians, he argues, "feel that the best traditions of their profession are insulted when the prophet poses as a historian. . . . The new [Toynbee] volumes [VII-X] are . . . a further installment of the same maddening profusion of vastly learned example, stated in an attractive or impressive, but frequently slipshod, fashion and proving exactly nothing." (Ibid., pp. 260ff.)

¹⁴See particularly H. E. Barnes, Historical Sociology (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948).

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 15ff. and 58f. Cf. H. E. Barnes, Howard and Frances B. Becker, Contemporary Social Theory (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940), pp. 63, 500, 511, and 516. The role of generalization in social thought is suggested in Professor Barnes's observation that the "fundamental tenet of the evolutionary and comparative school [of] anthropologists and historical sociologists was the assumption of the basic unity of the human mind, the universality of major cultural traits and institutions, and the similarity and invariable sequence of the stages of cultural and institutional development. . . . The most complete opposition to this attitude is . . . Historicism, represented by some of the more extreme members of the Boas School . . . Paul Radin, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Richert, and Karl Heussi, who held that history can only discover and portray the unique." (Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., pp. 58f.) Although it will not accept extensive generalization about social evolution, the Boas school nevertheless discovers local trends and Boas himself, along with Wissler, Kroeber, and Goldenweiser, make cautious generalizations.

¹⁶Arthur James Todd, Theories of Social Progress (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 84.

¹⁷Mandelbaum, loc. cit., and Destler, loc. cit., review thoroughly the general problems of historiography.

¹⁸Feibleman, op. cit., p. 200.

¹⁹Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 442.

²⁰Richard Chase, "Toynbee: the Historian As Artist," American Scholar, XVI (July, 1947), 270.

²¹Hughes, op. cit., p. 31.

²²Thompson, op. cit., pp. 296f.: "Mr. Toynbee has the highest regard for the science of statistics. But he doubts its usefulness in at least two spheres. In a letter to this writer he refers to one: 'When I study Sorokin's attempt to bring this last field [that is, any area where there are prospects that free will or intellect may be in command of man's behavior] under the rule of statistics, I find myself skeptical of the applicability of the method here.'" Thompson quotes a letter from Toynbee dated September 22, 1949.

²³Toynbee refers to the "master institutions" of the present "stage" of the West. He divides Western civilization into four stages: 675-1075--early, 1075-1475--medieval, 1475-1875--post-Renaissance, and the present beginning around 1875--post-Modern. Kroeber, op. cit., also makes a similar division at around A.D. 1875.

²⁴Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 157. Cf. Renier, op. cit., p. 57: Freeman inspired Toynbee to believe that "no portions of history are more truly 'modern' than the history of the times which in mere physical distance we look upon as 'ancient.'" (E. A. Freeman, Comparative Politics [London: The Macmillan Co., 1873], p. 337.) Cf. John B. Bury, Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 55f.

²⁵Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (2 vols.; New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), I, 183f.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 75-131, 251, 471, and 531f.

²⁷T. K. Penniman, A Hundred Years of Anthropology (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1935), pp. 298f. Penniman refers specifically to Jung's theory of monogenesis which has subsequently become the assumption of Toynbee as well. See Jung's chapter, "Psychology of the Unconscious," in Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, trans. Constance Long (London: Baillière, Tindall, & Cox, 1916).

²⁸Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁹Fiess, op. cit., p. 279. Cf. Rushton Coulborn, "Fact and Fiction in Toynbee's Study of History," Ethics, LXVI (1956), 235-49. Coulborn concludes that "Toynbee is finally to be judged as an artist. He is a great artist, if rather a queer one." (Ibid., p. 247.)

³⁰Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), pp. 159-62. Cf. Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., pp. 114, 119; Montague Francis Ashley-Montagu (ed.), Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956).

³¹Renier, op. cit., p. 216.

³²Ibid., p. 217.

³³These negative criticisms see in Toynbee a form of Christian apologetics and read into every word of Toynbee's an ulterior motive. See particularly the extreme views of Bertram D. Wolfe, "Dissenting Opinion on Toynbee," American Mercury, LXIV (June, 1947), 748-56; and Montagu, op. cit., passim. They are unjustified in the light of the fact that the normative element is hardly avoidable in the descriptive treatment of history. The charge that Toynbee is "prejudiced" carries no necessary onus so long as Toynbee clearly states his standpoint--and he does. The prejudicial stigma attaches to that treatment of history which assumes an objectivity which in fact it does not possess. The historian is obligated to make his own standards and axiology explicit as well as to develop an imaginative sympathy with his subject which affords him a measure of Einfühlung. Toynbee's so-called "moralizing" is not a legitimate objection per se. Ralph Barton Perry observes that "among the standards applicable to history by the historians there is none so decried, but none so pertinent, justifiable, and unavoidable as the moral standard. The only valid objection to a moralizing historiography is to its naïveté and lack of discrimination as when the historian judges history by his personal moral bias without being aware of it, or judges by the conscience of his own age without recognizing that it differs from the conscience of the past." (Realms of Value [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954], p. 406.)

³⁴Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 442. Toynbee's efforts are not confined to interpretive history. Examples are: Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927); The Conduct of the British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement (London: Oxford University Press, 1928); "Greece" in Forbes, Neville, et. al., The Balkans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915). See Popper, loc. cit.

³⁵Ernst Cassirer, Essay on Man (Anchor Book ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1953), p. 339.

³⁶Collingwood, op. cit., p. 176. Cf. pp. 190-204 and 263-66; Cassirer, op. cit., pp. 178, 201; B. Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, trans. Douglas Ainslie (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1921), pp. 108, 321-24; Carl L. Becker, "Everyman His Own Historian," American Historical Review, XXXVII (January, 1932), 227.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Renier, op. cit., p. 225. Cf. Collingwood's observation that "the historian never prophesies." (Op. cit., pp. 54f., 68.) Toynbee himself observes that "while we can

speculate with profit on the general shape of things to come, we can foresee the precise shadow of particular coming events only a very short way ahead." (Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on Trial [New York: Oxford University Press, 1948], p. 204.) Toynbee in numerous passages throughout A Study denies that he is a prophet.

³⁹Renier, op. cit., p. 100.

⁴⁰J. Pollard, "An Inquiry into the Status of Non-Conceptual Experience," The Christian Scholar, XXXVI (1955), pp. 6ff.

⁴¹Freeman, op. cit., pp. 32f.

⁴²Toynbee believes that compared to "facts" about primitive societies--about which societies over six-hundred are known--"facts" about "Man-in-Process-of-Civilization" are relatively scarce. Man has lived on the earth well over 300,000 years, yet civilizations have existed only around 6,000 years, and the highest number of successive generations is only three. As a human phenomenon, civilization is relatively recent. This fact cannot be ignored. (A Study, I, op. cit., 173, 233, and 461; IX, op. cit., 210.) Cf. studies by L. T. Hobhouse, et. al., in The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples (London: Chapman & Hall, 1915), pp. 30-44 in which the authors list 650 contemporary primitive societies.

⁴³Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 458.

⁴⁴Pieter Geyl, A. J. Toynbee, and Pitirim Sorokin, The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 78. Geyl argues that the "facts" are too plentiful and too complex to yield meaningful "patterns." Hence history can give no guidance for the future in the sense that Toynbee believes that it can. ("Toynbee the Prophet," op. cit., pp. 271f.) Cf. "Toynbee's System of Civilizations," Journal of the History of Ideas, IX (January, 1948), 93-124; and "Prophets of Woe," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVI (October, 1950), 587-602.

⁴⁵Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit., p. 3. Cf. Toynbee in Geyl, et. al., Pattern of the Past, op. cit., pp. 91f.

⁴⁶Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 201. Idealist historian Collingwood argues that "the cyclical view of history

is [itself] . . . a formulation of the limitations of historical knowledge. Everyone who has any historical knowledge at all sees history in cycles [of some sort]." ("The Theory of Historical Cycles: II, Cycles and Progress," Antiquity: A Quarterly Review of Archaeology, December, 1927, pp. 445ff.) Renier, op. cit., p. 221 adds: "Every historian holds [and imposes] a systematic and generalized view about the course taken in the past by human affairs."

⁴⁷Harris E. Harbison, "The Problem of the Christian Historian," Theology Today, V (October, 1948), 391. Harbison observes that "when Toynbee writes as a student of contemporary international affairs, he emphasizes uniqueness; when he writes as a historian of civilization, he emphasizes recurrence." (Ibid., pp. 403f.) Toynbee discusses this problem in Civilization on Trial, op. cit., Chaps. V and XII.

⁴⁸The charge that Toynbee's philosophy of history is a form of determinism is a grievous error. Yet it is not infrequently encountered. Some examples may be found in Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte (Zurich: Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1954); Geyl, loc. cit.; Barnes, loc. cit. Professor Barnes, for example, sees "his whole work [as] a majestic effort to establish the reality of a creative, spiritual determinism." (Introduction to the History of Sociology [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948], p. 719); and Wolfe, loc. cit., charges Toynbee with "an unconscious 'Calvinism.'"

⁴⁹Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 172. "In appealing to the 'Law of God' to resolve his dilemma, a human soul has to abandon certainty in order to embrace Hope and Fear for a law that is the expression of a [personal, theistic] will animated by a spiritual freedom . . . [and] is the very antithesis of the saeva necessitas of laws of Nature." (Ibid., p. 173.)

⁵⁰Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit., p. 3.

⁵¹Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., pp. 300-404.

⁵²Ibid., p. 174. Cf. A Study, IV, op. cit., pp. 34-48. Toynbee appears to be influenced by Turgot at this point.

⁵³Frederick J. Teggart, Theory of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), pp. 85-87.

⁵⁴Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 197.

⁵⁵Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," loc. cit.

⁵⁶Geyl, et. al., Pattern of the Past, op. cit., pp. 79f.

⁵⁷Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 217.

⁵⁸See Thompson, op. cit., p. 288, re Toynbee's synthesis of science and myth. "For Mr. Toynbee, history and the techniques for studying it are a curious blend of science and fiction." (Ibid.)

⁵⁹Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit., p. 3. Toynbee believes that the "academic division between history and the social sciences is an accidental [and unfortunate] one. . . . We need to throw history and the social sciences together into a single comprehensive study of human affairs." (Ibid.) Ralph Barton Perry addresses himself to the objection that history is not like science in that it is ideographic rather than nomographic with the comment that "knowledge, whether scientific or historical, is 'ideographic' [and] both [science and history] . . . are [also] 'nomographic'. . . . The difference lies in the fact that while natural science is primarily for the purpose of verifying the law, the historian is primarily interested in the individual and in the law as a means of knowing the individual." (Perry, op. cit., p. 387.)

⁶⁰Quoted in Barnes and Becker, Contemporary Social Theory, op. cit., p. 768. Cf. Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., pp. 60f.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 769. The idea of "etherialization" is, for example, an "ideal" construct.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Collingwood, Idea of History, op. cit., p. 159. Collingwood charges that Toynbee's method is derived from the natural sciences. He says that Toynbee's "principles are based on the conception of external relations . . . [of] discrete facts. . . . If the scientist's methods are to work at all, the first thing necessary is that a clear line should be drawn between one fact and another. . . . These are the principles on which Toynbee deals with history." (Ibid., pp. 161f.) Collingwood believed that Toynbee cut history into sections dealing with distinctly and mutually exclusive societies after the manner of Spengler. "This is the positivist

conception of individuality," he argued. "The inner and outer are mutually exclusive [as] the individuality possessed by a stone. . . . Toynbee's . . . general conception of history is [therefore] naturalistic. . . . He regards history as a mere spectacle, something consisting of facts observed and recorded by the historian." (*Ibid.*, pp. 163f.) In rejecting subjectivism, however, Toynbee did not win the plaudits of orthodox objectivists. Positivist and realist reviews of Toynbee see in his *Study* a "theology employing selected facts of history to illustrate the will of God, as the medieval bestiaries utilized biological fantasies to achieve the same results." (Barnes, *Historical Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 110.) Elsewhere Barnes laments the "mystical fog currently being spread by . . . Professor Toynbee," (*Ibid.*, p. 119), and Geyl asserts that Toynbee writes in the spirit of Augustine. (*Pattern of the Past*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.) Other examples of this kind of criticism appear in Ashley-Montagu (ed.), *op. cit.*

⁶⁴Although Toynbee and Max Weber arrive at vastly different conclusions--Toynbee discovering a religious destiny for man and Weber a secular one--both stress the use of the culture case study method. This method is essentially a compromise between historicism and social Darwinism. See Barnes and Becker, *Contemporary Social Theory*, *op. cit.*, Chap. 15, and Barnes, *Historical Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁶⁵H. Berr and L. Febvre, "History," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. E. R. A. Seligman and A. Johnson (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), VII, 357f.

⁶⁶Barnes, *Historical Sociology*, *op. cit.*, p. 111, speaks of Toynbee's "erroneous method of . . . [thinking] out in advance a pattern of cultural development and [seeking] ethnographic data . . . to confirm [his] thesis." Cf. Sir Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee's *Study of History*: A Review [of Vols. VII-X incl.]," *International Affairs*, XXXI (January, 1955), 7. Perry observes--and rightly so--that Toynbee is a victim of the task he essays to accomplish--to take in the entire sweep of history and to avoid having to force the facts on occasion. "[Toynbee's] very temper of empiricism, and his scrupulous scholarship," says Perry, "emphasize the difficulty of escaping dogmatism in the attempt to make a unified drama of the totality of historical facts." (*Realms of Value*, *op. cit.*, p. 387.)

⁶⁷Toynbee, *A Study*, VII, *op. cit.*, 500. In this view, therefore, "the principles of historiography are not to be discovered by a comparative study of the procedures actually

followed by students of history. They are embedded in ethics and metaphysics. Before settling down to his task the historian must have made up his mind as to what he is to think of human nature." (Helmut Kuhn, "Dialectic in History," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (January, 1949), 29.

⁶⁸A particularly worthwhile study of this problem will be found in Harbison, op. cit. Cf. Edmund D. Soper, "Arnold Toynbee and the Preacher," The Garrett Tower, XXX (March, 1955), 1-5; and Martin Wright in Toynbee's A Study, VII, op. cit., Annex, 737. Soper and Wright lament Toynbee's "pan-Hinduism." Toynbee, however, steadfastly reaffirms what he believes to be the essential articles of the Christian faith: "I believe that the Jewish-Christian belief that individual human souls are of supreme value in the sight of God is the historical origin and the abiding--though now submerged--foundation of our Western belief[s]. . . . Our surest hope lies in the appeal of this religion to all men at all times everywhere." (Arnold J. Toynbee, Will Herberg, and Hans Morgenthau, "The Revolution We Are Living Through," Intercollegian, LXXII [February, 1955], 4.)

⁶⁹Edward J. Ryan, "A Critical Evaluation of A. J. Toynbee as Historiographer of Chinese Civilization Before 500 A.D." (Unpublished Master's thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1948), p. 217. Hughes, op. cit., p. 140, also charges that "as a good Christian, Toynbee cannot . . . be a historical or ethical relativist. For him, Christianity . . . represents final truth."

⁷⁰Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., p. 110.

⁷¹Irwin Edman, "Review of A Study of History," Saturday Review of Literature, XXXI (May, 1948), 9.

⁷²Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 428, n. 2.

⁷³A good example of this "positivist antipathy" is the treatment of Toynbee in Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955), Chap. IX.

⁷⁴Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 37, n. 3.

⁷⁵Jacques Maritain, True Humanism (London: Centenary Press, 1939), p. 84. Cf. pp. 85-105. An excellent study may be found in Mueller, op. cit. Actually Toynbee reflects the creative dynamism of Bergsonian and Jewish metaphysics.

⁷⁶Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 49, 81. Cf. pp. 156f.

⁷⁷Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 756.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 449. Cf. pp. 445-48.

⁷⁹Toynbee, A Study, VIII, op. cit., 89.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 88 et passim.

⁸¹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 448 et passim. The term "ecumenical trans-Christian society" is not Toynbee's but the writer's. It appears to best describe what Toynbee believes to be emerging. He is confident of a unification of the world either through voluntary cooperation or the coercive action of a Universal State. To outline Toynbee's entire philosophy of history would be impractical within the limits of this dissertation. Moreover, a summary statement would add little to those already available and no summary would be free from misleading generalizations. For summary treatment of Toynbee, therefore, see Edward D. Myers, "Some Leading Ideas from Toynbee's A Study of History," Theology Today, I (October, 1944), 378-94 and "The Unity of History: An Epitome of the Concluding Volumes of Toynbee's A Study of History," Theology Today, XI (October, 1954), 312-34. For Vols. I-VI incl., cf. also the "Argument of the Somervell abridgement of Toynbee's Study, pp. 567-89.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 411ff., Table IV.

⁸³Toynbee, A Study, V, op. cit., 23. Cf. VI, op. cit., 169 and VII, op. cit., 392.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 193.

⁸⁵Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 423.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 485.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 448. Cf. p. 445.

⁸⁸Cf. Jaspers' thesis, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), that there is emerging the dawn of "world history."

CHAPTER IV

TOYNBEE'S THEORY OF MAN, SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

History is the story of the life of human societies and, in the final analysis records the deeds of men as individuals and in groups. Hence some theory of man and society, explicit or implicit, must undergird a philosophy of history. Toynbee's philosophy of history is grounded in the conviction that man, institutions, and society share a common destiny insofar as the personal and the social interrelate. Hence he devotes considerable attention to a theory of man and a theory of society.

For Toynbee, the problem of human society is essentially the problem of human personality, and human personality is part of a vast psychic continuum which embraces sub-consciousness as well as consciousness. Human personality embraces also an external field of action. Its dimensions are therefore infinite, and its roots reach into the biological and social origins of human life itself; in the final analysis, human personality is grounded in God.¹ This view of man directly influences Toynbee's view of the nature of society and the dynamic of personal and social processes.

Theories of society are limited by two extreme positions. The first is that society constitutes an aggregate of autonomous

individuals. The second is that society is a superorganism from which are abstracted individuals. Both these extremes Toynbee rejects:

A human society is not a whole of which the individual human beings are parts, any more than it is an aggregate of individual human atoms that are free to associate or dissociate at will. . . . Human society is, in itself, a relation; a particular kind of relation between human beings who are not only individuals but are also social animals in the sense that they could not exist at all--or at any rate not humanly--without being in this social relationship with one another.²

Man is neither a selfless ant nor an Ismaelitic Cyclops, but a social animal in whose nature there is not a Frazerian [or Freudian] 'pre-established disharmony' between the individual and society. . . . The individual can only express and develop his personality through relations with other personalities, while, conversely, Society is nothing but the common ground between one individual's network of relationships and another's.³

Toynbee's view of man and society is not incongruent with contemporary social theory. Social psychologist Solomon Asch, for example, defines society as "the inclusive content of the processes that occur between men;"⁴ and Professor Aberle and his associates define society as,

a group of human beings sharing a self-sufficient system of action . . . a system of action in which the actors participate.⁵

Indeed, their participation is the basis of their humanity.

Man's essence is not to be found in isolated individuals, but in his bonds with his generation and his society. . . . It is in inter-personal communication that man becomes a self, a persona. . . . The biological individual becomes a self in personal existence when and insofar as he steps into a living relation with other selves.⁶

The significant fact about human personality and social processes is that these,

processes occurring between entities both of which have a psychological structure will differ from interactions between things or between person and thing.⁷

Men live together in a world of meaning [and value] only because there is a prior undergirding social process within which their biologic lives are set. . . . The primary situation for observation, therefore, is a field in which one's self is present in the same way that other selves and physical objects are present [and to which the self responds].⁸

This approach to the nature of society leads directly to Toynbee's "society as the interaction of fields-of-action" theory. For Toynbee, the essence of humanity lies in what happens in and between men, and the primary data for study is the human "field of action" and its interaction with other "fields of action." Thus Toynbee defines society as,

a relation between individuals; and this relation of theirs consists in the coincidence of their individual field of action; and this coincidence combines the individual fields into a common ground; and this common ground is what we call society. Inasmuch as an individual's field of action is a part or aspect of the individual himself, each single individual is in a sense coextensive and indeed identical with the whole of society. . . . On the other hand, inasmuch as the Microcosm is distinct and distinguishable from the Macrocosm--and it is only in the field of the Macrocosm, and not in the fastness of the Microcosm, that the different individuals interact--it cannot be said that every individual is identical with every other, in spite of their being each identical with the society through which they are related.⁹

In short, Toynbee believes that man is both individual and social as a human personality.

Toynbee's field of action embraces a vast continuum.

It includes an "internal," or social "field." Internally man possesses an Ego "with a consciousness and a will moving on the face of the waters of a subconscious psychic 'abyss.'"¹⁰ Externally, man encounters other "fields-of-action" in the interaction which Toynbee defines as society.

As an explanation of the interactions which Toynbee defines as society, he suggests a "social geometry" in the form of an analogy based on the intersection of light cones.¹¹ Through this analogy he hopes to demonstrate that the interactions which are society occur at various levels and that in the infinite sense they become a "supreme identity."

The value of the conical analogy above is that the field of action can be extended inwardly or psychologically as well as outwardly or socially. The lower levels of the subconscious thereby merge at infinity pointing to a psychic unity and monogenetic origin of man. A social origin of individual

Ego-consciousness is also suggested. Toynbee is not explicit about this inward extension, but his acceptance of Jungian psychology suggests it. He does, however, refer to organismic philosophy and to the ultimate interrelationship of all events.¹² The conical analogy also suggests variations in the nature and levels of the interactions that comprise society. Thus there is no necessarily fixed notion of the social nature of man or the nature of society itself.

Other analogies such as the,

biological and psychological analogies are . . . least harmful and least misleading [as heuristic devices] when they are applied to primitive societies in their present static condition or . . . [to] civilizations . . . [in] a state of arrest. But they are manifestly unsuited to express the relations in which the growing civilizations stand to individual human beings.¹³

Thus Toynbee distinguishes between society in growth, wherein certain dynamic personal and social relations hold, and a relatively static society which may, on occasion, be likened to an organism with a predictable destiny. The important point is that the nature of a society is determined largely by its internal conditions, by what is going on within and between human personalities. Moreover these events possess a wider significance than the social alone. In some sense they involve the totality of Reality--even the Life of God Himself.¹⁴ Thus all events are interrelated in some manner even as they are also unique in some sense. The individual is both an autonomous entity and a part of a larger relationship.¹⁵

On the basis of this view, Toynbee stresses the importance of psychic phenomena in the life of society. Psychic aberrations which distort or in any way affect the individual's field of action exert a profound influence on the life of society. On the other hand, the social field may profoundly alter the nature of the interaction by which the individual field of action encounters other fields of action. The powerful "cone of influence" or social dissolvent of a creative personality penetrates many levels of society, involves widespread social relationships, and becomes the vehicle of social solidarity--so great is its influence. In all cases, personal and social processes are mutually related.

Not only is the life of man and society profoundly affected by the psychic processes which reverberate between them, but values relate to and are established by the nature of these processes. For Toynbee, the higher values are those individual achievements which carry important social and religious implications. This is because of the essentially social and religious nature of man and the mutual interdependence of human phenomena.¹⁶

Because of the differentiation of values, society tends to stratify into a number of planes. Toynbee identifies these as the economic, the political, and the cultural. "The cultural plane," he says, "is not only deeper but fundamental."¹⁷ It is the most highly resistant to penetration, and undergirds the political and economic planes of society.

Cultural elements are also basic because of their

psychological and religious significance. Toynbee believes that the destiny of man and society depends primarily on the outcome of encounters of "challenge-and-response" in the realm of cultural elements.¹⁸ All planes of society are inter-dependent however. Hence all societies--insofar as they are societies--exhibit some of the characteristics of an organism. While a civilization as a species of society is in growth, it is a distinct unit of human geography reflecting distinct elements of social solidarity. It retains its identity as a "civilization" only insofar as it retains this healthy state of growth as a "whole." Hence the terms "growth" and "in-process-of-civilization" are generally synonymous in Toynbee. A society loses its identity as a society when it "breaks down," when it suffers a "schism of the soul." "Civilizations are wholes whose parts all cohere with one another and all affect one another reciprocally."¹⁹ This coherence or solidarity is essentially social and spiritual. It does not imply a causally unified whole in the mechanistic sense of the term.

It is one of the characteristics of civilizations in process of growth that all aspects and activities of their social life are co-ordinated into a single social whole, in which the economic, political, and cultural elements are kept in a nice adjustment with one another by an inner harmony of the growing body social.²⁰

It is important to note Toynbee's emphasis on personal and social psychological phenomena in the "growing" state of society, particularly in the case of civilizations. Professor Sorokin, for example, fails to appreciate this emphasis

because he has not allowed Toynbee the full play of his psychology. Sorokin sees in Toynbee a restatement of the "organic" view of civilization. The root of Toynbee's difficulties, he believes,

consists in [his] acceptance of . . . "civilization" as a real unity, in the sense of either a causal or causal-meaningful system. . . . [He] assumes that the total culture of each . . . "civilization" is completely integrated and represents . . . a causally unified whole.

Sorokin, on the other hand, believes that,

"Civilizations" are a sort of dumping ground where billions of diverse cultural phenomena are thrown together.²¹

If civilizations are merely cultural congeries, he continues, they are "neither born . . . nor can they grow or disintegrate."²² The point that Sorokin disregards, however, is Toynbee's belief in the social nature of man and the profound psychic processes which link man and society. For these psychic processes Sorokin tends to substitute a mechanical system of cause and effect. Toynbee, instead, has in mind a relationship of "challenge-and-response" in which the outcome is not pre-determined by antecedents.

It is to the drama of challenge-and-response, Toynbee believes, that social action must be traced, and this drama is resolved in individuals. It is these psychic processes of personality brought into play by challenge-and-response that so profoundly influence the nature of society. Hence the source of action in society must be an individual "agent."

A field of action--and a fortiori, an intersection of a number of fields of action--cannot be a source of action. . . . The source of action cannot be the society, but can only be each of some of the individuals whose fields of action constitute a society. . . . A "field" merely provides a locus for the action of an agent who operates in the field but who is not the field itself; a "relation" merely provides a common ground for the interaction of two or more agents with one another. . . . The society is not . . . anything more than a medium of communication [like space] through which the individual human beings interact with one another. It is human individuals and not human societies that make human history.²³

This "agent" within the field of action is the "psychic energy" of human personality. "The Macrocosm," says Toynbee, is apprehended and acted upon by the Microcosm: and the action which is the theme of human history is the action of individual human beings on that common ground of their respective fields of action which we call a society.²⁴

Personality, then, is the agent rather than the vehicle of cultural or social growth. What confronts us is not the happenstance of this or that individual as the inevitable means by which social growth is realized, but social growth results from the unique events within and between unique and individual human personalities. Rushton Coulborn argues on behalf of Toynbee as against anthropologist Alfred Kroeber that,

although most persons are little more than mediating agents, exceptional persons are the main creators. I do not think, as Kroeber does, that the large probability that one person will make the creation if another fails to do so eliminates the creative function of the human personality.²⁵

The fate of society depends on what happens within and between human personalities. "If we had the knowledge and patience to analyze a culture retrospectively," argues Alexander Goldenweiser,

every element of it would be found to have had its beginning in the creative act of an individual mind. There is, of course, no other source for culture to come from, for what culture is made of is but the raw stuff of experience, whether material or spiritual transformed into culture by the creativeness of man. An analysis of culture, if fully carried out, leads back to the individual mind.²⁶

This conviction should not lead us, Toynbee warns, to a "great man" theory of history. Since man is both individual and social in the psychological sense intended by Toynbee, neither the individual as an atomistic organism nor any aspect of the environment as such can be viewed as the sole cause of action in the "field of action." Toynbee rejects the excesses of the "great man" theory as well as the excesses of environmental determinism. The members of Toynbee's "creative minority" are not the product of a hereditary determinism as are Carlyle's "great men," nor are they the recipients of a "cosmic grace" as Spengler believed them to be. Nor can they be said to be "products" of biological and social factors as such. Instead, for Toynbee, the "creative minority" emerges from the psychic drama of the human situation in which all participate--in varying degrees--depending on the nature of the responses to the challenges of life.

"The 'great man' theorists of history," observes Goldenweiser:

often fell in [the] error, as did almost all systems of psychology, from the subjective analytical attempts of the classical associationists to the semi-experimental folk-psychologists of the Wundtian variety, and to the modern [Freudian] psychoanalysts [of rendering an] . . . absolutistic view of history which explain all happenings either through the individual or through the group.²⁷

Toynbee has the support of Goldenweiser at this point in the belief that although the locus of creativity and history is the individual, the individual psyche does not respond to or move within a vacuum--material, spiritual or otherwise, and although cultural content and environment do condition individual responses, individuals modify their particular situations by bringing to bear specific conscious and unconscious psychic contents and attitudes which in turn condition the specific aspects of the environment to which they respond.

Goldenweiser continues:

The effectiveness of some individuals as social factors necessarily moulds and determines other individuals; so that the very significance and conspicuousness of some persons imply the passivity and relative unimportance of others.²⁸

"In every manifestation of Life," says Toynbee,

we find empirically . . . that a creative power is exhibited . . . by some, but not by all representatives of a given species.²⁹

When we consider that a number of human beings who are in social relations with one another share more or less the same social background and social heritage and are exposed to more or less the same social challenges, it would rather be surprising if more or less the same response were never hit upon by several people at once. . . . [Yet] while it is true that a new creative thought or plan does often occur to more than one member of a society simultaneously, it is also true that it never occurs simultaneously to more than a minority.³⁰

For Toynbee, history is made by men who are neither the pawns of historic or social process (as in von Ranke or Hegel) nor the élite of Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Spengler.

"In a growing civilization," says Toynbee:

A creative personality comes into action by taking the lead in making a successful response to some challenge.⁴⁰

This is the "man-in-process-of-civilization."

Although they may be conditioned by the influence of a relatively advanced culture, most individuals within any given society or civilization exhibit psychic characteristics differing little from those of primitive men. "In every growing civilization," says Toynbee,

even at the times when it is growing most lustily, the great majority of the participant individuals are in the same stagnant quiescent condition as the members of a primitive society which is in a state of rest.³²

On the other hand, no civilization or particular society of men enjoys a monopoly of "creative minority." The most humble African village may have,

individuals who have lived and died obscure because they have failed to break "the cake of custom" and have therefore failed to win for their potential genius the field which it needs in order to realize and manifest itself in action.³³

After any creative act, says Toynbee, the major problem confronting the creative personality is the securing of "mimesis" on the part of the uncreative majority. To effect progress in any form, the creative personality must be able to evoke a felicitous response in the majority. At its best, this response involves something more than mere mechanical imitation.³⁴ If it involves a spiritual identification, "mimesis" constitutes a response of the highest order. As a society grows, "mimesis" becomes progressively more difficult. Paradoxically, the greater the advance, the

greater the difficulty of continued advance--not alone because the creative personality in any particular field may not be able to effect continued "etherialization," but also because it cannot effect a sustained "mimesis."

Toynbee refers to Bergson's observation that there are two paths open to the "education of the human race"--that of drill (dressage), that is, mechanical imitation, and that of spiritual identification through mystical experience.³⁵ The latter defies conceptualization. It is a rare phenomenon. The transmission of creativity in the life of society must come about chiefly through mechanical imitation. This unfortunate "mechanicalness of mimesis," dooms it to almost certain failure, Toynbee believes, for the creative spirit defies imitation. Yet through the tenuous phenomenon of "mimesis," civilizations may flower--for a time--with unparalleled greatness.

The faculty of mimesis is the characteristic possession of the majority of any society.³⁶

[It] is the acquisition, through imitation, of social "assets"--aptitudes or emotions or ideas--which the acquirers have not originated for themselves, and which they might never have come to possess if they had not encountered and imitated other people in whose possession these assets were already to be found. Mimesis . . . is a generic feature of social life. Its operation can be observed both in primitive societies and civilizations.

It is the means by which creative achievements are diffused throughout society, the means whereby creative influence is felt in the interactions of "fields of action" which comprise society. Notwithstanding its superficial nature and its

ultimate incapacity to sustain growth, mechanical mimesis serves a useful social function. It is the only means by which the majority of any society can share the process of civilization.

Toynbee is not the first to speak of social imitation. Plato referred to it, and modern writers like Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) have given it considerable attention. Its fortunes in social thought have varied. David Hume, Thomas H. Huxley, Walter Bagehot, William James, and Josiah Royce--to name a few--supported the doctrine of social imitation in varying degrees.³⁸ Toynbee appears to accept the doctrine as a natural psychic function and a necessary social phenomenon. Imitation, however, is only incidental to social growth, for creativity is genuinely imitated only through mystic identification. But the process of mimesis--however mechanical--points up the role of psychological processes in society. It suggests that social phenomena bear an intimate relationship with psychic phenomena.³⁹

In its broader aspects, mimesis is the means whereby social qualities are acquired by the majority of any society. Relatively rare occurrences of genuine creation may enrich the culture of a society, but cultural reception is the means by which a society acquires most of its traits and patterns. Cultural reception, says Toynbee, is "a particular orientation of the challenged party's faculty of mimesis". . . .

The Human Psyche's ability to vary the orientation of its mimesis is one manifestation of a general versatility which is characteristic of Human Nature and is perhaps its most distinctive gift.⁴⁰

In primitive societies mimesis tends to be directed toward the past. Primitive societies are custom dominated. They are essentially static. On the other hand, societies in process of civilization follow the lead of a creative minority. They tend to be future oriented, that is, "in dynamic motion along a course of change and growth."⁴¹ All societies, however, are the recipients of culture "radiated" from other societies. This is Toynbee's equivalent of the sociologist's cultural diffusion.

According to him, "Radiation-and-Mimesis" is distinct from "Challenge-and-Response" in that the former is a means whereby novelty is diffused whereas the latter is the means whereby novelty may be created. Diffusion--that is, radiation-and-mimesis--is more effective in the spread of the relatively trivial aspects of culture. The Hindu, for example, acquires Western technique in transportation more readily than he acquires the Western world-view. Cultural diffusion, therefore, is not the principal source of social growth. "The process of Radiation-and-Mimesis," Toynbee says,

through which Diffusion works in human affairs, is vigorous and effective in inverse ratio to the value and importance of the social properties that are conveyed. . . . The process operates . . . least potently of all on the cultural or spiritual [i.e. ideational or psychological] plane.⁴²

In Toynbee, therefore, the profound aspects of social growth are attributed to the independent activity of a creative minority. Toynbee favors the theory of the independent origin of culture. The ubiquity of the modern rifle, he says, due

to the diffusion of a particular material cultural trait does not provide an explanation for a similar ubiquity of the bow and arrow. In other words, Toynbee rejects the generalization that growth is principally a function of cultural diffusion. We are influenced by the more obvious material elements of human culture to overlook the less obvious but basic spiritual and psychological elements, he says.⁴³ This, he believes, is the root error of Western theories of man, society, and social change. As Toynbee sees it, the problem is essentially spiritual. It involves relations that do not reduce to simplistic solutions, and it involves relations that must be articulated within a framework of an adequate theory of human nature.

CHAPTER IV

Footnotes

¹Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 454f. Cf. III, op. cit., 223-30; VII, op. cit., 500, 506, and 508; VIII, op. cit., 116; IX, op. cit., 169, 328-39, 399-401, 697-704; X, op. cit., 40, 225.

²Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 223. Cf. Alexander A. Goldenweiser, History, Psychology and Culture (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933), pp. 62ff.

³Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 386f. Cf. 223-30; I, op. cit., 173, n. 3 and 454; III, op. cit., 217-22.

⁴Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 117.

⁵D. F. Aberle, et. al., "The Functional Prerequisites of a Society," Ethics, LX (1950), 101.

⁶Paul E. Pfeutze, The Social Self (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954), pp. 30 and 204-205. Cf. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 199: "That essence of man which is special to him can be directly known only in a living relation." Cf. also Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), passim.

⁷Asch, op. cit., pp. 141f.

⁸Pfeutze, op. cit., p. 100. Cf. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. with an introduction by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 230. Cf. pp. 223-48 and IV, op. cit., 12.

¹⁰Ibid. Cf. IX, op. cit., 169.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 229f.

¹²Ibid., p. 227. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 99, 134, and 193; Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (2d ed.; London: The Macmillan Co., 1927), pp. 17f., 121-24, 336, and 347f. Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), passim. Shankara's doctrine states that the Ultimate Self reflects the Ultimate Whole, Atman equals Brahman. Cf. Sri Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1940); and a recent work entitled The Supreme Identity by Alan A. Watts (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950).

¹³Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 223-30. Cf. I, op. cit., 454f. and IX, op. cit., 169.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 227-30.

¹⁶Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 151.

¹⁷Ibid. Cf. p. 30, n. 3.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 187. Cf. p. 165; III, op. cit., 151-53; V, op. cit., 196-203. Because of the impressive penetration of the world at large by elements of Western economics and politics, Western students of society tend to minimize the role of the basic cultural elements of religion and the fine arts. (Ibid., p. 165).

¹⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 380.

²⁰Ibid., p. 152. Cf. I, op. cit., 34ff., 43ff., 149ff., and 153ff.

²¹Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 209. Cf. p. 116; Pieter Geyl, et. al., The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 111. For a general study see Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (4 vols.; (New York: American Book Co., 1937-41), I, Chap. I; IV, op. cit., in entirety.

²²Ibid., p. 116. "What is not integrated [in the first place] cannot disintegrate; what is not born cannot grow and die." (Ibid., p. 217.)

²³Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 230f. Cf. pp. 217-72; I, op. cit., 173, n. 3, 454, n. 3, and IV, op. cit., 12; Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization. Part II: Civilization and Ethics, trans. C. T. Campion (1st. American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 73; Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (10th ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1894), pp. 30-38 and 87-97; Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., passim; Smuts, op. cit., p. 335.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Rushton Coulborn, "Discussion: The Rise and Fall of Civilization," Ethics, LXIV (1954), 216, n. 24. Coulborn's reference is to Alfred L. Kroeber's Configurations of Cultural Growth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1944), p. 763.

²⁶Alexander Goldenweiser, History, Psychology and Culture (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933), p. 59.

²⁷Ibid., p. 60, n. 2.

²⁸Ibid., p. 63.

²⁹Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 425f. Cf. III, op. cit., 232; and Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., passim.

³⁰Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 238f. Cf. VI, op. cit., 177. In a similar vein, Professor F. J. Teggart observes that "human advancement follows upon the mental release of the members of a group or of a single individual from the authority of an established system of ideas. This release has, in the past, been occasioned through the breaking down of previous idea-systems . . . [and] the building up of a new idea-system." (The Processes of History [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918], pp. 151f.)

³¹Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 177. It is to Thomas Carlyle rather than Toynbee that one must ascribe the "great man" theory. In the spring of 1840, Carlyle gave six public lectures outlining his "great man" theory. "Universal History," he said, "is at the bottom the History of the Great Men." (On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, ed. A. MacMechan [Boston: Ginn Co., 1901], Lecture I.) Toynbee's "creative minority" has no hereditary, biological, or social source of determination. "God has no favorites," he says. (Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955.)

Professor Barnes's glib generalization that "Toynbee espouses the 'Great Man' theory of history with gusto and consistence" (Introduction to the History of Sociology, [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948], p. 725), is insupportable in the light of a more careful analysis of Toynbee's theory. Possibly Barnes--like many critics--simply associated Toynbee with philosophers and sociologists who stress the role of the individual in effecting social change as, for example, Lester F. Ward who spoke of a small dynamic element of society responsible for progress (Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology [2d ed.; New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1924], pp. 12, 72, and 175) and William James who wrote of "Great Men and Their Environment," (The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy [New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912], pp. 216-54). Like Toynbee, these men were moderate in pointing up the role of the individual. By no means are they or Toynbee to be associated with the excesses of Carlyle or Nietzsche.

³²Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 242f.

³³Ibid., p. 244.

³⁴If a creative personality is unable to evoke mimesis, if he fails to communicate to a quiescent majority of any society, he stands under judgment by that society. He may pay for his deviation with his life. On the other hand, if he manages to effect a drastic mimesis on the part of the society of which he is a part, he may precipitate a revolution. (Ibid., p. 369.)

³⁵Ibid., p. 245. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., p. 88.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 245ff. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., pp. 80f.; Bagehot, op. cit., p. 27; Coulborn, op. cit., p. 209.

³⁷Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., p. 191. Cf. III, op. cit., 246; Bagehot, op. cit., pp. 96f.

³⁸Plato spoke of social imitation in both the Republic and the Laws. Gabriel Tarde renders a thorough study of the phenomenon of social imitation in The Laws of Imitation, trans. Elsie Clews Parsons (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1903) and Social Laws, trans. H. C. Warren (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), Chap. IX. This is an early study made shortly after those of Tarde; Michael M. Davis, Jr., Psychological Interpretations of Society (New York: Columbia University Studies,

1909), Chaps. II & VII; Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Washington: Harren Press, 1952), Vol. II, 851ff.; and Charles A. Ellwood, Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1912), Chap. XVI.

³⁹Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 425f. Cf. VIII, op. cit., 481.

⁴⁰Ibid., n. 1. Cf. Smuts, op. cit., p. 261.

⁴¹Ibid. Cf. p. 192; and Bagehot, op. cit., pp. 27, 35.

⁴²Ibid., p. 430. Cf. III, op. cit., 151f.; and V, op. cit., 196-203.

⁴³Ibid., p. 429.

CHAPTER V

TOYNBEE'S DEBT TO CARL G. JUNG

Failure to grasp Toynbee's psychology is a major reason for conflicting and ambiguous interpretations of his philosophy of history. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that Toynbee himself has only recently pointed specifically to the Swiss psychologist Carl G. Jung as his "navigator psycho-pompus" who added a "new dimension to [his] mental universe" and guided him "from a surface-craft to [a] submarine in order to sound the Psyche's subconscious abyss."¹

Most of Toynbee's philosophy of history was formulated on assumptions which--though similar to Jung's--were distinctly original. Toynbee's associate, Professor Edward D. Myers, believes that,

Toynbee was feeling his own way, through his own reading and experiences, to the set of conceptions about "the supreme identity," the Unconscious, etc. when he came on Jung and found in his writings a formulation of the sort towards which he had been groping, thereby saving himself the labour of having to make his own formulation.²

Toynbee himself says that when he parted with the "would-be scientific impersonal explanations" of history and turned instead to mythology he,

might have been less diffident if [he] had not been ignorant, as [he] was at that date [1920], of the new ground broken by [Jung's] psychology during the war of

1914-18. . . . If I had been acquainted at that time with the works of C. G. Jung, they would have given me the clue [to the interpretation of history].³

Instead he found the clue in Goethe's Faust.

In his search for a clue to a theory of man that would adequately support his philosophy of history, Toynbee discovered that,

the Will is only effective to the degree in which it succeeds in inducing the Subconscious Reservoir of the Psyche to lend itself to the Will's aim by suffering the Will to draw upon this amorphous yet exclusive source of psychic energy and to put it to work by canalizing it into a deliberate effort to attain some definite objective.⁴

This subconscious ground of the human Will has only recently commanded recognition in Western thought. It was known to the Greeks and was discovered earlier by the Hindus, but to Westerners preoccupied with the conscious and the rational, the notion of a subconscious smacked of pre-scientific superstition. For Toynbee, however, the rediscovery of this older intuition presented fascinating possibilities. It broadened the base of historiography as well as of psychology and philosophy. He believed that he had,

lived to see the subconscious well-spring of Poetry and Prophecy restored to honour in the Western World by the genius of C. G. Jung; but, before Jung's star at last rose. . . . Plato's example . . . [had given him] courage to part company with an early twentieth-century Western Zeitgeist whose . . . only realities were those that could be weighed and measured.⁵

The significance of these new theories of the subconscious and particularly that of Jung lay in the fact that they might be employed to clarify the mystery of the phenomenon

of the creative genius. "One of the puzzles which meets the philosophic historian," writes H. A. L. Fisher,

is the capricious and apparently unaccountable appearance of men of genius. When a man of genius has arisen, the historian is able to trace the causes which facilitate or obstruct the spread of his influence. What no one has yet succeeded in doing is to account for his emergence at all.⁶

The answer is to be found, perhaps, in a better understanding of the dynamics of human personality. And when it is found, it may also enlighten the student of human affairs concerning phenomena associated with individual and social progress.

Various hypotheses have been advanced, but Jung's psychology is particularly instructive. Bergson's élan vital was not unknown to Toynbee. He refers to it frequently, but he does not find in the notion of a "vital force" the basis for an adequate theory, and turns, instead, to the Jungian "concept of life energy."⁷

One may wonder why Toynbee did not employ the Viennese genius, Sigmund Freud, as his "navigator psychopompus." One reason is that when Freud's libido is examined in the light of Toynbee's view of man, society, and history, it becomes altogether too limited.

Freud's theories are in general too biological, too narrowly hedonistic, and they fail to give adequate recognition to what Toynbee believes to be the social origin and nature of man. In rejecting Freud for Jung, Toynbee joins with Gerald Heard in asking:

Is not Jung's concept of the Libido--a fundamental undifferentiated psychic energy--more true to the facts? . . . [Is not] sex [or affection] but one of its manifestations?⁸

In its original formulation, the Freudian hypothesis attempts to explain all psychic activity as the outcome of a highly individualistic and biological drives--essentially the sexual or affectional libido. Except in those instances in which this force is actually a factor, it explains nothing. The Jungian idea of "libido," on the other hand, "psychic energy," possesses no such limitation because it is not a "drive" or an "instinct" as such but the "function" of life itself.

Freud tries to trace the creative aspects of personality dynamics in terms similar to those by which he explains neuroses. He starts from individual behavior as such--not with the social nexus as does Jung. His thesis is that society suppresses human impulses and that the social order arises from the need for instinctual repressions.

At the other extreme from Freudian individualism is the social determinism of Émile Durkheim. Durkheim believed that universal biological tendencies, equipment, and individual capacities in man cannot be employed to explain differences between men. He proposed, instead, a special category of independently real social facts based on independent principles which could not be reduced to individual biological or psychological data. These principles would reveal the social factors that determine the nature of man. In short, man is a socially determined creature whose humanity derives from his social circumstances. This organic view of society and man Toynbee rejects. Instead, Toynbee prefers

the approach suggested by Solomon Asch who says:

People act with reference to each other. Interactions that are among the most unique events in nature occur between persons. They produce results of great diversity, which are the basis for all further social happenings. Each person is a source and center of psychological effects that extend into the lives of others. . . . All . . . relations between groups or between an individual and a group rest upon the primary events that take place between person and person.⁹

In steering between the extremes of "internal" or biological determinism and "external" or environmental determinism, Toynbee seeks a psychology congruent with the facts of fate and freedom as he discovers them in history. He finds it in the psychology of C. G. Jung who reveals, he says, "the equivalents, in the experience of the Soul [Psyche], of a number of phenomena that I . . . observed . . . in the experience of Society."¹⁰

In Jung, the contents of unconsciousness are not only personal but derive from the primordial--and in man, racial--experiences of life.¹¹ Jung distinguishes his psychology from Freud's by calling it "complex psychology." "The psychic," he asserts,

deserves to be taken as a phenomenon in itself, for there are no grounds for regarding it as a mere epiphenomenon, even though it is associated with the function of the brain; just as little as one can conceive of life as an epiphenomenon of the chemistry of carbon.¹²

Unlike Freudian theory--which is particularly adaptable to the analysis of individual psychic disorders--Jungian theory is particularly adaptable to the understanding of the creative personality and the social processes to which it is

related. In discussing this distinctive character of Jung's psychology which appealed to Toynbee, psychologist Progoff argued that,

Jung's approach to society differs from that of other psychologists in one outstanding and fundamental way. The usual practice is to begin with the notion of the individual, conceived either as a biological organism or as a hypothetical primal man, and . . . to generalize a theory based on a multiplication of the individual case. . . . Jung avoids the . . . tendency . . . to regard society as merely the plural of the individual, since he realized that the social quality of man is something inherent to human nature.¹³

The Jungian view of man which Toynbee embraces is the view,

that human personality consists of two things: first, of consciousness and whatever this covers, and second of an indefinitely large hinterland . . . [of] unknown factors [which] form what we call the unconscious. Of what [these] factors consist, we have no idea, since we can observe only their effects.¹⁴

The unconscious and its dynamics, Toynbee believes, is the "fount of Poetry, Music, and the Visual Arts, . . . the channel through which the Soul is in communion with God." Moreover,

the poetry and the prophetic vision that wells up out of the subconscious depths of the human soul [psyche] is not amenable to the law [of Nature] . . . [for] we are in the presence of genuine acts of creation.¹⁵

Though vitally important, biological and environmental factors do not alone account for human creativity.

Every creative person is a duality of contradictory aptitudes. On the one side he is a human being with a personal life, while on the other side he is an impersonal, creative process.¹⁶

In outstanding cases of creativity, observes Jung, "the creative force predominates [and] human life is ruled and moulded by the unconscious . . . the conscious Ego [being] swept along on [this] subterranean current," as it were.¹⁷ But the ego is not submerged in the subterranean current. It is not engulfed in a participation mystique. It captures the energy of it and channels it into creative activity. Indeed, the unconscious fount of poetry and prophecy is itself,

one of those statically perfect works of creation that are the Creator's "stopping places," [and] the Conscious Human Personality [is] an infinitely imperfect approximation [of] a Being of an incommensurably higher order, who is Himself the maker of both these divers [sic] but inseparable organs of the Human Psyche.¹⁸

The Human Psyche is a psychic chronometer, continues Toynbee, the Intellect [Ego-Conscious] and its partner the subconscious well-spring of Spiritual Creativity. Human acts of creativity are [therefore] governed by a law of spiritual dynamics.¹⁹

The hands of the psychic chronometer link, on the one hand, ego-consciousness and, on the other hand, "God the Dweller in the Innermost."²⁰ Toynbee is convinced of the existence of an "everlasting intercourse between the two members of this indissoluble pair of psychic partners [the Ego-conscious and the Subconscious]."²¹

The subconscious source of creative potential is both opportunity and threat. It is the fount of demonry as well as the fount of poetry. According to Toynbee, the human protagonist of the cosmic drama must live a life of dynamic

tension, a life of challenges and responses, if, indeed, he is to "live" at all. Like the boy of Zen Buddhism, he must learn to coax the ox within. He must live with that which can destroy him but without which he would have no life.

Toynbee speaks of a

subconscious Psyche [which] enjoys the same effortless harmony with God that its innocence assures to every non-human creature. This negatively blissful Yin-state, in which the Psyche "was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep," was broken up when human consciousness and personality were created through a Yang-movement. . . . The Soul is perpetually prone [to live] in the unstable spiritual equilibrium which is the essence of Human personality. . . . The recovered Yin-state in which salvation is to be found by Man is the peace, not of nerveless self-annihilation [of Nirvana], but of taut-strung harmony [between ego and subconsciousness].²²

For Toynbee as for Jung, therefore, man is animated by a "psychic energy." Psychic energy is the agent "within" man that is stimulated by and channeled through an environment--social or physical--which provides the "challenges." In Toynbee, psychic energy finds its ultimate source in God or in the cosmic process rather than in biological drives. It relates to the functioning of the human psyche and comes to life within a "social field." It "takes form only [within this] social field, and . . . the changes . . . [it] produces alter individuals at their center."²³

For Toynbee as for Jung, individuals possess distinctive aptitudes which derive from and are altered by society. Yet man is not merely the reflection of a coercive social reality as Durkheim believed. He is not merely part of a larger social macrocosmos. He is the center of unique and

autonomous psychic phenomena.

What is most distinctive in Toynbee and Jung is their account of the origin of human characteristics. Social experience and biological factors merely comprise the raw materials of the human psyche. They do not of themselves absolutely determine its consequent nature. The human psyche is more than the totality of its biological and social makeup. It is more than the effects of biological and social causes. It is a unique reality in itself.

Toynbee and Jung have not made the mistake of explaining man solely in terms of antecedent or consequent social factors or of any other factor which may happen to occupy the psyche's field-of-action. This is because the elements of the psyche's field-of-action comprise the challenges. The final answer must be the nature of challenge-and-response. The drama is not resolved until the play is finished. Thus man is neither free nor determined in the absolute sense of the term. Insofar as "external" challenges determine his responses as cause and effect he is not free. Insofar as these challenges can be transmuted into "internal" challenges to which unique volitional responses are given, man becomes relatively "free." Insofar as the human psyche becomes its own environment, becomes self-determined, it acquires freedom.

Psychic energy in man points to a reality more basic than its several particular manifestations. Toynbee believes that God is at the root of all psychic activity although He does not bear a cause and effect relationship to it. The Law

of Love which Toynbee believes to be the Perfect Law of God is reflected in man's essentially social nature. Apart from its social context, this law of love would be meaningless.

"In the study of the individual," as Bergson reminds us, "one can never overestimate the fact that the individual was meant for society."²⁴

Through man, God expresses His purpose--not as predestination--but through the profoundly subtle reality of a humanity "created in the image of God"--a God whom Toynbee portrays as the God of agape.

The paramount fact is that men come into relations not alone with the objects of nature but also with other men, and that in this encounter they are transformed into human beings. The environment of others . . . becomes a powerful, comprehensive region of forces within which each individual moves and has his being. . . . In the process the radius of his life undergoes profound extension.²⁵

This extension is expressed in Toynbee's metaphor "field of action." In these fields of action whose interaction comprises society,

the decisive psychological fact . . . is the capacity of individuals to comprehend and to respond to each other's experiences and actions . . . [and] the paramount fact about human interactions is that they are happenings that are psychologically represented in each of the participants.²⁶

The limits of this interacting influence are essentially psychological. Human failure stems from what is "false within." Challenges are not insuperable because of their particular severity they are insuperable because they do not provoke a creative response in the human field of action.

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The important Jungian concepts of "psyche" and "psychic energy" require accurate definition. They bear a particularly significant relationship to Toynbee's general theory. For Jung,

the psyche is indistinguishable from its manifestation [It] is [both] the object of psychology and--fatally enough--its subject at the same time.²⁷

In the conventional sense, it is spaceless and timeless; it must be conceived metaphorically and described functionally.

"Psyche is existent," Jung says, "it is even existence itself." But, he continues,

it is quite impossible to define the extension and the ultimate character of psychic existence. . . . The psyche reaches so far beyond the boundary line of consciousness that the latter could be easily [compared] to an island in the ocean.²⁸

The psyche is rooted in the social, racial, and primordial experiences of life.

Roughly speaking, the "psyche" is Toynbee's "field of action," a kind of non-physical space in which psychic phenomena occur. When speaking of the psyche, neither Jung nor Toynbee have in mind metaphysical substance. One can only say that the psyche functions, that a field of action is active--not what the psyche is in itself. This account of the psyche echoes current conceptions of the nature of physical reality according to which "matter" is what it does; to "define" it is to describe its functional behavior. And description of activity involves relationships and structures.

The psyche is not a "piece" of physical reality--whatever that may be--but an element in a continuum beginning with the "Supreme Identity" and including Life, Subconsciousness, Consciousness, and Society. For Toynbee, God the Creator is clearly the ground of this continuum--the ground of a continuum in which consciousness is but a minutely differentiated ego. The ego lives and moves and has its being in encounter with the contents of its own field of action, with other psyches, with life in general, with nature as a whole, and finally with Ultimate Reality or God.

Ego-consciousness, Toynbee and Jung insist, is functionally different from, yet coexists with, unconsciousness. Jung describes their relationship as one of "reciprocal relativity"--a dynamic unity in which the individual psyche embraces in tension the unconscious, the conscious, and the social. This psychic unity is energized by its deepest elements, by what Jung calls the Objective Psyche or Collective Unconscious. As the creative well-spring of the psyche, the Collective Unconscious reflects the activity of God "within" even as His activity challenges the psyche from "without."

The "field-of-action," or "psyche," possesses an "agent"--better labelled, perhaps, by the Jungian term "psychic energy." Like physical energy--whose ontology is by no means established--psychic energy can only be described in terms of what it does or is able to do, not in terms of what it is. Hence both the "field" and the "agent" are dealt with in terms of function and phenomena rather than in terms

of substance or metaphysical reality. The psyche and its energy are real however. They are by no means barren abstractions.

Psychic energy is associated with the rhythmic processes of life. A parallel to the Bergsonian dialectic is suggested in the suggestion of an opposition to the vital on-going activity of God by a recalcitrant creation which, having come into being, resists or challenges the on-going spirit of the Creator in a continuous series of encounters. This fundamental opposition is the resistance by creation of the tendency to continue creation, a resistance which issues in further creation itself.²⁹

Theologian Paul Tillich's analysis of the "power of being" is instructive at this point. Jung's psychic energy is--in this sense--Tillich's "power of being."

The power of being becomes manifest only in the process in which it actualizes its power. . . . Power is real only in its actualization, in the encounter with other bearers of power. . . . Life is the dynamic actualization of being. . . . nothing is final except those structures which make the dynamics of life possible. Life includes continuous decisions [responses to challenges] not necessarily conscious decisions, but decisions . . . in . . . encounter. . . . [The] power of being remains hidden if actual encounters do not reveal it.³⁰

In Jung, psychic energy is the totality of that which activates and integrates elements of the psyche. It stands for the character and intensity of the psychic processes which "we probably do best to regard . . . as the process of life itself." The psyche, on the other hand, is the field in which psychic energy is manifest--"the totality of all

psychological processes, both conscious as well as unconscious."³¹

Psychic energy becomes available through the dynamics of personality.

In Life there is always an irreducible minimum of psychic energy that will insist on discharging itself through some channel or other.³²

For some, Jung and Toynbee revive animism. Professor Sorokin argues, for example, that when,

psychical experiences are made the agencies which govern the dynamics of the trans-subjective process, cause, determine, and control them, we are simply reasoning in the fashion of Molière's quip that "opium makes man sleepy because it has a sleeping power."³³

Sorokin here recognizes the difficulty of bridging the gap between the "psychic" and the "physiological" through which psychic activity must take place. He recognizes the interminable complication of the problem of causation. "If a psychical agency is regarded as the cause of an overt action," he argues,

the whole chain [of causation] represents an incessant mental salto mortale from the realms of psychic experience to that of the trans-subjective phenomena, and vice versa. . . . The very character of such a chain is a denial of the causation known to other sciences . . . [and] is sheer mysticism.³⁴

The basic objection in this instance is that psychic variables defy analysis, that they are in a constant state of flux, and that there are no reliable means of measuring them. "When only these [psychic] circumstances are taken into consideration," Sorokin continues,

it becomes quite clear that even the greatest mathematician cannot keep account of [them] . . . and their

fluctuations; therefore, a computation of their "function" that is, a single overt action, becomes impossible.³⁵

But Toynbee and Jung do not assert that opium makes-- or "causes"--men to be sleepy because it has a sleeping power. They simply describe observable phenomena in the most appropriate language at hand: men getting sleepy on taking opium. The Jungian psychic energy which is the modus operandi of psychic processes is not a vital force or power to be explained in turn by reference to some more primal animalistic force or power in an analysis of cause and effect. The only assumption made is that God is the ground of a process that is occurring. This, to be sure, explains nothing, but metaphysics is not their problem. What is sought is insight into the dynamics of personality and society--particularly as they deal with the growth process. Whether God is in the process, beyond the process, or the process itself is not the point at issue.

The error which both Toynbee and Jung combat is the failure to appreciate the depth of human personality and the means by which this depth is to be understood. Both take account of "time" as well as "psychic" depth. They believe that the experience of the race is latently contained and unconsciously expressed in each individual, that once having occurred, an event has "immortally occurred." So far as the human psyche is concerned, the "event is what it is by reason of the unification in itself of a multiplicity of relationships."³⁶ They believe that Bergsonian intuition is as

necessary as is Cartesian analysis for an understanding of the total human problem.

The psychic processes which bring into action psychic energy in man involve polar tensions--opposites in dynamic tension--a continual "running counter to" as, for example, in Toynbee's challenge and response motif. Speaking of this motif, Tillich says:

Categories such as challenge, reaction, withdrawal, return, belong to a phenomenology of encounter. . . . Toynbee's example leads to an analysis of the relation of the power of being in an individual to the power of being in a group.³⁷

If one examines Toynbee's "phenomenology of encounter," one will discover the Jungian view that the psyche comes to grips with a Heraclitean reality in terms of contrasts and opposites. Insofar as the psyche can deal with its own and other manifestations of psychic energy, it must speak, describe, and comprehend them in terms of the "principle of opposites." Historically this is illustrated in the Yin and Yang of Chinese thought, in the Shiva-Shakti theme of the Hindus, as well as in the anima-animus images of Jung's own system. In the Hindu concept of māyā, for example, the dynamic encounter of the opposites of being and non-being issues in the "world" of becoming. Becoming is in turn swept away in the never ending flux of Samsara. This dynamic view of the world of the psyche is also the basic intuition--with variations to be sure--of Chinese, Egyptian, Zoroastrian, and Hebrew thought as well as much primitive thought.³⁸

"The psyche is a self-regulating system," says Jung.

There is no equilibrium and no self-regulating system without opposition. . . . Ever must high and low, hot and cold, etc., proceed in order that the process of equalization, which is nothing but energy, can take place. . . . All that lives is energy and is therefore based upon antithesis. . . . Not a conversion into the contrary but a conservation of the former values together with a recognition of their contrary.³⁹

"The energy charge of the unconscious," says Jung's interpreter Jacobi,

risks in the same measure as consciousness loses energy. It follows further that the energy is capable of being transformed.⁴⁰

The functioning of the psyche as Jung views it can best be portrayed by reference to a model. Hence the following is suggested. It should not be interpreted strictly or literally, and it should be interpreted in terms of Jungian definitions.

The ego constitutes the "self" which enjoins consciousness and the external world via a "persona." "The ego," Jung says,

[is] subordinated to, or contained in, a super-ordinated self as a center of the total, illimitable and indefinable psychic personality.⁴¹

The persona or personal "masks" offers "a compromise between the individual and society." It is that portion of the ego that changes in the encounter with changing social environment.⁴²

"LAYERS" OF THE PSYCHE

- A -- Area of unconscious tensions }
 B -- Area of conscious tensions }
 C -- Area of EXTERNAL or SOCIAL tensions
 in the personal "field of action." 43

INTERNAL TENSIONS

The personal unconscious contains forgotten, repressed, and sublimally perceived contents of all kinds. It embraces Freud's preconscious (Vorbewusstsein) on the border of consciousness and Dessoir's subconscious (Unterbewusstsein) which consists in unrecalled or repressed contents. As compared to the collective unconscious which carries the imprint of common human experience, its contents are personal experience. The collective unconscious is that part of the psyche which can never be made conscious but from which eruptions may occur. Jung prefers to call it the Objective Psyche and Toynbee the Racial Unconscious. It is the residence of the archetypes or primordial images. Collective unconsciousness is indifferent to the ego's attempt to adjust to the external. It participates in the impersonality of nature as a whole. It corresponds in part to the Freudian Superego--the collective social attributes consciously but unreflectively followed which give direction to the group. It is in consciousness, however, that functions affecting internal and external adjustment exhibit their varying degrees of differentiation and individuation.

On the basis of this view of the psyche Toynbee speculates that,

in between the uppermost and lowermost of the layers of the Subconscious . . . there might be intermediate layers deposited neither by [strictly] racial experience nor by [strictly] personal experience but by corporate experience of a supra-personal but infra-racial range . . . common to a family . . . community . . . society; and if, at the next level above the Primordial Images common to the whole Human Race, there should be images expressing the peculiar *ethos* of a particular society, the impress of these . . . might account for . . . periods [of] . . . certain social processes [i.e. rhythms exceeding single life spans in time].⁴⁴

It is then possible, he continues, that this understanding of the psyche might provide,

a psychological explanation of regularities in human affairs [which] account for the uniform recurrence of social processes . . . [which] expand over periods which are many times longer . . . than . . . a single life time . . . on the level of personal consciousness.⁴⁵

These and other possibilities intrigue Toynbee. He believes that he should embark on a "scientific exploration of [this] psychic underworld that . . . [was] familiar to Indian and Sinic contemporaries of the Hellenic discoverers of the Intellect."⁴⁶ His exploration brings to light "primordial images"--the Jungian archetypes. These are the subsistent modes or "axial systems" of human experience--the basic modes of psychic functioning. They determine as limits the possibilities of human experience in general in the manner that the environment determines as limits which possibilities shall be realized in particular. Toynbee speaks, for example, of the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return as,

a motif of cosmic range . . . [which] has furnished one of the "primordial images" of Mythology [and] which is [in turn] an intuitive form of apprehending and expressing universal truths.⁴⁷

The Jungian archetypes are not Plato's Forms nor are they innate ideas. They embrace a dark as well as a light side. Plato's Forms are perfect; how they participate in life Plato never clearly explained. Instead, Jung's archetypes are "psychic organs":

forms or images of a collective nature which occur practically all over the earth as constituents of myths and at the same time as autochthonous, individual

products of unconscious origin. . . . Even complicated archetypal images can be spontaneously reproduced without any possible direct tradition.⁴⁸

The archetypes function in individuals of every age and place and social environment.

The form of these archetypes is perhaps comparable to the axial system of a crystal, which predetermines as it were the crystalline formation in the saturated solution, without itself possessing a material existence. The existence first manifests itself in the way the ions and then the molecules arrange themselves. . . . The axial system determines, accordingly, merely the stereometric structure, not however, the concrete form of the individual crystal . . . and just so the archetype possesses . . . an invariable core of meaning that determines its manner of appearing always only in principle, never concretely.⁴⁹

Man-in-process-of-civilization develops his culture creatively and self-consciously. Its differentiation is considerable. The archetypes are much less immediately evident. Primitive man on the other hand, lives closer to his subconscious. Archetypes are more evident in his culture. Uniformities are more pronounced.

In particular the data for the thoughts and inferences of Primitive Man are very limited and are much the same everywhere. The nearer we come to the earliest type of Man, the more the means to his ends tend to coincide over the whole Race, as is shown by flint tools and weapons scattered all over the world and in many strata of Time. Hence the similarity of the means he takes in various places and ages to express his early religious and social ideas, and to attain his crude moral and spiritual ends.⁵⁰

The archetypes are significant for two reasons: they are the key to the form of the psychic processes, and they express fundamental intuitions about life. "They represent or personify," says Jung, "certain instinctive premises in the dark, primitive psyche, in the real but invisible roots

of consciousness."⁵¹ They are not innate or inherited ideas but inherited modes of the functioning of the ideas of experience.

The archetypes may find expression through energy transforming symbols.⁵²

Put to their right use they make possible a re-direction of energy and, by so doing, progressively transform the man who uses them.⁵³

They are, in brief, the means whereby the ego can consciously tap the resources of the psyche.

The transforming symbol, unlike the autonomous complex, does not tend to take over and run the man. On the contrary, consciousness has to recognize and use it if it is to have effect; in which case it performs the invaluable function of mobilizing the combined energy of consciousness and the unconscious.⁵⁴

In contrast with the transforming symbol there is the autonomous element of unconsciousness which acts as a center of functional disturbance. It is the autonomous complex. The complex is important to psychic functioning because it represents,

something ununited, unassimilable, conflicting. . . perhaps a hindrance, perhaps a stimulus to greater efforts and even to fresh successes. Complexes are thus in this sense focal and nodal points of psychic life with which one would not wish to dispose, indeed, which one could not do without, for else psychic activity would come to a standstill.⁵⁵

If a complex breaks into consciousness, however, psychic disorder may lower the threshold of consciousness. The psyche may become "possessed" in the very literal sense of the word. It may "fall from an active, conscious state into a passive 'possessed' one."⁵⁶

When consciousness loses energy it goes over into the unconscious, activates its contents--archetypes, complexes, etc.--which thereupon commence a life of their own, and breaking into consciousness, can cause disturbances, neuroses, and psychoses.⁵⁷

A distinction must be made, however:

The autonomous complex normally tends to possess the man; but provided a right relationship is made with it, can become a means of wholeness. The transforming symbol [on the other hand] normally makes possible a more developed attitude: but if misused can become a means of disintegration [breakdown]. Autonomous complexes and transforming symbols alike may be personal in character--in the main an outcome of the living experience of that particular individual. Or they may be archetypal, part of the psychic condition of man. In practice they are likely to be both.⁵⁸

Consciousness is precious. "Even an emotion," cautions Jung, "can cause a considerable loss of consciousness."⁵⁹

Jung describes experience in terms of four points of a psychic compass: Feeling, Sensation, Thinking, and Intuition. Thinking and Feeling are rational functions in opposition whereas Sensation and Intuition are opposing non-rational functions. Sensation is immediate experience which may provoke thought. Thought in turn gives rise to evaluation or "feeling." In addition, the psyche acquires direct insight through Intuition which is distinctly unthoughtout or unmediated. The manner of the response of the psyche is described as Introversion and Extraversion. Introversion is the direction of psychic energy toward the psyche itself. Extraversion is the direction of psychic energy toward the outer world. In Jung, "movement" of psychic energy is described as "progression" when there is a shift of energy from unconsciousness to consciousness, and "regression" when

energy shifts from consciousness to unconsciousness.

Regression, for example, may be introverted or extraverted depending on whether the psyche withdraws to the inner or to the outer world.⁶⁰

Challenges which confront the psyche from without and from within provoke responses which call into play the dominant or more highly differentiated function of the particular personality. The psyche utilizes this function because it is more effective in rendering successful adjustment. Insofar as the psyche responds successfully to these challenges, the dominant function of the four becomes more sharply differentiated.

The very conditions of society force a man to apply himself first and foremost to the differentiation of that function [or "faculty" in Toynbee] with which he is either most gifted by nature, or which provides his most effective means for social success. Very frequently, indeed as a general rule, a man identifies himself more or less completely with the most favored hence the most developed function.⁶¹

Over-differentiation of a function, however, reaches a point of diminishing returns. The very quality which renders most effective release and application of psychic energy becomes--by the nature of the psychic process itself--a threat as well as a challenge. This is because the opposite function is suppressed into unconsciousness where it may activate contents of unconsciousness and provoke an eruption from below.

In Western society, over-differentiation of the "thinking" function has tended to isolate Western man from the creative source of his being and to destroy his sense of

personality. The tragedy of civilization, warns Gerald Heard, results from a "fissure and specialization in consciousness." Hyper-rationalism and individualism has led to a mass sense of alienation and anxiety. This condition is symptomatic of social breakdown and constitutes a phenomenon which cannot be safely ignored in contemporary society.⁶²

The isolation and subsequent alienation of individual psyches is the prelude to the formation of those pseudo-social relationships which characterize dehumanized totalitarian collectivism. A mechanically and forcefully cemented community is substituted for genuine community in depth.

"One of [Jung's] major contributions regarding the 'diagnosis' of the condition of modern man," says Progoff, "is [his view] that consciousness has been overstressed to the point where an unbalanced situation has developed in the psyche."⁶³ Toynbee agrees. With Jung he believes that the emotional life of man cannot be denied.

The rapid increase of science and technics [has] attracted human consciousness to such an extent that it forgot the unaccountable forces of the unconscious mind.⁶⁴

In personality development, Jung continues,

the goal is always totality--the ideal solution in which all four psychological functions and both forms of attitudinal reactions are at the individual's command in as nearly the same degree of consciousness and disposability as possible.⁶⁵

This goal of "individuation" constitutes a condition in which,

the conscious and the unconscious are joined together. . . in a living relation to one another. . . . The undisturbed functioning of psychic life is guaranteed by the fact that unconsciousness can never be made completely

conscious [yet] always possesses the greater . . . energy. The wholeness thus remains always relative, and we have an opportunity to work on it further all our life long.⁶⁶

Individuation--Bewusstwerdung--is self-realization or "becoming conscious"--not of specific objects, but of a more intense awareness of life as a whole.⁶⁷ It is a living integration of consciousness and unconsciousness--a discovery and full employment of energy transforming symbols.

The aim of individuation is to achieve a balance, a harmony, in which conscious and the unconscious complement each other in a relation of "reciprocal relativity." It involves integration of the psyche as a unity.⁶⁸

Consciousness rests on the unconscious in a constant tension, out of which individuality emerges Individuation involves a release of tension by means of balancing opposites and setting up of a relation of harmonious dependence between consciousness and unconsciousness.⁶⁹

Moreover:

Just as the process of bringing psychic contents to consciousness involves a sharpening and clarifying of the ambiguities of the unconscious, so the individual emerges out of society by the process of differentiation and individuation.⁷⁰

In conclusion, Jung's idea of the depth, breadth, and dynamic of human personality is congenial to Toynbee. With encouragement from Jung, Toynbee has extended the dimensions of human personality to include time and social relationships customarily ignored. Both believe in the natural creativity of human personality, and both believe that this creativity is a manifestation of a more basic reality which is active in and through human personality. Moreover they link the dynamics of personality to the dynamics of history.

Like Jung, Toynbee ascribes to myth psychic reality-- a reality fully as significant to life as material reality, and, in the ultimate sense, more basic. Yet the material and the psychic are functional distinctions of what is actually a continuum in human experience. The world as man experiences and evaluates it is a function of psychic processes.

The goal of life is individuation or self-realization-- a "transfiguration" of human personality. When achieved, human personality shares in the creative life of God.

The tensions that confront the human psyche are the challenges which may give rise to creative responses. For Toynbee, the life of man must become more nearly identified with the life and creative purposes of God. Since the life of man is social as well as individual, society and man share a mutual destiny in achieving this goal.

CHAPTER V

Footnotes

¹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 20. In response to an enquiry concerning this influence, Toynbee wrote that "Jung's influence though now great is fairly recent. . . . [It] has been specially great since the Second World War." (Letter from Toynbee, loc. cit.) What Toynbee says is substantiated by the fact that only one reference to Jung is to be found in the first six volumes of A Study, i.e., in Vol. V, pp. 567f. wherein Toynbee refers to Carl G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1934).

²Letter from Edward D. Myers, December 22, 1955.

³Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 11. Professor Percival William Martin observes that "as he [Toynbee] was assembling the comprehensive data on which it is based, Jung, in complete independence, was working out the psychological means by which the withdrawal-and-return can be made." (Experiment in Depth: A Study of the Work of Jung, Eliot, and Toynbee [New York: Pantheon Books, 1955], foreword.) Later Martin comments that "in the withdrawal-and-return . . . it is the Jungian approach that is especially relevant." (Ibid., p. 7, n. 1.)

⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 172. Cf. VIII, op. cit., 116.

⁵Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 228. On the Western rediscovery of the Subconscious, see VII, op. cit., pp. 468, 497-98; IX, op. cit., pp. 328, 336, 377, 396, and 698, n. 1; and X, op. cit., 12. Regarding the suggestion of the existence of the Subconscious by the Hellenic writers, see IX, op. cit., 327f. and 332. Regarding the original discovery of the Subconscious by the Indic and Sinic worlds, see VII, op. cit., 468; IX, op. cit., 185, 328, and 332f.

⁶H. A. L. Fisher, "A Universal Historian: Review of Vols. I-III, A Study of History," The 19th Century and After, CXVI (December, 1934), 667.

⁷Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, foreword by Dr. Jung, trans. K. W. Bash (rev. ed.; New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1951), p. 68: Jung's "concept of life energy has nothing to do with a so-called vital force." According to Martin, op. cit., both Toynbee and Jung use "what Eliot once termed the 'mythical method'--the exploration of those symbols, visions, idees-forces which, acting powerfully from the unconscious depths, enable men and communities to find new energies, new values and new aims." (Foreword.)

⁸Gerald Heard, Social Substance of Religion (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 54. Cf. Sorokin's attack on all "psychological theories." "Needless to say," he observes, "an all-embracing concept like the Freudian libido ceases to have any definite contents and becomes scientifically useless." (Contemporary Sociological Theories [New York: Harper & Bros., 1928], p. 654, n. 83.) It is important to note, however, that "psychological theories"--as Sorokin describes them--vary. There are important distinctions. Alternative "non-psychological" theories are in general much less adequate.

⁹Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952), p. 139. Cf. also Chap. V, "The Problem of Human Interaction." Asch approaches the problem from the Gestalt viewpoint. Concerning the excesses of Durkheimian social determinism or "sociologism," see R. M. MacIver, Social Causation (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1942), pp. 76f.; Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, op. cit., Chaps. VIII-X; H. Alpert, "Durkheim and Sociological Psychology," American Journal of Sociology, XLV (July, 1939), 64-70; A. Salomon, "Sociology and Sociologism," Journal of Social Philosophy, III (April, 1938), 210-22.

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 225f.

¹¹Carl G. Jung, Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, trans. Constance Long (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1916), Chaps. VII through XV; Modern Man, op. cit., Chap. VI.

¹²Carl G. Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, trans. H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1928), p. 6.

¹³Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (New York: The Julian Press, 1953), p. 161.

¹⁴Carl G. Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 47f.

¹⁵Toynbee, "What I Am Trying to Do," op. cit., p. 4; A Study, VII, op. cit., 500. The italics are the writer's. Cf. Martin, op. cit., p. 207: "The unconscious is not fundamentally a menace, a source of fear and misgiving. It is the well-spring of life"; Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, trans. Michael Bullock (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 274: "Our consciousness is borne by the unconscious, it is a continual growth out of the unconscious and sliding back into the unconscious. . . . In every creative act . . . we are aided by an unconscious. . . . Pure consciousness is incapable of doing anything. Consciousness is like the crest of a wave. . . . We live . . . from out of it. . . . The more lucidly consciousness renders it manifest, the more . . . it becomes actual itself. . . . By entering into the unconscious . . . [we] attain heightened consciousness."

¹⁶Jung, Modern Man, (Harvest Book ed.), op. cit., p. 168.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 170.

¹⁸Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 498.

¹⁹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 40.

²⁰Like Plato, Toynbee tries to hitch Reason and Intuition side by side to the winged chariot of the Human Psyche--"to formulate in the language of reason the truth of Poetry and Prophecy." (Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 501, n. 1.) Cf. pp. 498, 508; and IX, op. cit., 399, 401, and 626.

²¹Toynbee, A Study, X, op. cit., 113. Cf. pp. 113-25 and VII, op. cit., 506. Jacobi, op. cit., p. 34, observes that creative individuals have an "extraordinarily close relation--as it were 'direct contact'--with the unconscious." Concerning the relationship of subconsciousness to conscious personality in Toynbee see: VII, op. cit., 501-06; IX, op. cit., 203, 317, 332ff., 348, 361, 380, 391, 403, and 629; X, op. cit., 124f.

²²Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 508. Cf. pp. 498 and 501-502; "The subconscious," says Toynbee, "is nearer to God than the Conscious Self." (VII, op. cit., 508, n. 3.) The significance of the Jungian hypothesis is also recognized by anthropologist Paul Radin. Radin observes that "it is application of the psycho-analytical theories of Jung [rather

than Freud] that is most likely to have the most profound influence upon ethnology." (Social Anthropology [New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1932], p. 16.) With Jung and Toynbee, Radin believes that the "primitive mentality" is an essentially psychological rather than a chronological phenomenon. (Paul Radin, Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin [New York: The Viking Press, 1937], passim.) Progoff, op. cit., pp. 276f. reminds us that "in interpreting Jung . . . the question of a stage prior to the development of consciousness does not involve a distinction between primitive and modern thought as such, but rather a distinction as to the nature and degree of differentiation of psychic contents. The levels for Jung [and Toynbee] do not fundamentally involve types of [material] culture but rather aspects of the change that occurs in the movement from the unconscious [primitive mentality to [the] consciousness [of Man-in-Process-of-Civilization]. The processes of the psyche . . . [are] the hub of the question." There is in Toynbee the view congruent with Jung that the contemporary uncreative majority reflect an essentially "primitive mentality" contrasting to the creative "Men in Process of Civilization" who share more in common, psychologically, with the creative individuals of earlier epochs than with their own uncreative contemporaries.

²³Asch, op. cit., p. 79. What Asch rejects as well as does Toynbee in deterministic theories is the elementaristic doctrine that "units of behavior are specific anatomical-physiological paths of excitation and that action is a sum of elementary units of reflex-arcs, some of which are innately conductive [instinctive] and others of which are strengthened during the life of the individual [that is, learned]." (Ibid., p. 76.)

²⁴Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Clouesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 95.

²⁵Ibid., p. 119.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 127, 142.

²⁷Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 62.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 12, 100-102. Cf. Jung, Modern Man, op. cit., Chap. IX.

²⁹Cf. the analysis of the Bergsonian dialectic by Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte (Zürich: Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1954), pp. 16-23:

"Die Natur als der Inbegriff der materiellen Welt--'à la fois docile et rebelle,' 'instrument et obstacle,' 'massacreuse des individus en même temps que génératrice des espèces'-- hat dabei den Charakter einer Herausforderung. Die Herausforderung musz vom Leben beantwortet werden. Sie ist das Böse, ohne das sich das Gute nicht verwirklichen kann." (p. 22.) Zahn quotes from Bergson's L'Evolution Créatrice.

³⁰Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 41.

³¹Carl G. Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. G. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 588.

³²Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 639.

³³Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories, op. cit., p. 646.

³⁴Ibid., p. 648.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 649f. Cf. balance of Chap. II and H. Klüver, "Max Weber's 'Ideal Types' in Psychology." Journal of Philosophy, XXIII (January-December, 1926), 29-35.

³⁶Alfred Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 180. Cf. pp. 93ff., 133.

³⁷Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, op. cit., p. 43.

³⁸Carl G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1928), pp. 62, 79. Cf. Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 68ff. For an excellent study of "The Way Between the Opposites"--the Jungian "principle of opposites"--enantiodromia, or "running between opposites," see Martin, op. cit., Chap. VII. The basic opposites at work in the human psyche, says Martin, are the claims of the conscious and the unconscious. The psyche must steer a course between inner and outer necessity, inner and outer demands. "Visible and invisible, two worlds meet in man." Martin distinguishes four categories of opposites: those of attitude--yes and no, plus and minus, pleasure and pain, etc.; those of self-contradiction--body and spirit, Dionysiac and Apollonian, etc.; those of society--ego and ethnocentricity, individual and group, etc.; those of time and eternity (existential)--subjectivity and objectivity

of values, naturalism and supernaturalism, This World and the Other World, et cetera. Opposites reflect themselves in the dynamics of human personality on the basis of what Jung terms a "reciprocal relativity"--a theory of the complementariness and compensatory nature of psychic relationships. For example, the unconscious tends to compensate for an "over-differentiation" of a conscious function. Suppressed functions of the psyche act as stimuli which set in motion psychic processes that tend to redress imbalance--to restore equilibrium.

³⁹Jung, Two Essays, op. cit., p. 62.

⁴⁰Jacobi, op. cit., p. 71. Cf. Jung, Two Essays, op. cit., p. 71, and Modern Man, op. cit., p. 242.

⁴¹Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴²Jung, Two Essays, op. cit., p. 165. See also the analysis by Martin, op. cit., pp. 169f. wherein he observes that there is a serious danger in the complete identification of the ego with the persona, i.e., the individual believes that he is actually his persona. In this instance he becomes the victim of his unconscious, projecting his "shadow" self on others. Cut off from awareness of the whole self, he is "left high and dry . . . bloodless and sterile . . . a mere simulacrum." The latter becomes a personal tragedy, the former a social tragedy." (Ibid.)

⁴³Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., Chap. I; and Jacobi, op. cit., Chap. I, "The Nature and Structure of the Psyche." "The structure of the unconscious is inferred from manifestations--empirically--of symptoms or complexes, dreams, fantasies, and visions. Compare, says Jacobi, "the parallel with the methods of physics and its hypothetical construction. . . . There too the waves and atoms themselves are not perceived, but they are inferred [as constructs] from their observed effects, and hypotheses are sought that are able to explain as comprehensively as possible what has been observed and postulated." (op. cit., p. 45, n. 9.) In physics one observes the activity of the "particle"--not the "particle" itself, yet these forms of scientific shorthand are universally accepted as valid scientific fictions. Likewise one does not "see" the collective unconscious. It is a useful hypothesis designed to cope with realities more complex, perhaps, than any aspect of physical reality.

⁴⁴Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 328. Toynbee also discusses a personal and collective unconscious and appeals

to the use of Jungian analytical psychology. Cf. pp. 48f., n. 1, 329, and 698; also VIII, op. cit., 115f. For a more detailed description of the unconscious, see Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., pp. 613ff.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 327.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 328.

⁴⁷Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 259f. Cf. I, op. cit., 442; Carl G. Jung and Carl Kerényi, Essays on a Science of Mythology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 105: "What an archetypal content is always expressing is first and foremost a figure of speech."

⁴⁸Jung and Kerényi, op. cit., p. 110. Cf. Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 63f.; Psychological Types, op. cit., pp. 379, 554ff.; Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 56f.; Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., p. 262: "The dispositions of the species [man] subsist, immutable, deep within all of us."

⁴⁹Carl G. Jung, "Die psychologischen Aspekte des Mutter-Archetypus," Eranos-Jahrbuch 1938 (Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1939), p. 410, trans. and quoted in Jacobi, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁰J. Murphy, Primitive Man (London: Milford, 1927), pp. 8f. The theory of primordial images is by no means limited to the creative imagination of Dr. Jung. It is suggested in the psychology of Alfred Bastian who wrote during the nineteenth century. Friedrich Nietzsche believed that "in our sleep and in our dreams we pass through the whole thought of earlier humanity. . . . This atavistic relic of humanity manifests its existence within us, for it is the foundation upon which the higher rational faculty developed." (Human, All Too Human, trans. Alexander Harvey [Chicago: C. H. Kerr & Co., 1908], II, 27) quoted in Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 64 wherein Jung also cites many other sources of the idea of archetypes including Durkheim's notion of the "collective representations." Jung discusses the archetypes in Psychological Types, op. cit., pp. 554ff.; Modern Man, op. cit., Chap. IX; and in The Integration of the Personality, trans. S. M. Dell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940), Chap. III, "Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious." In Proffoff, the discussion concerning archetypes is found op. cit., pp. 68-73; in Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., p. 262; and in Toynbee, VII, op. cit., 413; and

IX, op. cit., 48f., 328, and 698. Concerning Toynbee's view of their role in the fine arts, see IX, op. cit., 697-704.

⁵¹Jung and Kerényi, op. cit., p. 110.

⁵²Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., Chap. XI.

⁵³Martin, op. cit., p. 115.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 162.

⁵⁵Jung, Modern Man, op. cit., p. 91. Cf. Martin, op. cit., p. 162: "The autonomous complex . . . consists of a twisting-together of psychic contents, having its own energy and operating in its own fashion. The human psyche contains many such autonomous complexes. Any one or combination of these, whether in the form of projection or of invasion, is liable to take over and run the man for anything from a split-second to years at a time."

⁵⁶Jacobi, op. cit., p. 47.

⁵⁷Jacobi, op. cit., p. 72.

⁵⁸Martin, op. cit., p. 163.

⁵⁹Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 19.

⁶⁰For a more thorough treatment of these topics see Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., Chap. XII; Modern Man, op. cit., Chap. IV; Contributions to Analytical Psychology, op. cit., Chap. I; Progoff, op. cit., pp. 109ff.; Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 27ff.; and Martin, op. cit., Chap. II.

⁶¹Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., p. 564.

⁶²Heard, Social Substance of Religion, op. cit., pp. 30, 38. For an excellent study of this problem see David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); and Rollo May, Man's Search For Himself (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953).

⁶³Progoff, op. cit., p. 98.

⁶⁴Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 33f.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 139. Cf. Martin, op. cit., Chap. VIII, "The Individuation Process." Martin summarizes individuation as: a way of living life, an "inward transforming experience" transcending self-achievement, unique for each individual, distinct from "individualism" per se, and a continuing activity of the psyche. (Ibid., pp. 164f.)

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 60f.

⁶⁷Progoff, op. cit., p. 146.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 166.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 164.. Jung borrows from Lévy-Bruhl the concept of participation mystique which the latter applied to the primitive mentality and which Jung applies to the psyche submerged in the collective mass. Failure of the psyche to individuate is characterized by a thinking and judging with the mind of some group with which the personality happens to share a common ground as with a family, clan, nation, etc. "Instead of a man working out his own unique experiment in living there is a kind of underground collective life . . . in which the individual . . . is submerged." (Martin, op. cit., p. 171.)

CHAPTER VI

TOYNBEE'S THEORY OF ETHERIALIZATION

Arnold J. Toynbee's philosophy of history has been characterized as a saga of sin, suffering, and doom. Professor Sorokin speaks of Toynbee as a self-styled "undertaker of civilizations," and Professor Harry Elmer Barnes adds that "Toynbee buries [his] civilization[s] in an Anglican churchyard."¹ Yet Toynbee's detailed treatment of disaster is no necessary indication of morbid concerns; much less is this treatment a necessary indication of the limit of his contribution to historiography. Nor does his religious interest necessarily transgress the legitimate prerogative of the historian to report history as he sees it. Toynbee's secular colleagues see in the Renaissance, in the Enlightenment, or in Modern Science a particular significance for history.² Toynbee finds this significance in the emergence of higher religion.

The issue of religious versus secular historiography is not new. Lucretius, for example, saw progress in the decline of religion much as V. Gordon Childe does today. Toynbee, on the other hand, sees progress in the advance of religion as did Augustine.

The purpose of this chapter is not, however, to defend Toynbee's philosophy of history as religious historiography. It is to focus attention on Toynbee's analysis of the nature and meaning of growth and progress. In particular, attention is centered on his idea of etherialization which he advances as a criterion of growth and progress.

The rise and fall of individuals, societies, civilizations, or constituents thereof may be likened to the meteorological phenomenon of convection in the one case and subsidence in the other. The analogy is manifestly crude, but nevertheless instructive. We note that within any air mass heated from below there may be found rather sharply differentiated convection currents which ascend rather spectacularly. These currents rise with varying degrees of rapidity and achieve varying degrees of height. Occasionally they are accompanied by sharp downdrafts. More often the air mass as a whole tends to settle slowly over a wide area in its return to earth. This gradual subsidence better characterizes the average state of affairs within the air mass. The spectacular updraft capped by a resplendent cloud is the exception rather than the rule although on occasion clouds may predominate in a particular area.

If we apply this crude analogy to the affairs of men, we note that regardless of the nature of the ultimate destiny of man, the totality of human experience embraces great individual and collective achievements, achievements which have been and continue to be accompanied by a relative and

widespread inactivity. Moreover, the analogy suggests that for most men most of the time, life is not a great creative venture but a striving to resist the forces of physical or spiritual decline, to sustain a modicum of happiness in the face of suffering and ennui. For many, the object of life is sheer physical survival. For others--perhaps less fortunate--life is an urgent flight from boredom arising from the enervation of creative potential.³ Yet for all of its anomalies, life is good. So it seems to the healthy mind and soul. For most men, zest for it is never wholly lost. Hope for the better is continually buttressed by a belief in the possibility of an amelioration of the worst either in this world or the next. Otherwise human effort would be a treadmill of futility.

If we return momentarily to the analogy, we note that the mass of air--or shall we say of mankind--possesses a potential for growth but exhibits instead, a tendency toward quiescence or actual subsidence. This relative quiescence, however, is intermittently punctuated by genuine surges of effort accompanied by genuine creative achievement. According to Toynbee, these particular instances reflect the activity of a creative minority. In more generalized cases these creative surges may be likened to the great social upheavals known as civilization. In any instance, growth applies to activity rather than to the physical extension of this or that institution, human trait, or social entity as such. This is the important distinction between Toynbee's and

Spengler's civilizations. The latter's organic analogy does not apply to Toynbee. For Toynbee, any creative activity--when it appears--is growth, and insofar as it has spiritual significance it is progress. Even the challenge of social disintegration may evoke creative spiritual responses which are genuine instances of progress in the life of man.

Indeed, Toynbee's criterion of creativity is the presence of significance or value in a particular activity. And significance or value vary as the quality of the human situation. The greater values are those which are more enduring or are ultimate in their significance, or whose presence supports or renders possible other values. These Toynbee believes to be spiritual. Hence his emphasis upon spiritual significance.

Toynbee believes that the potential for creativity is germane to the human situation. Countless variations of creative activity are manifest in the life of man. The most humble African village may include,

individuals who have lived and died obscure because they . . . failed to break "the cake of custom" and have therefore failed to win for their potential genius the field which it needs in order to realize and manifest itself in action.⁴

There is no élite blessed with a copyright on cosmic grace.

This widespread creative potential suggests religious intonations. It is related to the cosmic drama, to ultimate concerns. Indeed, the secret of history is to be found, Toynbee believes, in the dramaturgical overtones of mythology, for mythology expresses in living metaphor the most basic experiences of the human race. In his deepest intuitions,

man has learned that perfection is neither the ideal nor the goal of existence. Faust is perfect in knowledge, Job perfect in goodness, and Adam perfect in innocence. But perfection is stasis. Even the perfection of God requires a challenger to disturb "the waters of the deep," as it were, so that out of the turmoil and incompleteness of Yang, a fresh act of creation may restore the temporary perfection of Yin.

In these mythological expressions of the cosmic drama, the Devil symbolizes the challenger whose force of disequilibrium moves the Creator to renew creative activity, to restore Yin. Mephistopheles "shapes and must create, though Devil." The cosmic encounter is archetypal. It is the clash between Satan and the Lord in the Book of Job, between Yahweh and the Serpent in the Garden, between Artemis and Aphrodite in Euripides' Hippolytus. The human psyche discovers its tragic role. It discovers that in the drama of Life, it is human personalities who are the dramatis personae that perform the acts by which the "foundations of the great deep are loosed." Men share with the Creator the common concern of creation. In becoming the cooperative vessels of the Creator (Wu Wei), men participate in the drama of Life. "In the third stage," says Toynbee,

the reversal of the cosmic rhythm from Yang towards Yin, which was initiated in the second stage is carried to completion. . . . In this new creation, which the ordeal of one of God's creatures has enabled God to achieve, the sufferer himself returns to a state of peace and harmony and bliss [Yin] on a higher level.⁵

Though the human protagonist passes through "the dark night of the soul," the challenges and responses of Life become the joyful labor of creation. Perfection becomes perfect functioning or creative process--not Plato's contemplation of Eternity. For Toynbee, it is Prometheus rather than the philosopher who personifies the creative process--symbolizes the ideal. Prometheus knows that unless Zeus is kept on the move, he will be overthrown even as Cronos before him. Prometheus therefore gives Zeus no peace.

In participating in the creative process, man not only fulfills God's will but brings about human progress. "The human protagonist in the divine drama not only serves God by enabling Him to renew His creation, but also serves his fellow-men by pointing the way for others to follow."⁶

The way of Life in This World--which is the way of creative growth--is what Toynbee calls etherialization. In the ultimate and therefore religious sense, etherialization is the way of transfiguration. Progress in all spheres of life possesses spiritual significance, Toynbee believes. This does not mean that only the spiritual is real but that all values, all creative activity possess a spiritual as well as a mundane or more immediate significance. This is the condition of progress. Progress is a matter of ultimate significance as well as the increase of this or that, and ultimate concerns are ipso facto spiritual concerns. Indeed, if we view "terrestrial history sub specie aeternitatis,"

asks Toynbee,

what significance shall we find in the idea of progress in . . . the progressive improvement of some terrestrial institution: a tribe, a city-state, an empire, a church, a system of knowledge or "know-how" a school of art, a code of morals. . . .⁷

If progress possesses spiritual significance, to what does it point? Toynbee answers: full participation in the creative process which is the "Life of God."

The progress of individual souls through This World towards [cooperation with] God, and not progress of Society [Leviathan] in This World is the end in which the supreme value is found.⁸

Although Toynbee's etherialization is "a conversion of the soul from the World, the Flesh, and Devil, to a Kingdom of Heaven," a doctrine of escapism is not intended.⁹

This world is neither a Kingdom for Leviathan nor an irreclaimable spiritual wilderness, but a province of the Kingdom of God. It is a rebellious province which has been betrayed by the sin of pride into ungratefully and unlawfully declaring its independence and has thereby brought upon itself the self-imposed penalties of misrule and distress; but this act of rebellion has neither invalidated God's sovereignty nor alienated His love.¹⁰

If God has not renounced and abandoned This World, Toynbee argues, why should man? Etherialization has to do with the quality of life processes. Transformation of life--not escape--is Toynbee's goal, and "every example of human growth," he says, "will always be found to have a social as well as an individual aspect."¹¹ No aspect of existence is beyond the purview of the creative activity of God:

The phenomenon of "etherialization" asserts itself in the domain of Applied Sciences . . . Theology . . . Mathematics . . . Art and Philosophy.¹²

Indeed, when creative activity ceases in one sphere of life, it is likely to spring up in another. The dynamic of human psychic energy will not be denied, for its source is God Himself. An example is to be found in the experience of contemporary Western man whose spirit is threatened by the dehumanizing effect of mechanization and regimentation.

"Our prediction," says Toynbee,

- [is] that some revolutionary change in the Western Society's religious life [is] likely to occur as a result of the revolutionary changes produced in Western Society's economic and political life by the psychological effects of the mechanization of its technology. . . . Indeed, so far from the regimentation of Western life on the economic and political planes being likely to induce a regimentation of Western life on the religious plane as well, it seems likely to militate against it; for one of the devices by which Life achieves the tour de force of keeping itself alive is by compensating for a deficit or surplus in one department by accumulating a surplus or incurring a deficiency in another. . . .

In Life there is always an irreducible minimum of psychic energy that will insist on discharging itself through some channel or other. . . . Life's device for economizing energy is mechanization. For example, by making the beating of the heart and the alternating inflation and deflation of the lungs automatic in the human body, Life had released human thought and will for other uses.¹³

The creative activity of God is manifest in both the external growth of human societies and in the internal growth of human personality:

Civilizations grow through an élan that carries them from challenge through response to further challenge and from differentiation through integration to differentiation again. . . . This kind of progress cannot properly be described in the spatial metaphor of "direction." For the progress which we call growth is a cumulative progress, and its cumulative character is apparent in both its outward and its inward aspects.

In the Macrocosm, growth reveals itself as a progressive and cumulative mastery over an external environment; in the Microcosm, as a progressive and cumulative inward self-determination or self-articulation. In either of these two manifestations of growth--the external or the internal--we have a possible criterion of the progress of the élan itself.¹⁴

A difficulty in grasping the nature of Toynbee's etherialization as the Way of Life arises in part from failure to appreciate the significance of the psychological processes involved. Toynbee's critics tend to view etherialization in strictly Platonic terms as, for example, in the comment that for Toynbee "spiritual ends cannot be achieved through material means."¹⁵ Professor Barnes, for example, admits that Toynbee's progress through etherialization "is almost exclusively a result of psychic and social forces," but laments that,

the soft mystical note that merely confuses the earlier parts of [his] work becomes so loud toward the end of the third volume [in which Toynbee introduces etherialization] that it almost drowns out the systematic-empirical strain. We therefore do not discuss his concepts of "etherialization" and "withdrawal-and-return" largely because we do not fully understand them.¹⁷

Professor Feibleman also exhibits a typical difficulty in grasping Toynbee's psychology when he wonders whether,

the conception of "etherialization" . . . is inconsistent with the movement of genesis [of civilizations]. Why would a civilization whose genesis was social be enabled to grow only by a movement which is personal? That the elements of social growth may have their correspondent effect upon and interrelation with the individual is to be expected; but that they should be exhausted by that aspect of society is not logical. Does etherialization have no social and objective counterpart? Is there nothing in the objective relations between individuals, and between social

groups, which corresponds to what is happening within the individual. . . . It is curious indeed that etherialization goes into the individual and not upward on a social basis at all. Toynbee . . . insist[s] that higher levels of cultural value must be exclusively confined to the individual's soul and that these higher levels can have no existence in the objective social and nature world.¹⁸

In a letter to Feibleman, Toynbee's rejoinder was that higher values are individual achievements which have social and material implications and conditions by virtue of the nature of man and society.¹⁹

A common and serious charge that must be carefully examined is the charge that Toynbee revives Other Worldly interests with a view to escape from This World. Initially we must argue that because the cosmic drama works in and through human personality, it does not follow that the actions or concerns of human personality are confined to interest in escape from This World. Part of the error arises from the association of the human field-of-action with "mind" in the traditional dualistic sense as over against "body." There follow then the conventional dichotomies of individual and social, material and spiritual, and so on. The erroneous notion arises that the cosmic drama of which Toynbee speaks must be resolved in exclusively spiritual or individual terms without regard to material or social considerations. Toynbee's answer is that the human psyche's field-of-action embraces the material as well as the spiritual, the social as well as the individual. Spiritual values, Toynbee insists, are not necessarily antithetical to material or social values but

sustain them and in the ultimate sense give them their significance. In other words, these values are antithetical only in the sense that they distort or replace spiritual values. So long as growth persists and there is no idolization of the ephemeral, values are complementary. Insofar as values lose their complementary relationship so as to pit material against spiritual, individual against social--which is often the case--breakdown occurs.

"In seeking God," Toynbee says,

Man is performing a social act. . . . Man's efforts to make himself less unlike God who has created Man in His own image must include efforts to follow Christ's example. . . . The antithesis between trying to save one's own soul by seeking and following God and trying to do one's own duty to one's neighbour is therefore false. . . . It is a paradoxical but profoundly true and important principle of life that the most likely way to reach a goal is to be aiming not at that goal itself but at some more ambitious goal beyond it.²⁰

"The spirit of higher religions," continues Toynbee, "so far from being a social cancer [as Gibbon and Frazer have told us], is the bread of social, as well as spiritual life."²¹

Progress through etherialization implies qualitative advances to which value attaches, and the ground of all value is--in the final sense--spiritual. Moreover that which supports value also supports progress.

The religious emphasis in Toynbee does not consist in a repudiation of or an attempt to escape from the processes of Life. It is, instead, an attempt to restore purpose and value to these processes. Yet Toynbee is not simply reviving Aristotelian teleology or Augustinian otherworldliness. He

is invoking insights from twentieth-century process philosophy.

"In Life-in-Time, as human souls experience it in their passage through This World," he explains,

a finite human understanding, that cannot resolve an apparent moral conflict between divers laws reigning within the human ken, can at least discern that . . . these laws stand to one another in a hierarchical relation . . . and that this hierarchy of laws is [a] Jacob's ladder up which God is ever seeking to draw His Creatures towards Him.²²

"Earthly existence is an ordeal," Toynbee believes, that necessarily embraces all mundane activities. Etherialization is not, therefore, removal of the human psyche from its field of action but a transformation of that field of action itself. It ascribes significance to a process that would otherwise be meaningless. The idea of etherialization makes it possible to see in,

the operation of "laws of Nature" in the histories of civilization . . . a struggle between a dominant tendency at work which prevails in the long run against repeated and, in the short run, repeatedly successful-counteracting moves in which . . . the persistence of the weaker tendency . . . accounts for the repetition of the encounter in a series of successive cycles; the dominance of the stronger tendency makes itself felt by bringing the series to a close sooner or later, instead of letting it go on repeating itself ad infinitum.²³

The ultimate significance of etherialization is not circumscribed by the nature of any particular manifestation of it.

In any analysis of [the] rhythm [of Life] we have to distinguish between the movements of the part and of the whole and between the natures of the means and of the end. There is no law of pre-established harmony which decrees that the end must have the same nature as the means or the whole the same movement as the part; and this is immediately obvious in the case of the wheel. . . . The fact that the vehicle can only move in virtue of the wheel's circular movement

round the axle does not compel the vehicle itself to travel like a merry-go-round in a circular track.²⁴

Unfortunately there can be no brief, all-inclusive and definitive statement of etherialization. It must be apprehended by examination rather than by definition. The meaning of the term is relative to its context. Any simple definition would be partial and misleading.

The idea is not altogether original with Toynbee. Henry Adams spoke of the Ethereal in reference to pure, abstract mathematical thought.²⁵ It is improbable, however, that he influenced Toynbee in any way. In a letter to this writer, Toynbee ventured the opinion that his etherialization was an original idea although--he hastened to add--all ideas have origins, and the major source of inspiration for etherialization he believed to be the New Testament.²⁶

The term "etherialization is an unfortunate word" says anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, "[but] there is an important concept here in spite of the term."²⁷ Etherialization is an unfortunate word because it suggests a kind of ghostly quality not intended by Toynbee. Actually it stands for the essential character of the creative process. When one considers that "creative acts . . . defy description . . . even by the innovators themselves," one can readily appreciate Toynbee's selection of the term etherialization.²⁸

One of the earliest hints of the idea of etherialization is to be found in The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922)--a major work which suggests many of Toynbee's

key ideas. In The Western Question, Toynbee hints at the essentially moral nature of growth.²⁹ Etherialization is suggested in the view that self-determination is the criterion of the growth and decay of civilizations.³⁰

If the influence of the New Testament is disregarded momentarily, numerous possible sources of inspiration for the idea of etherialization suggest themselves. Professor Sorokin advances "H. T. Buckle's dynamics of a 'diminishing influence of physical laws and of an increasing influence of mental laws' as time passes."³¹ One might also point to Hobhouse's belief that social processes tend to be increasingly determined by the self-conscious volitions of man. There is a possible influence in the Russian sociologist, Jacques Novicow (1849-1912), who saw a progressive shift in the arena of human conflict from the material to the mental and the spiritual. Toynbee himself cites the work of a Bishop Barnes who "put his finger on the principle . . . of 'Etherialization'" in his study of evolution, and "Mr. Heard," who,

suggests that the armour which saved the Mammals' lives was not physical but psychic, and that the strength of this psychic defence lay in a physical defencelessness.³²

Heard's influence is suggested in the,

psychological hypothesis--the opinion that the condition of civilization is the consequence of the quality of the consciousness of its constituents.³³

A significant work by Heard entitled The Social Substance of Religion appeared in 1931 during the period between 1929 and 1935 when Toynbee was writing the first three volumes of

A Study. This work may have had a marked influence on Toynbee with regard to the idea of etherialization. Historian Bertram Wolfe seems to think so.³⁴ However Professor James H. Nichols is probably correct when he says that "Bergsonian evolutionism hit Toynbee 'with the force of a revelation.'"³⁵ Bergson's influence persists throughout the writing of A Study. It is earlier and more germane than that of Jung. The latter became particularly influential in the four concluding volumes of A Study.³⁶ But Toynbee had by then already developed his idea of etherialization. One can scarcely appreciate Toynbee unless Bergson--particularly his Two Sources--is read first. Rushton Coulborn believes that Toynbee's

interpretation of history is made in the light of Bergson's theory of "dynamic religion," a theory which is effectively sustained for primitive societies by the work of such anthropologists as Wilson Wallis and Philleo Nash . . . [and] is equally applicable to civilized societies.³⁷

Toynbee's religious emphasis and its relation to the life and destiny of man is suggested in both Heard and Bergson. They believe with Toynbee that civilization develops under the aegis of religion. Heard asks:

What is the force which preserves [civilization]
 . . . which neutralizes [destructive] individuality?
 . . . It is Religion.³⁸

"The clue to the history of civilization," he continues,

must be looked for in the history of religion, for religion is the form in which psychic expression is found least adulterated, and psychic forces are the fundamental causes of history.³⁹

Even the manner by which Toynbee develops his thesis concerning etherialization in the life of man is suggested by

Heard in his Ascent of Humanity in which he speaks of a "systole and diastole of Time"--a mystic evolutionary rhythm by which growth proceeds. In the emergence of human consciousness, the co-conscious individuality of primitive man [or the primitive mentality] is followed by self-conscious individuality [of civilized man] from which may develop a super or common self-consciousness in the next development of man.⁴⁰ In his Source of Civilization, Heard strongly suggests one basic aspect of Toynbee's theory of etherialization in the statement that,

Life evolves by sensitiveness and awareness; by being exposed [challenged], not by being protected.⁴¹

Though not yet fully defined or described, Toynbee's etherialization suggests a qualitative and functional aspect of process--an infusing of value into change.⁴² It is this axiological problem that impoverishes most sociological theories of progress. The sociologist is obliged to deal with his categories in terms of ephemeral values. This does not mean that these values are unreal or insignificant but merely that they are contingent. The ephemeral values which the sociologist is likely to invoke derive their significance from a surreptitious introduction of an unacknowledged ground or ultimate basis of value. If the sociologist successfully avoids the issue of ultimate and therefore religious assumptions, his system of values and consequently his theory of progress will be groundless. On the other hand, if he chooses to come to grips with the value problem, he may find himself

violating the principle of verifiability. The usual response is therefore to avoid the issue altogether and to accept the principle of progress merely as a preferential matter of faith rather than of fact.

Toynbee has clearly apprehended the inadequacy of naturalistic attempts at a definition of progress. Whatever may be the patent errors in the detail, outline, or application of his theory, his insight into the importance of personality processes and values for any theory of progress is noteworthy. Moreover, what many of his critics have believed to be the basis of his difficulties--his religious axiology--is in reality the basis of his strength. The question is not so much what kind of a theory of progress one may prefer as whether any theory of progress is possible and, if so, on what grounds. When the sociologist attempts an explicit or implicit theory of progress, he is involved in a philosophy of history and a theory of values as well. Hence he is likely to avoid the issue altogether if he can. Toynbee, on the other hand, can approach the problem of progress head on.

For Toynbee, the history of man is punctuated by two events of climactic importance--the emergence of Homo sapiens and the emergence of "man-in-process-of-civilization." The first event constituted a psychic revolution of vast importance not accompanied by evidence of any corresponding revolution in material technique.⁴³ The latter is contemporary in the sense that it involves contemporary man.

Man-in-process-of-civilization is the result of a unique set of interactions between man and his environment--material, social, and psychic. These interactions evoke unique responses in particular individuals. They are the universal possibility of all men in all environments. In actuality, however, they appear to be limited to the responses of particular individuals and groups to particular challenges. The particularity of etherialization is not a function of time, or culture, or external causal factors alone but the outcome of a unique interaction of psychic and non-psychic factors. Indeed it is a genuinely creative phenomenon.

The Genesis of man-in-process-of-civilization is conditioned but not determined by physical environment:

Any kind of climate and topography is capable of serving as an environment for the genesis of a civilization if the necessary miracle is performed by some [other] positive factor. . . . The genesis of a civilization can take place in any kind of human environment or--on the evidence of the "unrelated" civilizations--without any human environment at all. . . . The cause of the genesis of civilizations is not simple but multiple; it is not an entity but a relation. . . . Moreover this relation is not one of harmony but of opposition.⁴⁴

An "inner creative factor," suggests Jan Smuts--whom Toynbee quotes--

in a measure acts directly under the stimulus of the external factor, and the variations which emerge are the result of this intimate interaction.⁴⁵

This kind of relation of environment to human personality was recognized by the American sociologist Arthur Todd who argued that,

climate, topography, soil are hardly to be set down as "causes" of human evolution or progress [or civilization]. They are merely conditioning phenomena. . . . They have the same relation to human association that the temperature of a hall has to the rendering of a symphony.⁴⁶

"Life is a maze of social stimuli," says another American sociologist, Emery Bogardus:

Stimulation of one human being by another is the fundamental element in all mental and social growth. . . . [Moreover] stimulation is naturally followed by response. . . . [Although] physical environments determine many social stimuli. . . . within limits, self control and trained judgment enable a person to determine the stimuli to which he will respond.⁴⁷

The Genesis of man-in-process-of-civilization must therefore be sought in factors other than the simple cause-and-effect relationship of man and environmental stimuli. This is because the environment in which man lives and moves and has his being is psychic as well as physical. "Action is never fought solely on one field in any of those successive bouts of Challenge-and-Response." Environmental determinism in any form which is confined to the stimulus of the external environment alone is incapable of accounting for the dynamic character of man-in-process-of-civilization.

The environmental determinist tends to treat phenomena of the human psyche as effects of external causes and psychic activity as epiphenomenal. Toynbee, on the other hand, suggests that environment does not consist solely in the raw materials of an external challenge but in the entire content of the human field of action--internal as well.. To the degree that man frames his own environment, self-

determination is possible--perhaps inescapable. Thus we can only say that man is determined--whatever the form of determination may be--when we are prepared to accept his fate as self-determined as well. If we insist on a doctrine of causality on the basis of either probability or determinism, we must be prepared to accept the conclusion that it is the environment that shapes itself. Are not the contents of the human psyche--the human field of action--a part of this environment? Is not man in a sense a part of his own environment? If so, is not man himself a factor in his own determination? Is it reasonable to conclude that the material aspects of existence which possess little if any sentience are the sources of their own determination whereas relatively sentient organisms must forego the privilege of self-determination? Biological or environmental determinism must confront the fact that if man and all that he accomplishes is solely the product or instrument of his environment, his actions and his thought which attempt to formulate these environmental laws or his theories about the environment must themselves be subject to the very laws or theories he is trying to establish.. Toynbee prefers the theory that man himself is part of the environment he transforms. Quoting Professor Murphy, he says:

Man may remain within a certain integration [resting place] of his life for immense ages, provided the adaptation of his needs and powers to the environment continues substantially the same and no differentiation in his own life, or in that of his fellows, or in the external conditions of existence, calls for a new effort to secure survival or for an advance to a further stage in his development.⁴⁸

One answer which Toynbee gives to environmental determinism is that the effective environment confronting the human psyche is so vast that no particular portion of that environment can be credited as the sole cause of human motivation or activity. Moreover any factor to which relationship with creative behavior is to be ascribed must speak to particular human situations as a whole. We cannot, therefore, exclude the mystic, for example, whose environment and responses have been transformed.

Because of the failure to grasp this theory of the human field-of-action and its processes, some of Toynbee's critics take too seriously Toynbee's references to the role of climate or geography. Toynbee was no doubt impressed by Ellsworth Huntington's geographical hypothesis, but he was by no means persuaded to embrace a geographical determinism.

For Toynbee, human freedom has to do with the quality of the functioning of human personality. Attention is centered on the nature of the life processes--the challenge-and-response rhythm. No human activity is solely determined or free in the absolute sense of either word. Only in full transfiguration of the human personality does Toynbee recognize an approach to the absolute freedom or self-determination of God and then only as God is in direct encounter with human personality.

The genesis of civilizations is therefore the outcome of psychic as well as physical factors in the environment of men. In the case of primitive men, the mind is less self-

articulated; it is more subject to the laws of the sub-conscious. Stimuli are mostly external or subconscious, and responses are mechanical. There is less creative behavior. The primitive is the slave of habit, the subconscious, and the cake of custom--all of which buttress each other in a participation mystique. He lacks the ability to shift his field of action. The struggle to survive may exhaust his energy. Survival alone may become the all-consuming tour de force. Absence of the dynamic of growth is reflected in the absence of self-determination in general. Toynbee notes that,

in a case where a civilization is in an exact, and therefore static, equilibrium with its environment, a change in the physical environment, a rising [e.g.] from a shift of the climatic zones, may act upon the society in question in a mechanical way instead of through the vital give-and-take of Challenge-and-Response. This is to be expected, because a society that is "arrested" in static equilibrium is inhibited, ex hypothesi, from exercising the vital mobility and free will and initiative which the movement of "Challenge-and-Response" involves. In this condition, a society must either remain unaffected by the impact of an external force or else react to this impact in a merely mechanical fashion [of primitive mentality].⁵⁰

Etherialization is discouraged in the primitive society. The security of stasis is preferred. Yet the creative spirit of God is not to be denied. From primitive man emerges man-in-process-of-civilization, the stage in which contemporary man lives. On this vast scale of time, exaggeration of the significance of the scientific method melts down to more modest pretensions, and Toynbee can confidently assert that it is the emergence of Homo sapiens

and "man-in-process-of-civilization" that are the two events in the total life of man that eclipse all others.

The break from the bonds of primitivism occurred when man began to "internalize" his environment, and the entire process by which this transfer of the field of action is achieved is what Toynbee has chosen to call etherialization by internalization.

A given series of successful responses to successive challenges is to be interpreted as a manifestation of growth if, as the series proceeds, the action tends to shift from the field of the external environment--whether physical or human--to the for intérieur of the growing personality or the growing civilization. In so far as this grows and continues to grow it has to reckon less and less with challenges delivered by alien adversaries . . . and more and more with challenges that are presented by itself to itself in an inner arena. Growth means that the growing personality or civilization tends to become its own field of action. . . . The criterion of growth is progress towards self-determination; and progress towards self-determination is a prosaic formula for describing the miracle by which Life enters into its Kingdom.⁵¹

Etherialization, Toynbee continues,

is the cumulative success [of man] in responding to challenges which is rewarded, not by an exemption from challenge which would be tantamount to a discharge from the active service of Life, but a transfer of the field of challenge from a Macrocosm where God challenges Man through the agency of Non-Human Nature or of Man's fellow human beings to a Microcosm where God challenges Man through the agency of Man's own soul by an ineffable epiphany of God the Challenger Himself.⁵²

The distinction that Toynbee makes between primitive homo sapiens and man-in-process-of-civilization is a crucial one. Ability to etherialize is the distinguishing factor. In short, the life and death of men and societies hinges on

the inscrutable working of psychic factors which lead to or from etherialization. On this basis, the creative minority are the men-in-process-of-civilization and the quiescent majority are the vestigial remains of primitive man. Yet with respect to creative potential,

the psychic make-up of all extant human beings, in all extant types of society, appears to be substantially identical.⁵³

Toynbee's categories are Bergson's static and dynamic, closed and open. The creative minority are an avante garde of saints who open the way to the ultimate etherialization of Man. The quiescent majority follow by mimesis. They are unable to break the bonds of primitivism--psychically or socially. Jung clearly expresses what Toynbee intends when he comments that,

the primitive mentality differs from the civilized chiefly in that the conscious mind is far less developed in extent and intensity. Functions such as thinking, willing, etc., are not yet [fully] differentiated.⁵⁴

"So completely [is] the individual subordinated to the community" in the primitive state, adds Professor Teggart,

"that art [for example] is just the repetition of tribal designs, literature the repetition of tribal songs."⁵⁵

Durkheim spoke of this phenomenon as collective representation.

But collective representations are not the monopoly of the Negritos of Central Africa or of any other particular segment of humanity. The creative personality of the Neolithic Age who could etherialize his tools or his thoughts is more modern in the psychological sense of the meaning of

civilized mentality than the contemporary primitive who fails to etherialize his environment in spite of the challenge of vastly greater opportunity. Primitive culture is not static because of a stasis in material culture alone. It is static because of a state of mind.

In the most primitive as well as in the least primitive state in which homo sapiens is in any way known to us, we may conclude that the individual human being possesses some measure of self-conscious personality that raises his soul above the level of the waters of the collective unconscious.⁵⁶

Progoff observes that "very often primitives [in the usual sense of the term] are more conscious . . . more highly individual . . . than moderns."⁵⁷ Primitive mentality, observed Lévy-Bruhl, "is not foreign to modern society. Our minds are also driven by collective thought."⁵⁸ Toynbee is convinced that "there is an overwhelming majority of ordinary people in the membership of even the most advanced and progressive civilization . . . [who are] virtually primitive humanity."⁵⁹

Civilization and progress are not, therefore, the rewards of fortuitous time and circumstance. They relate, rather, to the precarious undertakings of adventurous souls who convert hazard into opportunity and opportunity into actuality. Above all, civilization and progress through etherialization relate to the inner states of the human psyche as it lives and moves and has its being in its human, social, and physical environment.

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Basic to etherialization are rhythms, and Toynbee's fundamental rhythm is the rhythm of challenge-and-response.

Growth through etherialization,

is achieved when an individual or a minority or a whole society replies to a challenge by a response which not only answers the particular challenge that has evoked it but also exposes the respondent to a fresh challenge which demands a fresh response on his part. And the process of growth continues . . . so long as this recurrent movement of disturbance and restoration and overbalance and renewed disturbance of equilibrium is maintained.⁶⁰

The recurrent rhythm of growth is sustained by internalization of the challenges and responses.. Whatever may be the source, challenges may trigger the psyche into an activity of internalization. By internalization is meant the surveillance and control by ego-consciousness of a greater share of its environment. The field of action is widened. Psychologically, a qualitative change of perspective is effected--qualitative because a degree of simplification through integration is achieved. The world as a whole is seen more clearly, more steadily, and more meaningfully. Problems are transformed by a shift in the field of action. "It is only when human action is transmuted from the gross medium of [brute] will," says Toynbee, "into the etherial media of perception and thought and feeling and imagination, that it is able to transcend all limits of Time and Space."⁶¹ And Professor Tillich observes that,

one transforms the resisting powers [challenges] or one adapts oneself to them. One is absorbed by them and loses one's own power of being [or] one grows together with them and increases . . . one's . . . power of being. These processes are going on in every

moment of life, in all relations of all being. They go on between man and nature, between man and man, between individuals and groups, between groups and groups.⁶²

Toynbee's etherialization through internalization and the qualitative simplification it effects constitutes, therefore, a progressive shifting of the arena of human action from the order of non-human nature, from which life sprang, through the order of the subconscious domination of primitive mentality to the order of the ego-consciousness, which liberates the human spirit at the cost of the burden of the responsibility of a limited freedom, to the final order of the Law of God Himself--the Law of Perfect Liberty.⁶³ The encounter of the will of ego-consciousness with God's will evokes responses of the highest order.

Such challenges from God may evoke . . . creative responses that are genuinely free human acts; and this spiritual drama of Challenge-and-Response [now etherialized] is perhaps the key to an explanation of those human affairs in which human action wears the appearance of being . . . partially except from the dominion of laws of Nature.⁶⁴

As a shifting of the field of action, etherialization constitutes an ascent, so to speak, of "Jacob's ladder." In the lowest order of physical nature, man has achieved great freedom from the laws of physical nature. Continued progress in self-determination past the higher orders is less evident, however, because

freedom from the dominion of a law can be won only at the price of accepting the dominion of some other law that is higher in the scale.⁶⁵

But the effort is well worth the try, for

"the glorious freedom of the sons of God," which they enjoy under the Law of Love, is not merely the relative freedom of a release from the law of a compulsive Subconscious Psyche; it is also the perfect freedom possessed by God Himself.⁶⁶

In the light of this "Jacob's ladder," history is seen to

move in a five-dimensional framework--a framework of Life-Space-Time. The physical cosmos moving centrifugally in a four-dimensional frame of reference, Life moving evolutionarily. Yet there is a sixth dimension--the vertical dimension of the existential situation--in which a spiritual contact with Ultimate Reality is realized and through which there is an exercise of freedom for self-transcendence [through etherialization] towards God.⁶⁷

In short, etherialization through internalization and qualitative simplification involves a transfer of the field of action of the human psyche from an outer to an inner and therefore higher level, a progressive change from instinctive, habitual, and impulsive behavior to the behavior of greater self-determination and self-awareness.⁶⁸

The etherialized personality becomes

the mystically illumined Personality . . . [who] stands to ordinary Human Nature as civilizations stand to primitive human societies. . . . [This] transfigured individual is impelled to action because of an internal coercion of the identity of Life and Action. . . . No being can be what he is putting his essence into action in his field . . . [which] lies in a society which [in turn] is common ground between his field and the fields of a host of other people.⁶⁹

"Great innovations never come from above," Jung reminds us, "they come invariably from below, just as trees never grow from the sky downward, but upward from the earth,"⁷⁰ and if Freedom is the last stage of the tree of Life, can man be

doomed by any necessary fate? Toynbee believes not.

If Necessity is queen of the last act of the play . . .
[how] can Freedom have ever reigned at any stage? . . .
If . . . sin has been as inevitable as the punishment
inexorable how can the doom which the pitiless mills
grind out be identified with Justice? If we are to
salvage our theodicy "we require a theory of human
motives which will allow of our conceiving them, simul-
taneously, both as supernatural causes coming from
without and also as integral parts in the working of
the agent's mind. . . . Modern Psychology is
not equal to the task of this reconciliation."⁷¹

But, Toynbee continues, this was the pessimistic conclusion
of Professor Cornford in 1907:

Within the forty-six years [since] . . . a post-
Modern school of Western psychologists [by whom
Toynbee means the followers of Jung] have rehabili-
tated as a scientific hypothesis the Hellenic
religious belief that Cornford had diagnosed and
expounded. In the "autonomous complex" erupting
from the abyss of a Subconscious Psyche to challenge
the sovereignty of a Conscious Will that must either
subdue the intruder or suffer the consequences of
becoming its slave, we are manifestly presented with
a "scientific" name for the kêr or daimon that
assails the hero of an Attic tragedy.⁷²

Man learns and he progresses by suffering the unrelenting
assault of challenges. We find, says Toynbee,

that in the growth-process a particular challenge is
never presented more than once, and indeed, ex hypothesi,
could not be presented for a second time, since,
ex hypothesi, so long as growth is being maintained,
each successive challenge in the series is being
successfully met or, in other words, disposed of as a
living issue.⁷³

In our own day, for example, "it is [a difficult] moral
challenge and no longer a technical challenge that confronts
our . . . society."⁷⁴

The qualitative nature of etherialization is emphasized
in Toynbee by his conviction that material increase or

expansion as such in any form is not *prima facie* evidence of progress. Indeed, Toynbee submits a vast amount of evidence to support the idea that material increase or expansion accompanies social breakdown and decline rather than growth.

He says:

While the progressive and cumulative conquest of the human environment may perhaps be measured fairly in terms of geographical expansion, this geographical index is not a criterion of growth. And indeed the only social "law" apropos of geographical expansion . . . [is a] correlation . . . between geographical expansion and social retardation.⁷⁵

Toynbee attempts to show that geographical expansion varies as social decline ranging from slowing down of growth through a full arrest of growth to actual retrogression. One of the most striking examples of this correlation is the case of the Hellenic world. According to Toynbee, Hellenic civilization broke down during the Peloponnesian War and proceeded, nevertheless, to expand geographically under Alexander and Rome. This geographic expansion was accompanied, he says, by an increasing "Schism of the Soul." There is a positive correlation between improvement of material technique and increasing command of the physical environment, but neither of these are criteria of social progress. Technique may advance or remain stationary while civilization, as Toynbee defines it, advances, regresses or remains relatively stationary.⁷⁶ Numerous examples of a high state of material culture and technique in arrested civilizations are cited.

Toynbee rejects naturalistic and therefore ephemeral criteria of growth or progress, but he does not ignore the

significance of progress in technique. He says, for example, that,

the history of technique, which has not yet revealed to us any law of social progress, does reveal the principle by which technical progress is governed; and this principle may be described as a law of progressive simplification.⁷⁷

Toynbee is indebted to Bergson for his insight on progressive simplification. For Bergson, the external and material world exhibited staggering complexity. Life, on the other hand, introduced a certain unifying effort, a move toward simplification of purpose, function and design. At its highest level in personality, says Bergson, life "makes an effect of simplicity, whereas the material world [presents] a complexity that baffles the imagination."⁷⁸ "In each sphere [of life]," continues Toynbee,

this same fundamental tendency can be discerned under some different aspect. In morphological terms, "etherialization" appears as a progressive change in organization from complexity towards simplicity; in biological terms, it appears as a saltus naturae from Inanimate Matter to Life.⁷⁹

Yet the process of etherialization, he cautions,

involves not merely a simplification of apparatus but a consequent transfer of energy of shift of emphasis from some lower sphere of being or sphere of action to a higher sphere.⁸⁰

Etherialization, therefore, is not merely a progressive but also a qualitative simplification. As qualitative simplification, it involves more than a mere reduction or omission and suggests instead the addition of value. Perhaps the clearest statement of the essential nature of etherialization as qualitative simplification is that of the anthropologist

J. Murphy who says:

What happens is that Man with his unifying tendency forms a primitive integration, whether in his mental or practical life. This integration, on the emergence of some new power or idea in Man, is found inadequate, and is broken through by a differentiation which applies the new power or idea to wider areas of experience. Out of the more differentiated phenomena and relations thus arrived at, the mind with its determined search for unity creates a new integration, larger, richer and more organized than the former one. This again is followed by a differentiation; and so the process goes on, Man ever becoming more capable of more comprehensive, higher, and finer integrations both of his own inner life and of his outward social relations.⁸¹

An example of progressive and qualitative simplification may be drawn from technology in the instance of the invention of the automobile.⁸² This particular invention brought into synthesis six major antecedent inventions: the internal combustion engine, the fuel tank, the chassis, running gears, the intermediate clutch, and the drive shaft, each of which were etherializations of earlier inventions. The modern automobile has now become so etherialized through qualitative simplification of its mechanism that the problem is no longer primarily mechanics as it once was but the state of mind of the driver:

The old challenge of physical distance has been transmuted into a new challenge of human relations between drivers who have learned how to "annihilate distance" and have thereby put themselves in constant danger of annihilating one another.⁸³

In addition to the example of the invention of the automobile, there is the example--in transportation technology--of the development of the airplane whose structure, power plant, and instrumentation developed along a clearly rhythmic

pattern of progressive simplification. The first airplane utilized a reciprocating internal combustion engine of relatively simple design, the invention of which was in itself clearly etherial. With the advancement of airplane design generally came a complication of the internal combustion engine together with a proliferation of cockpit controls and instrumentation. These developments were followed by the invention of the qualitatively simplified turbo-jet power plant together with a marked simplification of cockpit instruments and controls. But this advance was almost immediately followed in turn by a renewed proliferation and complication of design and function in jet aircraft which may now only be relieved by the application of nuclear energy to aircraft power plants. Indeed, almost twelve years before Hiroshima, Toynbee noted that,

our more sanguine physicists look forward to exercising in our day . . . a method for "breaking up the atom. . . . [to provide] the ultimate form of human control over Physical Nature--the form which is to give Man boundless material power--[and which] is conceived as being incomparably etherial in its mode of operation.⁸⁴

Toynbee cites an example of etherialization from technology in his reference to the development and consequences of the cotton industry from its beginning to the present. He says:

In [the history of] modern Western cotton industry we can detect . . . the tendency for the scene of action to shift from the external environment to the internal life of the society or the individual that is the subject of the experience.⁸⁵

One of the most striking examples of etherialization, however, is to be found in Cosmology. Here progressive and qualitative simplification of theory is evident. The history of cosmology is characterized by a tendency to proliferate theory to the point of unwieldy complexity until a new radically simpler and more aesthetically satisfying explanation is advanced. Witness the progression from Ptolemaic to Copernican to Newtonian to Einsteinian theory which has now brought into synthesis the concepts of space, time, gravity, light, and magnetism. In each phase theory and practice tended toward a proliferation of ideas followed by a relative simplification of the theory embracing simpler patterns of relationship.⁸⁶ Einstein's achievement exemplifies a brilliant internalization and simplification of a great quantity of scientific thought under a general theory that at once relates and unifies profuse and, in some cases, contradictory theories. Newton performed a similar synthesis earlier.

In the area of linguistics a progressive and qualitative simplification is revealed in the development of modern languages which are considerably simpler in structure and more efficient in expression and function than most primitive languages.⁸⁷ Toynbee believes that there is evidence of etherialization in the progressive shift in the meaning of words from the secular to the religious as, for example, in the use of the word "transgression,"

which had been a term of art in the Attic "Old Comedy," in the physical meaning of a parade of the chorus from one side of the theatre to the other [but] had come to mean, in Christian language, a figurative "side-step" in the spiritual sense of sin. Edification had similarly come to mean a figurative "building up" of virtue in the Soul in place of its original meaning of the construction of a material edifice in brick or stone . . . [et cetera]--an example . . . [of] "etherialization" . . . [which is] a symptom of growth.⁸⁸

Another example in the area of language is in the use of the word power. Toynbee says that this word carries with it the Greek sense of military power in Aristophanes' Birds, but by the time it is found in the Gospels, the same Greek word carries the connotation of "divine power."⁸⁹ Toynbee is silent, however, concerning instances of a reverse trend in the usage of words from the religious to the secular. A possible exception is his reference to the vulgarization of meanings during periods of social disintegration. In this instance, however, Toynbee believes that etherialization shifts to the area of the religious where spiritual values emerge as a result of the trial and tribulation of learning through suffering.

In the development of Western music, etherialization is suggested in the emergence of the Sonata form, A.D. 1740, which, according to Toynbee, is the highest and maturest form of instrumental style. The Sonata form, he says, made music the dominant art form of the period:

The sceptre passed from the art of Architecture to the art of Music . . . from a grosser medium of stone into the subtler medium of sound.⁹⁰

In his study of the development of modern harmony in Western

music from Florentine opera early in the seventeenth century to the present, Professor Sorokin discovers a distinct example of the rhythm of growth of which Toynbee speaks:

The preclassical phase is characterized by an indeterminate confusion, incoherence, and complexity. . . . The classical phase [beginning with Haydn] is marked by simplicity, pure internal harmony, and an organic unity of music with perfect technique . . . [followed by] the pseudo-classical phase . . . [in which] complexities begin to creep in. Finally, in the post-classical phase . . . "colossalism" . . . attempts to find "new ways" . . . which results in ever-increasing incoherence [and points to a new synthesis or qualitative simplification].⁹¹

In the area of philosophy, Toynbee suggests the example of Taoist philosophy,

which--illuminated by knowledge born of suffering--had apprehended the truth of "etherialization," had resolved to live by it, and had acted on its own resolve by taking one of the highest and most arduous flights essayed by the Sinic spirit.⁹²

Etherialization is suggested in Lao-Tse's intuition of the paradoxical Wu Wei:

that utter emptiness which is the acme of plenitude . . .
that utter immobility which is the acme of motion, . . .
that utter relaxation which is the acme of intensity, and
that utter tranquillity which is the ecstasy of creation.⁹³

It is exemplified in the shift of attention by Socrates from interest in cosmology to a consuming interest in the problems of the good life, a shift from concern for the physical to concern for the spiritual, a shift from concern with the Macrocosm to concern with the Microcosm, from passion for the true in science to a passion for the good in life. And if specific examples of etherialization are sought in the field of ethics, one need only to look to the ethics of Jesus or Schweitzer in which a qualitative simplification of antecedent

thought is clearly indicated. In Jesus, a complex Talmudic code is profoundly simplified into a code of love to God and man. In Schweitzer's ethic of Reverence for Life, a qualitative simplification is suggested in the reconciliation of the demands of the subconscious will-to-live with the rational restraints of self-conscious reason--a reconciliation which issues in Reverence for Life. In both these instances, reason is not spiritually impoverished by being cut off from the source of its being in the will-to-live, nor are the unguided impulses of this will-to-live permitted to tyrannize the reason of consciousness. Instead of dynamic integration or wholeness is achieved.

For Toynbee, etherialization reaches its highest meaning in the

transfiguration of human nature in Jesus.. In the advent of "the second man who is the Lord from Heaven," Paul hails "the creation of a new species composed of one unique individual": the adjutor Dei whose mission it is to raise the rest of Mankind to a superhuman level by inspiring his fellow-men with his own inspiration from God.⁹⁴

For human personality, etherialization is the self-realization of the moral philosophers. For society, etherialization is social progress--the actualization of value in social relations, and always "the touchstone of [this] value . . . is whether it helps or hinders Man to find his way back to his Maker," back to the stream of Life.⁹⁵ Yet spiritual values are not alone real values, and non-spiritual values are ephemeral only insofar as they thwart etherialization. If "action is never fought solely on one

field in any of [the] successive bouts of Challenge-and-Response," then progress must be thought of as the progressive transformation of values--that is--a rendering of values more significant with respect to the creative process. This kind of progress moves the human personality from the order of determined responses to mechanical causes to the order of the self-directed and relatively free responses of the etherialized personality to internal or spiritual challenges. The measure of progress is whether the creative process--as we discover it--is furthered or hindered. Since values are the significant qualities and relationships of the human situation which enjoy an independent as well as relevant significance, they not only share the fate of that situation but maintain "a spiritual contact with Ultimate Reality." They "help . . . Man to find his way back to his Maker."

The human personality contacts Ultimate Reality through the mechanism of "Withdrawal-and-Return."⁹⁶ It withdraws from the limitations of the "cake of custom"--differentiates itself from the herd as it were--and returns transfigured. The profound social implications of withdrawal and return are suggested by social psychologist Solomon Asch in the observation that,

the capacity to perceive a situation that includes others and ourselves . . . is a remarkable achievement which involves transcending one's own viewpoint [withdrawal] by bringing it into relation with that of another [return]. This transcendence [etherialization] is . . . a process that occurs in the individual; it is a product of his activity . . . [it is] a psychological interaction . . . with an intrinsic social direction that has its locus in individuals. Phenomenally we

objectify the process of transcendancy by placing it in the field of action. As a result we tend in theory to distort the character of a social act in one of two opposed ways: to consider it either as the sum of individual acts or as a new product that transcends individuals. It is precisely the achievement of psychological interaction to be neither of these. . . . The individual is the seat of social events. It is individuals with [a] particular capacity to turn toward one another who in concrete action validate and consolidate in each a mutually shared field.

Withdrawal and return may be precipitated by an actual physical withdrawal from and return to the life of a society--but not necessarily so.⁹⁸ It is essentially a psychic rather than a physical phenomenon although, to be sure, the two are not unrelated. Toynbee cites the lives of the historians Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Josephus, Ibn Khaldūn, Machiavelli, Clarendon, and Ollivier as,

conspicuous examples of [the] process of "etherialization". . . . In the "practical" first chapter of their careers, these future historians have all set themselves to produce an effect upon their fellow men by the obvious and crude and finite "direct method" of bringing their wills to bear upon the wills of their neighbours. Their compulsory withdrawal, which . . . inhibited . . . activities on [the] "practical" plane . . . compelled them to find a new vent by transferring their action to another plane and transmuting their energies into a new [and more bracing] medium. . . . In this subtler form of interaction . . . [others responded to them] by a spontaneous movement that arises from within, and not under a duress that has been imposed upon it more mechanico or manu militari.⁹⁹

The new plane on which these men made their etherialized returns penetrated deeper into the life of society than their original and more practical planes. Who would remember Thucydides today had he not failed as Athenian naval commander in a crucial naval battle and been forced to withdraw in exile

so that he could return as the immortal historian of the Peloponnesian War? Toynbee cites other examples in the lives of great men:

David and Philopoemen withdraw as soldiers and return as statesmen; Solon withdraws as a merchant and returns as a statesman; Caesar withdraws as a politician and returns as a statesman; Loyola withdraws as a soldier and returns as a saint, and all these changes of capacity are in the direction of "etherialization."¹⁰⁰

In withdrawing on one plane to return on another, they have found [a higher] life in losing it.¹⁰¹

"The creative personality," Toynbee continues,

takes the path of Withdrawal-and-Return in order to rise to some occasion of social crisis; in order, that is to say, to cope with some challenge that is confronting the society to which the individual or minority belong.¹⁰²

In our own day there is the example of Albert Schweitzer who withdraws physically from civilization in terms of conventional participation to return as etherialized spiritual influence. As organist, pastor, physician, college teacher, or college administrator, his influence could not match the influence he commands today. The subtly etherialized influence of Schweitzer's living example constitutes a return only surpassed, perhaps, by the immortally resurrected spirit of Jesus of Nazareth himself. "In the concept of the Second Coming," Toynbee's "motif of Withdrawal-and-Return attains its deepest spiritual meaning."¹⁰³ The Christian doctrine of the Second Coming,

is manifestly a mythological projection into the future in physical imagery of the spiritual return in which the Apostles' vanished Master reasserts His presence in the Apostles' hearts when the Apostles take heart of grace to execute, in spite of the Master's physical

departure, that audacious mission which the Master, when he was actually present in the flesh had once laid upon them.¹⁰⁴

Toynbee's withdrawal-and-return is not the withdrawal of the ascetic. Only compulsion can bring Plato's philosopher back to the cave of the everyday world of action. The goal of Hellenic philosophy from Platonism through Stoicism to Neoplatonism was withdrawal to a life of contemplation without return. "This negative, weary melancholy temper," says Toynbee,

is manifest in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, the historic philosopher king who dutifully carried on his shoulders the burden of governing the whole Orbis Romanus.¹⁰⁵

With true Platonic sense of duty, Aurelius assumed his burden of social responsibility. But not so Plotinus. For him the return was unthinkable. Plotinus withdrew permanently to become the apologist par excellence of the defunct creative minority that had transformed themselves into the Hellenic dominant minority. With Plotinus etherialization ceased. The rhythm of withdrawal-and-return was broken. Disintegration set in.

This ultimate refusal of the Hellenic philosophers to return from the world of contemplation into the world of action . . . may explain why it was that the breakdown which the Hellenic civilization had suffered in the generation preceding Plato's generation was never retrieved.¹⁰⁶

"Mysticism," warns Schweitzer,

must never be thought to exist for its own sake. It is not a flower, but only the calyx of a flower. Ethics is the flower.¹⁰⁷

And ethics for Schweitzer is the life of action. "Detachment

of spirit," says Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan,

not renunciation of the world is what is demanded from us. The knowers of Brahman remake the world. . . . The Christian command to love one's neighbor as yourself because you are [in this sense] your neighbour.¹⁰⁸

As a social creature, man derives and sustains his personality from interaction with his fellows. In the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return, return is necessary. No human psyche can permanently estrange itself from the social field without repudiating its humanity.

Toynbee believes that the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return is also found in the life of groups as well as in the life of individuals. He believes that the life of society exhibits a rhythm of equilibrium-and-disequilibrium and that this rhythm is linked to the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return of groups within that society. Momentary equilibrium occurs in history, he says, when the response of a society at large to the return of a creative minority approximates the optimum. This occurred in the West, he believes, in the thirteenth century during the five years when St. Dominic and St. Francis, the Emperor Frederick II, and St. Louis, King of France, helped to achieve an ideal synthesis in the relationship between the Medieval Church and Feudalism. It occurred again during the 17th and 18th centuries between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the French Revolution during the general period of the Enlightenment when cosmopolitanism permeated European culture.¹⁰⁹ Rhythms are not necessarily the function of any particular time span. They may occur, Toynbee says,

on the time scale of the subconscious and exceed, therefore, the life span of any particular individual.¹¹⁰

The equilibrium of Yin is but a temporary respite in the life of a society as it is in the life of an individual--a "moment of reconciliation between the real and the ideal," says Toynbee,

which is the sequel to a successful movement of Withdrawal-and-Return in the history of a society in process of civilization [but] is bound to be ephemeral a priori.¹¹¹

It is ephemeral because it is but a temporary prelude to the ultimate transfiguration of human society. It is erroneously idolized as the epitome of human achievement. Thus there is allusion to the thirteenth as "the greatest of centuries," or idolization of the Age of Reason. The creative minority of any period are not "able to evoke the creative change from Primitive Humanity to Sainthood in Mankind at large."¹¹²

Through the idea of etherialization, Toynbee brings to bear new light on the nature of progress. He does this by clarifying the relationship of the growth of human personality and human society. By rejecting the secular view of progress he avoids the futile attempt to ground progress on the advance of ephemeral values. But whether etherialization can be advanced as a criterion of progress is doubtful unless by criterion he does not mean a quantitative measure or index. Yet an ambiguity remains, for if etherialization is purely a qualitative aspect of change dealing solely with values--and Toynbee suggests that it is--then it hardly qualifies as a

criterion in the strict sense of the word. It is a criterion only insofar as it can demonstrate the degree to which values contribute to the creative process. Etherialization suggests the nature of progress and performs, therefore, a descriptive and normative rather than a definitive function.

To be meaningful, a doctrine of progress must be grounded in a faith of an ultimate and therefore religious nature. It must be articulated by an axiology which is also grounded in this faith. It must account for the tragic realities of the human situation without subsuming human effort to some inexorable and impersonal cosmic process. It cannot ignore or explain away the reality of human evil and suffering. Toynbee accomplishes this when he envisions a creative harmony in the chaos of existence. For him,

the work of the spirit of the Earth, as he weaves and draws his threads on the Loom of Time, is the temporal history of Man as this manifests itself in the genesis and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human societies; and in all this welter of life . . . we can hear the beat of an elemental rhythm . . . of Challenge-and-Response and Withdrawal-and-Return. . . . This elemental rhythm is the alternating beat of Yin and Yang, and in listening to it we have recognized that, though strophe may be answered by antistrophe, victory by defeat, birth by death, creation by destruction, the movement that this rhythm beats out is neither the fluctuation of an indecisive battle nor the cycle of a treadmill. The perpetual turning of a wheel is not a vain repetition if, at each revolution, it is carrying a vehicle that much nearer its goal; and, if "palingenesia" signifies the birth of something new, and not just the rebirth of something that has lived and died any number of times already, then the Wheel of Existence is not just a devilish device for inflicting an everlasting torment on a damned Ixion.¹¹³

CHAPTER VI

Footnotes

¹Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 118. Cf. p. 235 and Chaps. V and XII; Harry E. Barnes, Historical Sociology (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 107; Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955), Chap. III; H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 49-52; and James K. Feibleman, The Revival of Realism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 189: "Civilizations are born only in order to break down and decline, and they break down and decline only in order to give rise to universal churches"; Bertram D. Wolfe, "Dissenting Opinion on Toynbee," American Mercury, LXIV (June, 1947), 748-56. Cf. p. 753: "For three reasons Toynbee is more deeply and extensively preoccupied with breakdown than with growth: first, because the civilizations he deals with (all but one) are either dead or dying; second, because the very tests he gives of breakdown suggest . . . that our own civilization has already climbed over the great divide; and third and emotionally most important, because his inquiry is intended to culminate with a demonstration that civilizations do not always perish utterly but often bequeath to their successors something exempt from the process of decay." So impressed are most of Toynbee's reviewers with his sober and provocative pronouncements on the prospects of Western civilization that they overlook the significance of detailed aspects of his theory and his keen interest in and treatment of the problem of growth. By no means is Toynbee merely another "prophet of doom overcome by the imagination of disaster." If pessimism be defined as the belief in the prospect of unmitigated doom, Toynbee is no pessimist. If it is the neglect of positive elements in man, Toynbee is still no pessimist. If it is the willingness to "stare at chaos in the face," to reckon with the realities of human history and the human situation, then Toynbee must confess his pessimism. One suspects, however, that Toynbee shares the fate of the prophet and that in this instance the prophet is the victim of a disenchanted and belligerent secular bias.

²See particularly Frankel's reaffirmation of the faith of the Enlightenment. Op. cit., Chaps. III and X.

³Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1953), Chap. I, "The Loneliness and Anxiety of Modern Man": "Boredom is the 'occupational disease' of being human." There is a considerable amount of literature on the subject of the threat of emptiness and boredom in contemporary life. For excellent literary expressions, see the poetry of T. S. Eliot and W. H. Auden.

⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 244. The question with Toynbee is not why there are creative minorities who respond in similar fashion to similar situations but why more people sharing these situations do not respond creatively as do the few. He believes that "stagnation of the masses is the fundamental cause of the crisis with which our Western Civilization is confronted in our day." (Ibid., p. 242. Cf. p. 106.)

⁵Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 297. Cf. p. 294.

⁶Ibid., p. 298. That man is the creative agent of God appears to be clear in Toynbee. Insofar as man works out his freedom, he participates in the life of God. "The movement of the Psychê," he says, "is not 'directed,' either by a deterministic push or a teleological pull." (III, op. cit., 125.)

⁷Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 561. "The super-human level [of "etherialization"] . . . is the goal of our human endeavours." (III, op. cit., 172).

⁸Ibid., p. 564. Cf. Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on Trial (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 260-63: "In what sense can there be progress in this world? The progress with which we are here concerned is a progressive improvement, continuous and cumulative from generation to generation in our social heritage. . . . Progress . . . is, of course, impressive in the field of scientific knowledge and its application to technology. . . . This, however, is a side issue [for] . . . cumulative progress is the improvement of our social heritage in terms of the spiritual life of mankind--which means the spiritual life of individual souls [as well, is the question. On these terms] a conceivable kind of progress [would be] . . . a cumulative increase in the means of Grace at the disposal of each soul."

⁹Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955. Toynbee wrote to this writer that "etherialization" is not a form of escapism. Geyl, for example, believes that

"etherialization" is merely "a conversion of the soul from the World, the Flesh, and the Devil, to a Kingdom of Heaven." (Pieter Geyl, A. J. Toynbee, and Pitirim Sorokin, The Pattern of the Past [Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949], p. 13.) Geyl quotes Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 192, but out of context and thereby misrepresents as well as misinterprets his "etherialization" as a restatement of Christian asceticism.

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 558. Cf. Civilization on Trial, op. cit., p. 263.

¹¹Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 170. The charge by Sorokin that "Anglican Christianity [is] Toynbee's terminal point of a spiritualization and etherialization of man" (Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 339, n. 3) is questionable in view of Toynbee's own opinion that it is the "Indian standpoint . . . from which [the] last four volumes of my book [A Study] have been written." (Arnold Toynbee, "A Study of History: What I Am Trying to Do," International Affairs, XXXI [January, 1955], 4.)

¹²Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 184. Toynbee speaks of "the wide range and extreme diversity of the spheres in which the phenomenon of 'etherialization' manifests itself." (Ibid., p. 191.)

¹³Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 638-39.

¹⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 128.

¹⁵Edward J. Ryan, "A Critical Evaluation of A. J. Toynbee as Historiographer of Chinese Civilization Before 500 A.D.," unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Claremont College, 1948, p. 13, n. 28.

¹⁶H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Washington: Harran Press, 1952), II, 808.

¹⁷Ibid., I, 756-57. Cf. p. 765.

¹⁸Feibleman, op. cit., p. 181. Cf. other similar misinterpretations of Toynbee in R. H. S. Crossman, "The Faith of Arnold J. Toynbee," The New Republic, CXVIII (July, 1947), 24ff. Even Lewis Mumford--who is among Toynbee's more discerning critics--fails to grasp the meaning of Toynbee's "etherialization" when he accuses Toynbee of failing "to see that it implies a complementary process of materialization." ("A Study of History," Diogenes, XIII

[Spring, 1956], 20.) But Mumford does recognize that unlike Spengler, Toynbee associates spiritual vitality with growth rather than with disintegration. Yet Mumford errs when he says "that Toynbee fails to recognize William James' insight that in life the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous." (Ibid.)

¹⁹Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee to J. W. Friend and J. K. Feibleman, January 16, 1940, quoted in Feibleman, op. cit., p. 182.

²⁰Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 388. Cf. I, op. cit., 173, n. 3 and 434, n. 3; III, op. cit., 174-230; and VI, op. cit., 170. Spiritual progress "brings mundane progress in its train, [and] the mundane progress that will be made in this incidental way will be far greater than the utmost that could be attained by aiming directly at a mundane [and therefore ephemeral] goal." (A Study, IX, op. cit., 562.) Cf. pp. 388, 510, and 546-48. Indeed, "we shall find it impossible to cite a case of challenge-and-response in which the entire action takes place on . . . one . . . [or another] field exclusively." (Ibid., p. 328.)

²¹Ibid., p. 392. Because the Universal Church thrives when the Universal State is suffering its worst, and because the Universal Church "can open up new channels for the baulked spiritual energies of Mankind," (Ibid.) it is regarded by the Dominant Minority--whose interest it is to sustain the Universal State--as a social cancer. This interpretation of the emergence of a Universal Church is that of the 18th century historian Edward Gibbon as it is also of the late 19th century anthropologist Sir James G. Frazer. "If we are looking for a social cancer," Toynbee answers, "we shall find it, not in a church which supplants a civilization, but in a civilization which supplants a church." (Ibid., p. 526.)

²²Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 298. Cf. IX, op. cit., 402.

²³Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 295.

²⁴Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 34.

²⁵Henry Adams, Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919), p. 308.

²⁶Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955. The passages of "the New Testament in which the principle of

"etherialization" has received its supreme expression . . . [are] Matt. vi 25-6, 28-9, 31-3," (A Study, III, op. cit., 191.)

²⁷ Alfred Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 373f.

²⁸ L. W. Doob, Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1952), p. 523. In a doctoral dissertation on Toynbee, Ernst Zahn interprets Toynbee's view of progress as the substantial enlargement of a social-cultural inheritance which enjoys an objective and continuing value in every cultural epoch. (Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte [Zürich: Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1954], p. 37.)

²⁹ Arnold Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (2d. ed.; London: Constable & Co., 1923), pp. 296ff. and 308ff.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 36. Many important ideas of Toynbee's are suggested in this work and in essays by Toynbee in The Legacy of Greece, op. cit. Cf. James H. Nichols, "Religion in Toynbee's History," Journal of Religion, XXVIII (April, 1948), 99-119, re early development of ideas later appearing in A Study.

³¹ Sorokin, Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 282.

³² Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 427. Toynbee quotes W. E. Barnes, Scientific Theory and Religion (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 472: "In Mammals, developments resulting in greater simplicity [by contrast with reptiles are noteworthy]." Concerning parallel theories, see Barnes, Historical Sociology, op. cit., pp. 128f. and Barnes and Becker, Lore to Science, op. cit., pp. 730-34.

³³ Gerald Heard, The Social Substance of Religion (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), foreword.

³⁴ Wolfe, loc. cit.

³⁵ Nichols, op. cit., p. 99.

³⁶ See the preceding chapter of this dissertation.

³⁷ Rushton Coulborn, "Review of A Study of History," American Historical Review, LX (July, 1955), 850.

³⁸Heard, op. cit., pp. 65f. Bergson speaks of a static religion which binds groups as organic units and a dynamic religion which frees man for a participation in the Life of God. Coulborn traces this doctrine of "dynamic religion"--which is important to Toynbee--to Giambattista Vico. (Rushton Coulborn, "Discussion: The Rise and Fall of Civilization," Ethics, LXIV [1954], 210.)

³⁹Ibid., p. 148.

⁴⁰Gerald Heard, The Ascent of Humanity (London: The Cape Co., 1929), p. 260. Cf. Schweitzer's idea of the growing sense of ethical solidarity and mystical reverence for life and Maritain's belief that man's role is "ceaseless effort . . . to effect a transformation of man and society" to the end that men may "become gods by participation in the divine life." (Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936], p. 81.)

⁴¹Gerald Heard, The Source of Civilization (London: The Cape Co., 1935), p. 71.

⁴²Hornell Hart believes that progress must be functionally conceived and defined. He spoke of a "proper functioning" as the criterion of progress in all phases of material and non-material culture. ("Is 'Progress' a Scientific Concept?" Sociology and Social Research, XIII [March-April, 1929], 303-14.)

⁴³Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 172. Cf. Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1894), pp. 112f., 134f. If one is to speak of axial events in the total life of man, there should be added to the emergence of Homo Sapiens and Man-in-Process-of-Civilization the event of God's revelation of Himself in Christ. The crucifixion, Toynbee suggests, is "a very recent event--perhaps the most recent significant event in history." (Civilization on Trial, op. cit., p. 238.)

⁴⁴Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 269-73.

⁴⁵Jan C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (2d ed.; London: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 227.

⁴⁶Arthur J. Todd, Theories of Social Progress (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 173f. Cf. Chap. IX; and William James, The Will to Believe (New York: Longmans,

Green and Co., 1912), pp. 237-39. Sociologist E. Bogardus asserts that "a stimulus may be either objective or subjective (as motive); in the latter case it may have definite environmental origins." (Fundamentals of Social Psychology [New York: The Century Co., 1924], p. 8.)

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 108f. Cf. an early work by David Hume on the potency of social stimuli entitled Of National Characters, 1748.

⁴⁸J. Murphy, Primitive Man (London: Milford, 1927), p. 26.

⁴⁹Sorokin exaggerates Toynbee's dependence on geographical factors when he says "Toynbee's geographical factor is entirely questionable." (Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 231.) For Ellsworth Huntington's thesis, see Civilization and Climate (3rd ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924), pp. 1-10, 186-93, 251-94. For Sorokin's analysis of geographical theories, see Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book Co., 1937-41), IV, 500ff. and 531ff.; and Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York: Harper & Bros., 1928), Chaps. II and III. Sorokin also objects to the emphasis by depth psychology on the role of the sub- or unconscious in the development of genius. Instead of the subconscious, Sorokin points to a "Super-conscious" which also has no ego and is the root of creativity. Without it, Sorokin believes, only mediocre accomplishments are possible. It functions through intuition and cooperates with the consciously rational or empirical. Its accomplishments are validated by logical and sensory evidence. In many respects, Sorokin's description of its creative manifestations parallels Toynbee's description of the phenomenon of etherialization. ("On Superconsciousness," Review of International Sociology, XI [January-March, 1953], 27-50.)

⁵⁰Toynbee, A Study, II, op. cit., 419.

⁵¹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 216. Cf. p. 128.

⁵²Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 306.

⁵³Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, op. cit., p. 255.

⁵⁴Carl G. Jung, Essays on a Science of Mythology, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 100. Cf. William James, Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1931), I, 224-30.

⁵⁵Frederick J. Teggart, The Processes of History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918), pp. 86f.
Cf. Todd, op. cit., p. 87.

⁵⁶Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, op. cit., pp. 255f.

⁵⁷Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (New York: The Julian Press, 1953), p. 277.
Cf. Barnes and Becker, Lore to Science, op. cit., II, 849.

⁵⁸Alexander Goldenweiser, History, Psychology and Culture (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933), pp. 184f.

⁵⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 243. "The so-called savage has no monopoly of the emotionally governed life of the collective unconscious," (Civilization on Trial, op. cit., pp. 254f.). Lévy-Bruhl believed that primitive mentality was essentially different from civilized mentality. Boas, on the other hand, advanced considerable evidence (in his The Mind of Primitive Man) to show that there is no essential difference. Lévy-Bruhl contrasted the two on the basis of the nature of the outcome of the two mental processes. Boas believed that the primitive could be educated into the civilized mentality. (Cf. a remarkable study supporting this view in Margaret Mead, New Lives for Old, Cultural Transformation--Manus, 1928-1953 [New York: Morrow, 1956].) Toynbee distinguishes the two mentalities on the basis of the nature of psychological processes themselves.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 377. Cf. p. 128 and IX, op. cit., 291. For Toynbee, "etherialization" is the tendency to shift the "field-of-action" (Ibid., p. 192). This tendency to shift stimuli is suggested in the social psychology of Charles Ellwood who speaks of the selective factor in human interaction with the environment, i.e., the mind tends to select stimuli to which it will respond. (Introduction to Social Psychology [New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1917].)

⁶¹Ibid., p. 289. "It is through the inward development of Personality that individual human beings are able to perform creative acts." (Ibid., p. 233.)

⁶²Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 42.

⁶³Toynbee's hierarchy of orders may be outlined as follows (with capitalizations retained): (1) The Order of Inanimate Physical Nature, the world of external nature more generally subject to man and thereby relatively less prescriptive than the Subconscious; (2) The Order of Psychic Nature, the world of the subconscious and its Laws, varyingly prescriptive depending on the degree of etherialization. It liberates Life from the bondage of Inanimate Physical Nature at the cost of Death and the Laws of the Subconscious. (3) The Order of Human Will, Ego-Consciousness, the order wherein Man is liberated to Limited Liberty in terms of Freedom of the Will at the cost of Moral Responsibility. (4) The Order of God Himself, the Law of Love and Perfect Liberty, absence of coercion, where Law and Freedom are indistinguishable and Man may be liberated to the Perfect Liberty of God when he wills God's Will with a will of his own.

⁶⁴Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 382. Cf. p. 395 and I, op. cit., 271-302.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 402. Cf. p. 391.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 404.

⁶⁷Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 561.

⁶⁸Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 233. Cf. a similar view in Smuts, op. cit., pp. 107, 205, 306, and 308. Etherialization by "internalization" of the challenge-and-response rhythm is suggested in the Darwinian hypothesis wherein "challenge" is the external factor of natural selection, i.e., "survival of the fittest," and "response" is the inner creative factor of "variation."

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 234.

⁷⁰Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (Harvest Book ed.; New York: Harcourt Brace, 1933), p. 243.

⁷¹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 124f. Toynbee quotes Cornford.

⁷²Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 306. The problems of life are resolved by their transformation rather than by their elimination. Cf. Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, op. cit., p. 42.

12. ⁷³Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 33. Cf. V, op. cit.,

⁷⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 211.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 134. Cf. pp. 139f.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 154-74. Cf. p. 134.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 174.

⁷⁸Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 248, passim.

⁷⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 191.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 183.

⁸¹Murphy, op. cit., pp. 24f. Toynbee quotes Murphy in I, 197f., 205f., 431f., and III, op. cit., 243f. The idea of rhythm was early suggested by Empedocles in his rhythm of Love as the integrative and therefore qualitatively simplifying force and Hate as its opposite disintegrating force. It was also suggested in the Yin and Yang of the neo-Confucian philosophers of the 11th century A.D. The dialectical approach to historical analysis is basic. It is found in Spengler, Sorokin, Heard, Smuts, and many others. In Idealism, it is Hegel's dialectic. In Marxism, it is the materialistic class struggle. In Pragmatism it takes the form of environment--challenge (maladjustment) and response (readjustment) or the process of adaptation. Helmut Kuhn, "Dialectic in History," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (January, 1949), 21: "An alternation of periods of predominantly integrative action followed by predominantly disintegrative periods . . . a systole and diastole of Time" is evident throughout history. The concept is indispensable to the analysis of history. Cf. Sidney Hook's contrary view in Reason, Social Myths and Democracy (New York: Humanities Press, 1951), Chap. XI, "Dialectic in Society and History." Hook argues that the term "dialectic" should be dropped. The writer does not agree. The rhythmic nature of "etherialization," for example, becomes evident when one examines examples of "progressive simplification" in the progress of technique.

⁸²Kuhn, op. cit., p. 27: "The rational agent . . . reflecting . . . on the world as the whole of which he is a part . . . discovers Organic Rhythm as [the] salient feature of this whole."

⁸³Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 210.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 184. The examples of etherialization drawn from transportation technology are the writer's rather than Toynbee's. Etherialization is evident in numerous social as well as mechanical inventions.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 209.

⁸⁶J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (Mentor Book ed.; New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1949), Chap. III.

⁸⁷Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 128-217.

⁸⁸Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 531.

⁸⁹Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 354.

⁹⁰Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 185. Cf. Spengler The Decline of the West, trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), I, 318ff.; and Heard, Ascent of Humanity, op. cit., pp. 226-28.

⁹¹Sorokin, Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 38. For a study of philosophies of history based on aesthetics, see Chap. II and Dynamics, op. cit., I, Chaps. V, VI, and VII.

⁹²Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 416.

⁹³Ibid., p. 187. See particularly poems no. 34, 37, 40, 45, 47, 48, 67, and 81 of the Tao Tê Ching.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 259. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., pp. 246-48 et passim; Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Anchor ed.; Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1953), Chap. VII. In the development of religion, "etherialization" is effected in the change from polytheism and the intolerable burden of complicated taboo systems to an "etherialized" monotheism and "etherialized" moral responsibility of freedom.

⁹⁵Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 295. Cf. VII, op. cit., 561.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 382. Cf. I, op. cit., 22-26, 442; III, op. cit., 217, 259ff., and 376f.

⁹⁷Solomon Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 286. The idea of "internalization" is also found in Freud, but it is a defense mechanism rather than a mechanism of growth. The individual responds to external challenges as social demands that conflict with his natural instincts by "internalizing" them. The response becomes a "conscience." "Internalization" becomes the tool of sublimation and repression in Freud rather than creativity. Creative activity follows from the sublimation of sexual instincts. Creativity is the secondary by-product of a sublimated sexual energy rather than the natural output of an integrated personality. "Freud did not deal with the productive forces in man." (Ibid.)

⁹⁸See Chap. VIII infra. re the psychological significance of the withdrawal-and-return rhythm.

⁹⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 288.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 466.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 290.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 263.

¹⁰³H. A. L. Fisher, "A Universal Historian," (A review of A Study of History, vols. I-III), The Nineteenth Century and After, CXVI (December, 1934), 689.

¹⁰⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 464.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 253. Cf. pp. 251f.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 254. Platonic perfectionism stands in sharp contrast to Augustinian or Bergsonian creationism at this point. Toynbee repudiates the former as a kind of intellectual pathology associated with and evidence of social breakdown and disintegration. The perfection sought by Toynbee is the perfection of a creative process which is the life of God, a process whereby man achieves harmony with God and His purposes.

¹⁰⁷Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, Part II, Civilization and Ethics, trans. C. T. Campion (1st American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p: 304.

¹⁰⁸Sri Radhakrishnan, Eastern Religions and Western Thought (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 101f. Toynbee does not believe, however, that the phenomenon of "withdrawal-and-return"--physical or psychic, individual or social--is an inexorable law. He cites an exception which "proves the rule" in "Muhammed's career," which--he says--"appears to have been a movement in the opposite sense. . . . The first stage of his career he withdraws as a merchant and returns as a prophet in keeping with 'etherialization.' In the second stage, however, he withdraws as prophet and returns as conqueror." (III, op. cit., 467.)

¹⁰⁹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 372.

¹¹⁰For studies by Toynbee of the time-scale of the unconscious, see A Study, VIII, op. cit., 116, 293; and IX, op. cit., 48, 328, 336-37, 361, 469, 470f., 527, 596, 600, and 704.

¹¹¹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 372.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 373. Whatever desirable effect these momentary periods of equilibrium have had socially has been limited largely to the outcome of "primitive social drill . . . called mimesis . . . [a] social expedient [that is] a 'short cut.'" (Ibid.)

¹¹³Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 324f. Toynbee goes on to say in his characteristically poetic prose that "the music that the rhythm of Yin and Yang beats out is the song of creation; and we shall not be misled into fancying ourselves mistaken because, as we give ear, we can catch the note of creation alternating with the note of destruction. So far from convicting the song of being a diabolic counterfeit, this doubleness of note is a warrant of authenticity. If we listen well we shall perceive that, when the two notes collide, they produce not a discord but a harmony, Creation would not be creative if it did not swallow up in itself all things in Heaven and Earth, including its own antithesis."

CHAPTER VII

TOYNBEE'S THEORY OF BREAKDOWN AND DISINTEGRATION

One of the perennial stimulants to speculation on the part of historians is the decline of the great world civilizations. To be sure, it is customary to fit the fall of Rome or of Assyria into the larger framework of Civilization, into a linear advance of human culture. Yet the somber fact of periodic falls of great societies moves the historian to speculate concerning the nature and cause of these catastrophes in the lives of proud societies-- societies which for the most part viewed themselves as the pinnacle of human achievement and blessed with immortality.

Particularly sobering is the fact that perhaps no civilization is more obsessed by this illusion of immortality than is our own Western civilization. Economic and political domination of most of the earth is more than Western man can enjoy without succumbing to the temptation to view his accomplishments as the acme of human achievement. There is no better evidence of this overweening confidence in his superiority and permanence than his systematically formulated self-assurance that he is indeed "civilized" man and that the touchstones of his values are those for which men everywhere will henceforth strive. This supreme self-confidence is

reflected in the unilinear view of Civilization which has become the implicit if not explicit doctrine of most Western students of human society.. The popular mythos of "the Unity of Civilization" is a convenient means, however, by which an overconfident Western man avoids the embarrassing fact that his "Illusion of Finality" is but a comfortable substitute for a real lack of spiritual confidence.. The error of some of the best Western minds is the belief that a particular method is the key to eternal progress and that this method is blessed with a universality and immortality that will persist even though its proponents falter. All this Toynbee exposes to the uncompromising glare of his logic and his facts. By revealing Western assumptions for what they really are, Toynbee has alienated the affections of most of his colleagues. Yet no one else "has taken in the dimensions of the current crisis in history better than Arnold J. Toynbee--or placed it in fuller historic perspective."¹

In his exposé of the paradox of pessimism and optimism in Western provincialism, Toynbee examines the efforts to attribute man's disasters to forces beyond his control. He says:

Three predestinarian explanations of the breakdowns of civilization [have been given]: the theory that they are the incidental consequences of a running-down of the clockwork of the Physical Universe; the theory that a civilization, like a living organism, has its own inherent life-span and life curve which compels it to pass, within a definite number of centuries, from birth through growth and senescence to death; and the theory that the breakdown of any given civilization at any given date is due to the

racial degeneration of a particular portion of the Human Race, from which this particular civilization happens to have drawn its "members."²

Toynbee rejects all these theories. He rejects as well theories of cosmic cycles which characterized Classical and Hindu thought and which found renewed life in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence. He rejects also Spengler's organismic theory of civilizations. These doctrines are themselves products of a psychic and social breakdown. Nor are the breakdowns of civilizations "acts of God," says Toynbee:

They are neither the inexorable operations of a Saeva Necessitas nor the sadistic sport of a Kali snatching another head for her necklace of skulls. Nor are they the vain repetitions of senseless laws of Nature . . . [or] loss of command over the environment, either physical or human. . . . [They] are not catastrophes . . . [or] homicidal assaults. . . . Broken down civilizations have not met their death from an assassin's hand . . . [but] from suicide. . . . "We are betrayed by what is false within". . . . The greatest danger to Man is Man."

Even in Life-in-Death [of "petrified" societies] there is still Hope-against-Hope. The Goddess with whom we have to do battle is not Saeva Necessitas . . . but only Probability.³

And within the limits of probability there is always possibility. "We are not compelled to submit . . . to the blind arbitrament of statistics."⁴ If we examine the record of the civilizations that have come into existence, Toynbee says, we note that,

sixteen [civilizations] prove to have broken down through their own acts, before ever any alien human force succeeded in dealing them a potentially mortal blow. In all of these cases the most that the alien

enemy has achieved has been to give the expiring suicide his coup de grace. . . . The histories of the Arabic and the Hittite Civilizations are the only two cases out of the nineteen in which the original breakdown . . . wears the appearance of being the work of an alien hand and even in these two cases this finding is not conclusive. . . . The cause of breakdowns of civilizations is not to be found in a loss of command over the human environment. . . . Actually an external attack usually proves to be stimulating.⁵

Symptoms of breakdown are evident in the West, Toynbee believes, but it cannot be said with certainty that breakdown has in fact occurred. No necessary law is indicated.

The great war [of A.D. 1914-18 and its sequel, A.D. 1939-45] . . . may or may not prove to have been the undoing of our own Western Civilization. . . . The generation now alive will not live to know whether the wound dealt to our Western Society . . . has been mortal or not, though the truth--whatever it may be--will doubtless be manifest, several centuries hence, to our descendants.⁶

The cause of breakdown, Toynbee believes, is psychological, social, and spiritual--not material, external or determined. Philosophies of determinism arise during periods of disintegration as emotional escape hatches. Failure of creative activity gives rise to the need for ego-satisfaction substitutes. Instead of accepting the reality of breakdown and responding creatively to its challenge, a degenerate creative minority may turn to dismal doctrines of doom. Perhaps the classic and most sublime example of this response is that of Lucretius. In his De Rerum Natura--particularly Book II, lines 1144-45 and 1150-74--Lucretius recognizes the reality of growth and progress but falls into pessimism when he resigns himself to what he believes to be the ultimate

senescence of all nature and admonishes his reader with sublime poetry to face the future without fear, to seek in the ephemeral the values and satisfactions of the good life. Predestinarian and deterministic doctrines are themselves a part of the phenomenon of breakdown.

Breakdown is the counterpart of etherialization. It is a failure of creative functioning in personal and social relationships. In turning to determinism, responsibility for the affliction is avoided--for the moment at least--and the burden of guilt shifted to forces beyond man's control. But determinism is an invitation to despair, for it destroys any possibility of reestablishing a basis of value in human existence.

In an eternally repetitive universe all human endurance becomes the torment of . . . Ixion, and all human action becomes the ineffective gesture of a Tantalus.⁷

In what sense can any act or relationship be creative, asks Toynbee, if it possesses no significance apart from itself, or if it is the necessary outcome of an antecedent condition? Only freedom and purpose can give meaning to history, and this freedom and purpose must link the destiny of man to the destiny of the universe itself.

Because creativity is the breath of Life, failure of creativity is death. This failure is what Toynbee means by breakdown. The idea of breakdown embarrasses conventional theories of progress. Consequently it is attributed by some to the fearful speculations of historians who have been

"overcome by the imagination of disaster." For Toynbee, however, breakdown is essentially the cessation of etherialization. It therefore involves all aspects of life.

If breakdown is the failure of creativity or etherialization, to what can this failure be attributed? Toynbee believes that "idolization of the ephemeral" is the key cause of the failure. Idolization of the ephemeral manifests itself in the direction of human faith toward some personality, social group, institution, or technique. By directing attention to some ephemeral achievement, it tends to peg etherialization at some particular level of achievement instead of encouraging a continuation of the creative process. Transitory goals are substituted for the creative process of Life. There is an absolutization of the relative. But "every form of idolatry is intrinsically disastrous for the idolater."⁸

At the personal level, breakdown is reflected in the corruption of personality. The creative personality is seduced by some particular success to imagine that this particular success possesses value in and of itself. The resulting overconfidence is deceptive. A dark horse may win out over a favorite.

An intrinsically superior technique which has been idolized by its adepts [for example] . . . may be defeated by an intrinsically inferior technique which has no point in its favor except that it has not yet had time to be idolized.⁹

Perhaps the most insidious of idolizations is the idolization of the "Ephemeral Self"--the perennial error of

anthropomorphism. This idolization assumes many forms depending on the particular Zeitgeist of the culture in question. The Greeks, for example, worshipped a false "God the Reason"--a false god that was subsequently favored by Modern Western Man. On the other hand, Vedantic philosophy worships "God the Subconscious"--a false god to which Westerners--thanks to Freud--are now beginning to turn.¹⁰

Idolization of a particular success is a powerful inducement to breakdown. For example, "a rise in spiritual standards," says Toynbee, may

incidentally produce a consequent rise in material well-being. . . . This incidental mundane effect of spiritual progress exposes Man to a temptation to which he readily succumbs. The material harvest of spiritual travail is apt to divert Man's energies from spiritual into material channels.¹¹

Indeed, Toynbee continues:

If "the greater the success, the greater the temptation" were in truth one of the laws to which the Human Psyche was subject then it would seem to follow that an equilibrium which had to be unstable if it was to be a vehicle for the growth-process must be prone to become ever more precarious with each successive victory.¹²

Hence "the price of growth condemns a growing civilization to live dangerously," Toynbee concludes. The creative personality must resist a growing temptation to idolize the ephemeral--to rest on his oars; for in succumbing to this temptation, the burden of creativity is abandoned for less burdensome but uncreative ephemeral pursuits.¹³ Dr. Inge's aphorism: "Nothing fails like success" aptly describes the predicament of "Man-in-Process-of-Civilization."

"Resting on one's oars," says Toynbee, "is the passive

way of succumbing to the nemesis of creativity [which is breakdown]." An active way, he continues, is the substitution of violence, of a masochistic and suicidal militarism, for the action of creativity.¹⁴

Breakdown is a potent social contagion. It takes its toll of the creative minority of all societies. When afflicted, corrupted personalities suppress the emergence of creativity in new minorities. Serious psychic and social stagnation may occur. "When these considerations are taken together,"

it will be seen that the . . . sterilizing of ci-devant creators through an inward psychological aberration to which their very achievement makes them prone is the most potent cause of breakdown of any that our survey has revealed.¹⁵

The sterilizing of which Toynbee speaks may follow a number of phenomena. If the creative personality is not seduced by success to abandon his creative effort, if he has escaped the deceptive illusion of having achieved perfection, he may yet acquire the mistaken notion that perfection is the goal of life. This was the fatal mistake of Plato and Aristotle. Their desire was to peg society at the ideal level of the city state, to preserve, if possible, the ideal form of society. "Not happiness and not progress, but stability, is the Alpha and Omega of the Athenian philosopher's social creed."¹⁶ "The Platonic and Aristotelian programme," Toynbee continues, "is to 'peg' the Hellenic society to the social level of a 'Lycurgeoan' system." In these instances, there is "a mental reversion from the human towards the insect type of mental rhythm."¹⁷

For Toynbee, perfection is creative process--not stasis. Only by plunging in the stream of Life does the human psyche fulfill its intended destiny, and the stream of Life pursues a turbulent and hazardous course. "Perfect adaptation is death" wrote the American sociologist, Arthur Todd:

Progress means struggle to adjust rather than adjustment . . . [and] man's progress has been won at the expense of nature's laws.¹⁸

Fortunately perfect adaptation is never achieved.

But man must keep the rhythms of life alive if he is to escape breakdown. The human personality must make the fateful choice between the hazards of a creative life and the deadlier hazards of stable inactivity. The choice is difficult, but is nevertheless the essence of the drama of the human situation. To etherialize is to invite breakdown--a challenge few can surmount. Yet not to etherialize is ipso facto breakdown. To seek the security of acquiescence to the "cake of custom," to renounce creative venture, is to renounce life itself. It is to return to the more primitive level of subconscious domination of life. Worse yet, it involves the risk of damming up psychic energy--a psychic disorder that may activate the autonomous contents of the subconscious.. The human psyche cannot long deny its creative potential without endangering the health of its personality as well. Either it withers from lack of psychic nourishment or the nourishing psychic elements assert a subhuman life of their own. In any event, the psyche must find its way back to the stream of life.

Idolization of the ephemeral commonly appears as the result of mechanization. Toynbee's negative appraisal of mechanization goes hard against the main stream of contemporary thought. Yet Toynbee is convincing when he argues that the invention of soulless mechanisms increases the tendency to rest on one's oars. This is because, he argues, mechanization frees people from the burdens of life and by so doing encourages them to extend mechanization to all spheres of life including the creative process itself. In other words, the creative personality may be encouraged by a partial and successfully etherializing mechanization to renounce the new opportunity for creativity by substituting for the burden of creativity a full mechanization of the remainder of life. The evil of mechanization is the tendency to idolize it rather than mechanization itself, for mechanization is progressive simplification of technique is a form of etherialization. But mechanization of human interactions or responses is per se a repudiation of self-determination and therefore an invitation to disaster.

The mechanization of Life, either in the inner workings of a soul or in the external relations between a number of human beings in a society . . . [involves a] risk of catastrophe [which] proves to be inherent in the use of the faculty of mimesis [social imitation], which is the vehicle of mechanization in the medium of Human Nature. . . . The weakness of mimesis lies in its being a mechanical response to a suggestion. . . . All action that proceeds from mimesis is essentially precarious because it is not self-determined.¹⁹

If mimesis is directed toward creative personalities who are able to prevent the cake of custom from hardening, growth may

persist. On the other hand if mimesis becomes mechanical obedience to habit or ephemeral worship of an institution or the past, disaster is invited:

The condition which is required for the maintenance of the Promethean élan of growth is a condition of unstable equilibrium in which "the cake of custom" is never allowed to set hard before it is broken up again.²⁰

Yet for all of its hazards in the mechanicalness of mimesis, social imitation is the unavoidable means of social communication of the Way of Life. Only a communion of saints, says Toynbee, could eliminate it. The irony of history is that the very processes by which progress is achieved are also the potential sources of breakdown. Man's doom is almost assured. Toynbee comes close to a fatal determinism--but only for a moment, because breakdown is itself a challenge. The traumatic experiences it evokes may issue in responses of the highest order. The Way of Life remains open to man. Instead of a spiritual determinism, Toynbee offers a crisis philosophy of life; and if we interpret crisis to mean opportunity as well as danger, we have in essence Toynbee's view of life. For Toynbee, man must confront the Charybdis and Scylla of the human situation, the sin hubris--being 'puffed up'--and a 'resting on one's oars' in a cessation of creativity.

The only wisdom we can hope to acquire
Is the wisdom of humility: humility is endless.²¹

With Bunyanlike steadfastness of purpose man must work out his salvation. The Way of Life is the eternal struggle of

creation, of self-transcendence.

For most of us, this is the aim
Never to be realized;
Who are only undefeated
Because we have gone on trying.²²

To falter is to fail but only if the challenge of failure does not itself provoke a creative response. There is no ceasing of this striving. Utopian hopes are the vain imaginings of those who would revert to the instinctive way of the beehive--the

mental reversion from the human towards the insect type of mental rhythm; from the blundering but progressive [and creative] mobility of reason to the infallible but inflexible rigidity of instinct [and habit].²³

Like the philosophies of determinism, utopian dreams are the phenomena of broken down societies--attempts to inhibit disintegration, in other words, idolizations of the ephemeral. They lead to the dehumanization of man rather than to progress.

The two phenomena of caste and specialization, and the fatally perfect adaptation of the society to its particular environment which these two phenomena bring about between them, are just as characteristic of the Utopian and the Insect World as they [were] of four actual societies [the Spartan, Eskimo, Nomadic and Osmanli] . . . which suffered arrest.²⁴

Compared with periods of growth during which there is evidence of a qualitative differentiation of culture "we shall now find," says Toynbee,

that conversely, the qualitative effect of the disintegration process is standardization. . . . As soon as a social breakdown has occurred and the process of social disintegration has set in, the tendency towards variety and differentiation that is characteristic of the growth phase of a civilization is replaced by a nusus towards uniformity and identity.²⁵

But no human enterprize can survive if it abandons the Way of Life. By leaving the stream of life, civilizations perish. The stream, however, moves on. Other societies, other creative minorities move with it.

The responsibility for growth and breakdown is the burden of the creative minority. "Moral responsibility for the breakdown of civilization lies upon the heads of the leaders." By resting on their oars, the leaders or creative minority forsake their roles as creators of value, and "if the blind lead the blind, both . . . fall into the ditch."²⁶

Any loss of creative power by the creative minority alienates the quiescent majority. When this occurs, the Creative Minority is no longer able to inspire mimesis and converts itself into a Dominant Minority which maintains leadership on the basis of favorable power relationships.²⁷ "In the interaction between leaders and led, mimesis and power are correlatives," says Toynbee.²⁸ During growth, power is exercised through inspiration. But inspiration requires a high level of personality development and human relationships. During breakdown this is lost, and coercion and mechanization take their inevitable toll in dehumanization. There emerges--in the words of T. S. Eliot--the phenomenon of

. . . decent godless people:
Their only monument the asphalt road
And a thousand lost golf balls.²⁹

Power relationships in society reorient themselves in terms of mechanized conformity backed by coercion. Self-

masses are cut adrift. No longer guided by free and inspired responses, their social life becomes the rubber stamp imitation of personalities who enjoy--for the moment--a favorable power relationship. But a society held together by the authority of brute force explicit or implicit converts itself from a state of harmonious integration into a state of chaotic disintegration which can be arrested only by the threat or application of increasing force and violence.

A civilization that has broken down and failed to retrieve itself becomes a paltry shadow of its former self. Its armies may occupy the four corners of the world, but its spirit is broken. Indeed it is doubtful that it can lay claim to recognition as a social entity. Attention must be directed to the social entities which emerge from its ruins.

From the disintegration of secondary civilizations emerge three social entities. The first is an alienated Internal Proletariat who create a Universal Church. This group is confronted by a second social entity, the Universal State which the Dominant Minority erects in pursuit of peace and immortality. A third entity also appears in the form of an External Proletariat which Toynbee indentifies with belligerent and barbarian war bands.

Of the three groups, the Internal Proletariat is the most significant, for out of the deep trauma of the challenge of alienation arises the creative response of higher religion. "The true hallmark of the proletarian," says Toynbee,

is neither poverty nor humble birth but a consciousness
--and the resentment which this consciousness inspires--

of being disinherited. . . . The subjective [i.e., psychological] proletarianism is not incompatible with the possession of material assets.³⁵

The internal proletariat are alienated by the distasteful and uninspiring social relationships which replace the sense of growth and purpose. This loss of confidence carries serious social implications of a general and widespread nature because the power relationships which bind the society degenerate. Symbols of authority become perverted, and there is a loss of the sense of community. Threat of coercion replaces respect; fearful imitation, inspiration. A sense of malaise within brings in its wake aggressive compensatory measures without:

One of the commonest forms in which the breakdown of a civilization declares itself is an outbreak of fratricidal warfare between the state members of the society; and if ever the children of the household pause for a moment from their self-imposed task of self-destruction in order to turn their arms against outsiders, it is likely enough that the improvement in the art of war which they have been making at the price of their own blood will purchase them wide dominion over their neighbours.³⁶

The illusion of growth which military conquest brings parallels the illusion of immortality which the Universal State appears to establish. Both are revealing symptoms of the progress of the social disease of disintegration. Both promote an artificial sense of unity to compensate for the pseudo-relationships of a diseased society, and both lead to the phenomenon of the "savior." "In a growing civilization," says Toynbee,

a creative personality comes into action by taking the lead in making a successful response to some challenge. . . . In a disintegrating civilization Challenge and Response is still the mould of action in which the mystery of creation takes place, but : . . [while] in a growing civilization the creator is called upon to play the part of a conqueror who replies to a challenge with victorious response, in a disintegrating society the same creator is called upon to play the part of a saviour who comes to the rescue of a society that has failed to respond because the challenge has worsted a minority that has ceased to be creative and has sunk to be merely dominant.³⁷

Saviors seek the salvation of their society by various means and with varying degrees of success or failure. Violent responses to the challenge of breakdown may be Archaistic or Futuristic. They may

attempt to substitute a mere transfer in the Time-dimension for that transfer of the field of action from one spiritual plane to another [higher one] which is the characteristic movement of [genuine] growth [through etherialization].³⁸

In essence, a pseudo-etherialization is attempted.

The gentle responses of Detachment and Transfiguration find greater favor with Toynbee because they "effect a genuine change in spiritual clime. . . . Their respective goals are 'otherworldly,' " instead of being mere transfers in the time dimension of This World. Detachment is an arrested form of etherialization. It constitutes a withdrawal without a return, a withdrawal "out of This World . . . [through the] push of aversion." Transfiguration, on the other hand, is the response of withdrawal-and-return--an etherialized response to the challenge of disintegration, and attempt to "transcend the earthly life of Man [which has broken down] without ceasing to embrace it."

. . . to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time . . .³⁹

It is the response of the Buddhist Bodhisattva who achieves salvation but lingers in This World to save his fellows.

During disintegration, transfiguration renews the broken rhythms of life. It "bears witness to the growth of a society . . . of some other kind than the one in disintegration."⁴⁰ In the relatively short history of Man, transfiguration has signalled the emergence of higher religion. Higher religion, Toynbee believes, is the supreme human achievement which makes of the growth and disintegration of civilizations something more significant than "the ineffective gesture of Tantalus."

A civilization that brings a church to birth and perishes in the creative act does not stultify itself by perishing, but, on the contrary, justifies its existence by carrying out its historical mission at the cost of its own life. [This is particularly true] when the life of a civilization has served as the overture not to the miscarriage of an abortive church, but to the birth of a living church. . . . [in which] the death of the precursor civilization is not a disaster but a triumph [of purpose in history].⁴¹

Only transfiguration is the successful response to breakdown, for in transfiguration the encounter of challenge-and-response takes place in the soul of Man.

In the diversity in the relations of Religion to the rises and falls of civilizations, in different generations . . . we can discern that human freedom springs from an encounter in which Man is summoned to respond to a challenge presented by God [Himself to the soul of Man].⁴²

Though the growth of civilization is "topped" by breakdown, the creativity of God does not cease.⁴³ During

disintegration, it shifts its field of activity from the broken down civilization to new social entities. In particular the Universal Church which is the visible expression of a higher religion becomes the vehicle of growth. "Both Detachment and Transfiguration," says Toynbee,

are examples of that "transference" of the field of action from the Macrocosm to the Microcosm which manifests itself qualitatively in the spiritual phenomenon of "etherialization." If we are right in believing that these are symptoms of growth and right again in believing that every example of human growth will always be found to have social as well as an individual aspect, and if we are also bound to assume ex hypothesi that the society to whose growth the movements of Detachment and Transfiguration thus bear witness cannot be any society of the species "civilization"--considering that a disintegrating society of that species is the City of Destruction from which either movement is an endeavour to escape--then we can only conclude that the movements of Detachment and Transfiguration bear witness to the growth of a society, or societies, of some other kind or kinds.⁴⁴

Because creativity is prostituted by mechanization in many mundane expressions of Life, it may find expression in exclusively spiritual activities. These may thrive when material outlets for creativity have withered. All four higher religions, for example, arose during a Time of Troubles.

An outburst of spiritual life at a moment of mundane catastrophe was the secret of the triumphant religion's success in converting both the human sheep left shepherdless by the disappearance of a secular universal state and the wolf-like invading barbarians.⁴⁵

Nicholas Berdyaev detects a similar correlation. Spiritual progress, he asserts, is realized when real life is difficult as, for example, during the Napoleonic Era in Germany.⁴⁶ Both Toynbee and Berdyaev detect a rhythmic progression of periods of spiritual plenitude wherein values

are created followed by periods of a plenitude of the material utilization of these values followed in turn by an attempt to replenish the source of value withered by idolization of the ephemeral. During disintegration, therefore, etherialization finds continued vent in religious and aesthetic creativity.

The creative activity in religion and the fine arts is paralleled by an ephemeral effort of a Dominant Minority and its saviors to establish and maintain the Universal State. In its effort to heal the Schism of the Soul, the Dominant Minority creates the Universal State, a pseudo-achievement which,

proves to [be] the last phase of a society before its extinction, and the pursuit of the mirage of immortality, into which a dominant minority is misled through mistaking its ephemeral universal state for the goal of human endeavour.⁴⁷

The plight of the Universal State is ironical. The best that it can achieve short of the delay of final dissolution is the reverse of etherialization in immobility and petrification. Its achievements accrue to the benefit of aliens rather than to the dying civilization for which they were intended. This frustrating

experience of losing their lives in order to find them again in the lives of their beneficiaries . . . provokes them [the dominant minority] to recalcitrance and indignation.⁴⁸

Yet for all its agonized efforts, the Universal State is but a temporary respite from the rhythm of disintegration.⁴⁹ It is, Toynbee believes, the social point of no return.⁵⁰

If the society that has become known as civilization

fails to retrieve the creative rhythm of life, and the spirit of God manifests itself in the emergence of newer societies, the differentiation of the creative life of the culture within that civilization will give way to pronounced rhythms and regularities that show up as patterns on a scale of time. During growth, patterns in the life of a society are obscured by the pronounced differentiation of cultural traits. After breakdown, and particularly with the onset of disintegration, these patterns become evident. Their presence suggests, for example, that the society and the individuals who comprise it are functioning more nearly at subconscious levels. Toynbee believes that,

if the social laws current in the histories of civilization are reflections of psychological laws governing some infra-personal layer of the Subconscious Psyche, this would also explain why these social laws should be as we have found them to be, so much more clearly pronounced and more exactly regular in the disintegration phase of a broken-down civilization's history than in its foregoing growth phase.⁵¹

During growth, irregularity characterizes the patterns of social phenomena as variety characterizes the challenges and responses. In contrast, the disintegration phases of twelve cases studied by Toynbee reveal regularities and uniformities in all their aspects.⁵² There is, says Toynbee,

a striking contrast between the regularity and uniformity of the phenomena of social disintegration and the irregularity and diversity of the phenomena of social growth.

Why should this be the case? Toynbee suggests that,

a key to its solution may be found in the difference between the respective natures of the conscious personality on the surface of the Psyche and the subconscious levels of the psychic life, underlying it.⁵³

For one thing, the challenge of individual and social encounters upon the subconscious psyche has a deeper effect than that which is evident in the immediate response of consciousness. Moreover, the laws operative in the subconscious and in the intermediate layers of the psyche are not necessarily confined to the life-span of a single individual, but stamp their effects on the psychic character of the collective or racial unconscious:

The pace at which the subconscious element in the Psyche habitually moves is . . . not merely the limiting, but the governing factor in [for example] the determination of the time that an encounter between two contemporary civilizations will take, from first to last, to work itself out; and the usual Time-scale of the working of the Subconscious in this province of the realm of social life [has] been of a much higher order of magnitude than 450 years [which is the approximate period of impact by Modern Western society on other contemporary civilizations].⁵⁴

The regularity of social disintegration suggests a rhythm of Rout-and-Rally:

The cyclic rhythm of Rout-and-Rally . . . has [in ten examples excluding a lost Minoan account and an uncompleted Western example] been apt--apart from cases in which the domestic history of a society has been thrown out of its own course by the impact of an alien body social--to take a run of three-and-a-half beats . . . [proceeding] from the breakdown . . . to its final unretrieved dissolution. The first rout . . . [initiates] "a Time of Troubles" which is relieved by the first rally, followed by a second, and usually more violent paroxysm. . . . This relapse is followed . . . by a second rally which is more robust . . . [and establishes] a universal state. . . . A further [third] relapse eventually supervenes . . . [but the] universal state manages to stage a recovery. This third rally, however, is the last that the disintegrating Civilization finds the strength to make. When, thereafter, the universal state is smitten by a second [the fourth for

the civilization] . . . stroke, this is the end, not only of this oecumenical body politic, but also of the body social.

The standard Time-spans both of the Times of Troubles and of the universal states . . . appear to be of the order of four centuries each.⁵⁵

The emergence of the affiliated civilization--if there is one--is about three hundred years after dissolution of the apparented civilization, that is, three hundred years between the last relapse of the apparented civilization and the earliest visible evidence of a new civilization. The total process of disintegration may last from 800 to 1100 years depending essentially on the resistance of the universal state to final collapse. This may be illustrated as follows:

In examining the above, we note that there is no uniformity in the spans of the individual routs and rallies.⁵⁶

General breakdown and the ensuing routs and rallies are terminated by dissolution of the civilization as a society. Though exhibiting a pattern, these phenomena do not indicate the working of an inexorable law of decay. Toynbee does not believe that sufficient evidence is available from the life histories of a handful of civilizations to establish more than a degree of probability. One can only describe

what has happened and view this eventuality as a possibility. No necessary pattern of breakdown, disintegration and dissolution is established by the relatively meager set of facts at hand. In the case of the Egyptian society, for example, an unusually long period developed between the breakdown in the 16th century B.C. and the final dissolution of that society in the 5th century A.D.⁵⁷ This deviation from the usual pattern Toynbee characterized as an example of "petrified-life-in-death." Knowledge of civilized societies cannot match the anthropologist's knowledge of primitive societies. Over six-hundred primitive societies have been studied.⁵⁸ Also, Egyptian history is by no means clear, and Toynbee's treatment of it as well as his treatment of Chinese history has evoked many objections. In the case of the latter, Toynbee radically revised earlier conclusions and suggested that he is disposed to alter other conclusions wherever evidence suggests to him that a revision is in order.⁵⁹

In summary:

The nature of the breakdowns of civilizations can be summed up in three points: a failure of creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the part of the majority, and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole.⁶⁰

If the stricken society fails to recover the Way of Life, it ultimately passes from the stage of history. Assuming ex hypothesi that breakdown has occurred, the future of the West depends in part on the emergence of a Universal State. If a Universal State--as Toynbee defines it--were to be established in the contemporary world, our doom would be virtually assured.

When once a Time of Troubles [which the West may be experiencing at present] has passed over into a universal state, there are manifest inherent obstacles to recuperation that are so serious that they may well be insurmountable.⁶¹

But emergence of a Universal State is only a possibility, and should it occur, the doom of the West would remain a probability rather than a necessity. No inexorable fate controls the destiny of man. Creativity--etherialization--does not cease with breakdown as Professor Sorokin believed Toynbee to say. Nor is creativity confined to the spiritual in exclusion of the material as Professor Barnes believed Toynbee to say.⁶² Instead, etherialization is the means by which value infuses all of life. Momentary failures are not necessarily the precursors of doom. They may be, instead, the prelude to transcending successes. For Toynbee, the destiny of man is resolved in the ultimate triumph of value for which purpose the creative process transcends all ephemeral existence, even breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution.

CHAPTER VII

Footnotes

¹Lewis Mumford, "A Study of History," Diogenes, XIII (Spring, 1956), 24.

²Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 23. Cf. Henry Adams's law of cultural entropy in the Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, with introduction by Brooks Adams (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919); and Brooks Adams, The Law of Civilization and Decay (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898). Brooks Adams portrays the history of human society as a manifestation of cosmic energy expressing itself through mental activity.

³Ibid., pp. 119ff. and 39. Toynbee quotes from George Meredith's Love's Grave and the anti-Enlightenment French archaeologist C. G. Volney's "Lecons d'Histoire: 'la source de ses calamités réside dans L'homme même.'"

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 115. For detailed studies by Toynbee of the breakdown of specific societies, see I, op. cit., 93, 101, and 169; II, op. cit., 109 and 114; IV, op. cit., 3, 85, 110, 119, 412, and 476; V, op. cit., 2f., 68, 269, and 351f.; VI, op. cit., 302. Toynbee identifies twenty-one full civilizations, i.e., civilizations that grew after birth, four abortive civilizations, and five arrested civilizations. Of the twenty-one that grew, seven are extant. The remainder are extinct. Of those extant all but possibly the West have broken down.

⁶Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 90 and n. 2. This was written prior to World War II.

⁷Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 30.

⁸Ibid., p. 639.

⁹Ibid., p. 465.

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 468.

¹¹Ibid., p. 762. Cf. pp. 425, 546-48, 551f., and 701f.

¹²Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 392.

¹³Ibid. Cf. IV, op. cit., 245-61; VII, op. cit., 425, 546-48, 551f., 701f., and 762. Richard Chase, "Toynbee: the Historian as Artist," American Scholar, XVI (July, 1947), 277 believes that Toynbee's "idolization of an Ephemeral Self" is the Freudian "repetition-compulsion" of the "death-instinct."

¹⁴Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 260. Cf. pp. 465, 584, 640, and 651.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 96.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 92, 110. See particularly Plato, Republic, bks. ii, iii, iv, and v; and Aristotle, Politics, bks. i and ii. In the Republic, Plato speaks of the "Noble Lie," the idea of "human watch dogs," selective human breeding, abolition of marriage, the family, and private property, subordination of the individual to the interests of the state, justification of slavery, and a general control of the population by the city state. Cf. studies by R. W. Livingstone, The Greek Genius and Its Meaning to Us (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912), pp. 186-90; and Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. I, The Age of Plato (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945). Livingstone is excellent on Platonic obscurantism, censorship, and authoritarianism, and Popper on totalitarian tendencies.

¹⁸Arthur J. Todd, Theories of Social Progress (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 96f. Cf. John Dewey, "Progress," Ethics, April, 1916, pp. 311-22; Thomas H. and Julian Huxley, Evolution and Ethics (London: Pilot Press, 1947), p. 81; and Albert Schweitzer, The Philosophy of Civilization, Part II, Civilization and Ethics, trans. C. T. Campion (1st American ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), passim.

¹⁹Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 127.

²⁰Ibid., p. 128.

²¹T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, quoted in Martin, Experiment in Depth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955), p. 211.

Cf. Chap. X in Martin, op. cit., for a general analysis of this problem.

²²Ibid., p. 227.

²³Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 110. Cf. R. W. G. Hingston, Problems of Instinct and Intelligence (London: Arnold Press, 1928), pp. 200-208, and 280ff.

²⁴Ibid., p. 89.

²⁵Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 330. Cf. V, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁶Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 129. Toynbee quotes Matt. 15:14.

²⁷Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 53-57 and 187f.; IV, op. cit., 5f. James K. Feibleman, The Revival of Realism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 182, asks: "Could it not be that while the minority are engaged in translating certain valid truths into actual events the proletariat are more than glad to give their allegiance, but that when more 'practical' ideas are selected by the minority, ideas which still parade as 'truths,' but which only serve narrow purposes, the allegiance of the proletariat, which see through the change, is lost." A better explanation, perhaps, may be that the majority recognize in the more successful achievement of the minority that which they themselves seek but with less success. The majority is able therefore to identify itself with the minority because the latter experiences more fully what the majority experiences less satisfactorily. When the minority are no longer able to perform this function, they lose the affection of the majority.

²⁸Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 131.

²⁹T. S. Eliot, Collected Poems, quoted in Martin, op. cit., p. 253. Cf. Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944), pp. 391-423; John Hallowell, Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950), Chap. XVIII; Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, op. cit., passim.

³⁰Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 41 and 53-62. Cf. Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954).

³¹Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 131.

³²Toynbee, A Study, VIII, op. cit., 7. Cf. I, op. cit., 34ff., 43ff., 149ff., and 153ff.; and III, op. cit., 152.

³³Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 132f.

³⁴Ibid., p. 16.

³⁵Toynbee, A Study, V, op. cit., 63.

³⁶Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 57. Cf. III, op. cit., 150ff.; and V, op. cit., 199ff.

³⁷Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 177.

³⁸Toynbee, A Study, V, op. cit., 383.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 394, 396. Cf. VI, op. cit., 169; T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets, quoted in Martin, op. cit., pp. 134 and 13:

. . . A people without history
Is not redeemed from time, for history
is a pattern
Of timeless moments.

⁴⁰Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 169. Cf. p. 170; I, op. cit., 173, n. 3; and III, op. cit., 174-217.

⁴¹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 532.

⁴²Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 394.

⁴³Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 157.

⁴⁴Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 170. Cf. I, op. cit., 173, n. 3; and III, op. cit., 174-217.

⁴⁵Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 702. Concerning the emergence of higher religions, see pp. 701-15. The Universal Church which provides the new outlet for creative energy and etherialization passes through phases of a profound psychological nature. During the initial "conceptive" phase,

the newly formed social entity is the recipient of creative energies that the dying Universal State does not seek nor can use. There is a "transfer of spiritual [psychic] energy from secular to religious channels." (A Study, VII, op. cit., 396, n. 3.) The new religious outlets are the equivalents of secular channels which were the creative outlets during the growth of civilization. (Ibid., p. 397.) The "gestative" phase that follows is distinguished by the vast amount of creative activity of the emergent religious entity. (Ibid., p. 396.) The transition to the "gestative" from the "conceptive" phase of a church's service as a chrysalis, Toynbee says, "is marked by an increase in the flow of vitality. . . . In both these phases a current of psychic energy that can no longer find vent through the choked or shattered institutional channels of a disintegrating civilization is flowing into alternative channels newly opened for it by the church." (Ibid., p. 401.) The third or "parturient" phase is that in which "creative energy" flows "out again under religious auspices into secular channels on the economic and political as well as the cultural plane of social life." (Ibid.)

⁴⁶Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, trans. George Reavey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 212. Berdyaev's thesis is that there is a law of inverse relationship relating cultural and material achievements. Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, Force and Freedom, trans. James H. Nichols (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943), Chap. III; and Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 138f.

⁴⁷Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 54. Cf. VIII, op. cit., 54.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 381.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 56. Cf. VI, op. cit., 278-87.

⁵⁰Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 341ff.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 329.

⁵²Toynbee, A Study, V, op. cit., 12f.

⁵³Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 331.

⁵⁴Toynbee, A Study, VIII, op. cit., 483.

⁵⁵Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 289. Cf. VI, op. cit., 278-327; and VII, op. cit., 769 and Table I.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 240.

⁵⁷Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 62ff. and V, op. cit., 2f.

⁵⁸In contrast to the twenty-one full civilizations which Toynbee delineates, he refers to 650 contemporary primitive societies described in Hobhouse, et. al., The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples (London: Chapman and Hall, 1915), pp. 30-44.

⁵⁹J. A. Wilson, The Burden of Egypt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), is one of those who have "used, criticized, improved and discarded" some of Toynbee's ideas. Rushton Coulborn, "Discussion: The Rise and Fall of Civilization," Ethics, LXVI (1956), 235-49, compares Toynbee's and Wilson's respective theses regarding Egypt. Cf. also Edward J. Ryan, "A Critical Evaluation of A. J. Toynbee as Historiographer of Chinese Civilization Before 500 A.D.," (unpublished Master's thesis, Department of History, Claremont College, 1948), concerning Toynbee's difficulties with early Chinese history.

⁶⁰Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 120. Cf. p. 6.

⁶¹Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 343f.

⁶²Sorokin, Social Philosophies, op. cit., Chap. V.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHERIALIZATION

Toynbee's idea of etherialization and his psychological principle of withdrawal-and-return deserve a careful analysis in terms of the psychology which he has embraced. When Toynbee revealed his preference for Jungian assumptions about man in the last four volumes of his Study, he had already developed his idea of etherialization and the psychic mechanism of withdrawal-and-return. What is invariably overlooked is that Toynbee's alliance with Jungian psychology greatly strengthened this theory. Indeed, it is doubtful that Toynbee himself fully grasped the significance of the implications of this alliance.¹ The Jungian picture of personality not only provides an explanation of the phenomenon of etherialization but also yields clues to the emergence of creative minorities. Without this Jungian picture of personality,

Toynbee's minority [would] remain a complete mystery as to the what, how, whence, and why of its emergence and disappearance,

and Sorokin would be further justified in objecting that,

instead of explaining the creativity of a given group, [Toynbee's] postulate [would] itself require even greater elucidation than the question of why some groups become civilizations while others do not.²

Sorokin insists that because Toynbee's rhythms of challenge-and-response and withdrawal-and-return are

universal, continuous, and common to all living groups and individuals, [they] evidently cannot be a factor that operates only for creative groups and persons. . . . Only if Toynbee had specified that what he had in mind was a special form of challenge-and-response, of withdrawal-and-return, a form found in operation only among creative groups and persons . . . only in such a case would these factors . . . [be] helpful.³

But Toynbee did not make the mistake of suggesting a dimorphism of human personalities based on factors external to psychic functioning. Instead he suggests--but never fully develops--a theory which relates these personality processes themselves to the appearance of creativity. The rhythms he employs--which are strikingly similar to those of Jung--become the means for describing these almost inscrutable processes. Sorokin's difficulty illustrates the impossibility of making sense of Toynbee apart from his psychology.

If the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return is carefully examined in the light of Jung's system it will be noted that withdrawal is Jung's regression. It is a search of the depths of a suffering psyche for spiritual resources. The return--or Jung's progression--puts new energy into action in a social as well as psychic field because the psyche lives and moves in interaction with other psyches. In withdrawal and return, the individual psyche consciously differentiates from the group in order to make it

possible for the personality to realize individual potentialities which might have remained in abeyance if the individual . . . had not been released for a moment.⁴

The rhythm of withdrawal-and-return does not necessarily involve distinct events in clock-time:

Under the term "withdrawal" a variety of different kinds of action is comprised. One obvious kind is [that in which] a man goes apart by himself for some considerable period and only when he has thus made a rather complete adjustment to the inner world attempts the return. . . . Another . . . man continues in his normal way of life but gives far more attention . . . to the other side of consciousness [as self-awareness]. . . . Another type . . . is not so much a movement of "withdrawal" followed by a movement of "return" as a continuous process.⁵

The important point is that the return is the return of a personality rather than the addition of a cipher to the mass, and that wholeness or integration is achieved in a personality that,

as individual and as collective [social] being alike, consciously as well as unconsciously [is] in touch with the universe [Ultimate Reality].⁶

In other words, the rhythm gives significance to life as well as establishes communion with it. It introduces a spiritual dimension that infuses objective significance into all aspects of life. Values that are relevant to the human situation must be able to transcend the vicissitudes and necessities of that situation. The eternal must be able to enter time in kairos--the "fullness of time."⁷ In short, the withdrawal-and-return leading to etherialization has as its end what Professor Tillich terms a theonomous culture: a culture wherein the infinite infuses the finite, the unconditioned the conditioned, the eternal the temporal, and the creative the created. Values emerge and persist because,

the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action; the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content.⁸

During withdrawal, the "inward-turning of the libido [as psychic energy] is a painful time for the individual, a time of crisis."⁹ It may become a "bitterness not far from death. . . [but] it is a tide which, rightly taken, can float the man to a new level; wrongly taken, destroy him."¹⁰ It is, however, the "necessary condition for an action of creation," for it taps the "springs of human action . . . [and] human life is either action or failure."¹¹

In Jung's system of thought . . . progression [return] is founded on the necessity of adjustment to the external [social]. . . . Regression [is] founded on the necessity of adjustment to the internal. . . . Both are equally necessary forms, in which natural psychic processes are experienced.¹²

When related to Toynbee's etherialization, Jung's progression implies an expansion of consciousness through a widening of the field of action. More of the external is internalized by Ego-consciousness. By internalizing more of the external through increased consciousness, the Ego becomes less influenced by its own unconscious. Its field of action involves more social concerns whose challenges are internalized through a qualitative simplification. The whole process of the return or progression may be summarized as a psychic synthesis and an acceptance of the total environment. In short, the human situation is etherialized. The individual achieves greater self-determination.

Practically speaking this suggests a number of

observable results. The individual becomes more inner--rather than outer--directed, more socio- rather than ego-centric. He comes to terms with his problems more objectively at the level of Ego-consciousness. Tensions tend to challenge rather than to disrupt his personality.

Through the rhythm of withdrawal-and-return or regression-and-progression the psyche is able to maintain a dynamic unity of consciousness and unconsciousness on the one hand and consciousness--the Ego--and society on the other. In other words, there is an integration of internal psychic and external social functioning. The personality achieves a wholeness that Jung calls an individuation.

Because members of the creative minority are more self-directed than their less creative colleagues, a "variety and differentiation . . . becomes characteristic of growth," a proliferation of values which accounts for the

striking contrast between the regularity and uniformity of the phenomena of social disintegration and the [apparent] irregularity and diversity of the phenomena of social growth.¹³

Through withdrawal-and-return, the creative individual "performs the invaluable function of mobilizing the combined energy of consciousness and the unconscious."¹⁴ More energy is brought into action through transforming symbols, and more energy is directed into social life as well. A strong sense of style may develop as the "subjective counterpart of the objective process" of growth.¹⁵ This may be illustrated by the two diagrams below:

The miracle of psychic energy is the marvel of human personality. In human personality physical energy is transformed into psychic energy. Physical energy is no less impermanent than physical matter was once thought to be. Indeed, if the human protagonist is the creative agent of God's Will in This World, values that have spiritual significance must accrue through a transformation by the Human Psyche of energy available to it from nature into psychic energy, for it is psychic energy which is the active agent in the psyche's field of action. If it is God who is the source and sustainer of creative process, it is God who is the ultimate source of the energy which is transformed in the Human Psyche or field of action into the psychic energy of creativity. Insofar as this transformation occurs through the catalytic action of human personality, man becomes the creative agent of God, and he becomes God's agent all the more as self-determination is achieved. God is therefore not only ultimate source but ultimate challenger, for it is God who brings into the human situation the contents of that situation.

Psychologically speaking, etherialization may be described as evidence of the psyche's successful effort to extricate itself from the mechanical laws of Physical Nature and the laws of the Unconscious, to an existence in which the energy of these primordial determinants is transformed into the energy of self-determination. As "power of being"--to borrow Tillich's term--etherialization is evidence of,

the possibility of self-determination in spite of . internal or external negations [that is, subconscious or natural determinants]. . . . Human power is the possibility of man to overcome non-being infinitely.¹⁷

The psychic energy thus brought into action in creativity is essentially inexhaustible. Toynbee is justified in believing that there is no "intrinsic reason why this process should not repeat itself ad infinitum."¹⁸ So long as man is a social creature, a source of psychic energy is available through the

pressure [challenge] of society that converts physical to psychic energy. . . . If the conditions of man's life were not social, psychic energy would not be brought forth. The fact of living in groups is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of psychic energy, and it is just this type of energy that characterizes the human being.¹⁹

Man is not the only creature who lives in groups, but he is the only creature who has developed self- or Ego-consciousness, who converts physical into psychic energy.

The role of man as a social creature in creative process cannot be overemphasized. During etherialization, a progression of psychic energy brings into interaction individual fields of action. It also brings social tensions into individual consciousness. Consciousness can etherialize these tensions. Both Toynbee and Jung recognize that it is social experience that is the main content of the individual field of action. This emphasis upon the social origin of psychic contents links Toynbee to Jung rather than to Freud. Unlike Freud, whose theory is particularly applicable to the analysis of psychic disorders, Jung offers a theory of the human psyche

which is particularly applicable to creative behavior. The Jungian theory of the human psyche is fully congruent with Toynbee's field of action theory. When conjoined, the role of individual Ego-consciousness vis á vis society in the external field of action and vis á vis the collective unconscious in the internal field of action becomes apparent.

Progress depends on creativity of individuals with respect to the advance of values. It is at once personal and social--not only with respect to the values themselves but with respect to personality realization. It is "in interpersonal communication . . . [that] man becomes a self, a persona." But individual and social values issue from human relations in depth:

The biological individual becomes a self in personal existence when and in so far as he steps into living relationships with other selves. . . . The essence of human life is what happens [in and] between man and man.²⁰

Toynbee reminds us that,

no being can be what he is unless he is putting his essence into action in his field . . . [which] lies in a society [and] which [in turn] is [the] common ground between his field and fields of a host of other people.²¹

Every example of human growth will always be found to have a social as well as an individual aspect.²²

The profound effect of the relations which Ego-consciousness enjoys or suffers with respect to society without is more than matched by the relationships which it enjoys or suffers with respect to its subconsciousness.

Toynbee's "fount of Poetry and Prophecy" is Tillich's "power

in personal and social life that is creative and destructive at the same time."²³ The Ego must face this power within--not to slay it as Mithras slew the bull--but to transform it into the ox of Zen Buddhism which the boy charms and coaxes down the path:

Every being [must] affirm its own being. Its life is its self-affirmation--even if its self-affirmation has the form of a self-surrender. . . . The self-affirmation of a being is correlate to the power of being it embodies. It is greater in man than in animals and in some men greater than in others. A life process is the more powerful, the more non-being it can include in its self-affirmation, without being destroyed by it. The neurotic can include only a little non-being, the average man a limited amount, the creative man a large amount, God--symbolically speaking--an infinite amount. The self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being is the expression of its power of being.²⁴

But most men are so fearful of the contents of their subconsciousness that they cultivate a cautious conservative mood. In contrast to the courageous venturing of the creative minority who are willing to plumb the depths of their being, the uncreative majority will suppress the demonic at all costs. "The post-Christian world," writes Toynbee,

has been vainly seeking to ban those dread psychic principalities and powers in the name of . . . Science . . . [but it is] as impotent to exorcise them as [was] any pre-Christian magic.²⁵

To avoid these unpleasant realities, a self-conscious rationalism may center attention on externals--on the objective study of phenomena which in no way suggest the darker side of human personality. Revulsion fills the rationalist at the thought of the subconscious; it is something sinful; it is basically indecent, or it suggests pre-scientific modes of

thought. Because consciousness is a precious possession, it is guarded at all costs. Indeed, it may be deified as God the Reason.²⁶ This repudiation of the inner man may become so compulsive that personality may be denied contact with its source of being. Yet, paradoxically, the failure to come to terms with that which drives the psyche from within may only lead to its being blindly driven from without.

Human freedom is the capacity to transform these drives from within. It is not merely the capacity to conquer the world from without.

Constructive activity of the unconscious [is] not restricted to neurotic patients. Normal men and women, provided they are prepared to take the trouble and run the risks, also experience this flow of life-bringing symbols; and [undergo] a profound change in values and attitudes as a consequence [of what may be termed etherialization]. . . . This . . . energy . . . [is] not a kind of psychological antibody, produced by the psyche to combat neurosis. It [is] an integral part of normal life.²⁷

Failure of creativity is breakdown, a reality that the human psyche can hardly escape. But breakdown is not doom, for it confronts the personality with the most challenging of all challenges. The increasing depth and intensity of psychic tensions it brings may unleash new sources of power. This is why Toynbee stresses the idea of "learning through suffering."

Breakdown may also be a failure to confront the "beast within"--to establish a modus vivendi with the "demonic" as Tillich calls it. If this happens, subconsciousness wins by default, for failure to come to terms with

subconsciousness prevents individuation of personality. A participation mystique may engulf the personality imposing the sluggish, routine-like behavior of primitive mentality. "Man in the crowd," says Jung, "is unconsciously lowered to an inferior moral and intellectual level, to that level which is always there, below the threshold of consciousness."²⁸ Failure of the Ego to "dwell in unity" with its subconscious may lead to a corollary external projection of the inner conflict in terms of social disharmony.

Consciousness, whose mission is to liberate the Human Spirit from "laws of nature" ruling over the subconscious abyss of the Psyche is apt to defeat itself by misusing, as a weapon in fratricidal conflict between one personality and another, the freedom that is its raison d'être.²⁹

This unhappy state of affairs is reflected in the behavior of a defunct creative minority. "A declining society," says Toynbee,

is apt to hasten the day of its dissolution by squandering its diminishing store of vital [i.e., psychic] energy in material [uncreative] performances on an excessive scale, not so much out of a wanton megalomania as in a vain effort to give the lie to its own unacknowledged but agonizing consciousness of incompetence and failure and doom.³⁰

At the personal level this may be reflected in grandiose displays of conspicuous consumption.³¹

Whatever may be the severity of the breakdown, however, doom is not final. Withdrawal to the womb of Magna Mater may open the floodgates of new energy. The miracle of life does not cease. But "the price of growth condemns [the creative minority of] a growing civilization to live

dangerously."³² The measure of their success will be the possession of "the psychological strength and stamina to undertake withdrawal-and-return."³³ Withdrawal may be final. "The regressive movement . . . [may result in] a one-sided but . . . unavoidable obstruction of energy," a spiritual malaise.³⁴ An "obstacle [may] dam up the river of life," cautions Jung,

and whenever such a damming up of libido [psychic energy] occurs, the opposites formerly united in the steady flow of life [in personality individuation] fall apart and henceforth oppose one another.³⁵

In short, breakdown occurs. Yet if the psyche refuses to withdraw, to maintain the rhythms of life, it may lapse into a participation mystique--a group mind as it were--whose thoughts and ways become its own and for whom the individual possesses little significance. New values cannot emerge.

Progress is not achieved, however, because of these breakdowns. The relationship is not one of cause and effect. Nor does growth occur in order to effect a breakdown, so that religion which is "the true end of man," may emerge triumphant.³⁶ Rather it is man's capacity to suffer and to transcend his failures that prevents him from entering a cul de sac. "If the law of the Universe [were] really the sardonic law Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose," argues Toynbee, one would

cry for the Buddhist release from [the] Wheel of Existence [a wheel] which may be a thing of beauty so long as it is merely guiding the stars in their course, but which is an intolerable tread-mill for our human feet.³⁷

On the other hand, etherialization does not require, nor does it imply a perfection of psychic functioning. It is rather the exploitation and the intensification of the normal rhythms of life and a transforming of otherwise meaningless situations into significant opportunities. "Seldom does a man's strength suffice to bring [all] his work without and within to like perfection."³⁸ Breakdown is a temporary interruption of life which may prove to be disastrous, but which the human psyche transcends by progressing on "the stepping stones of its dead self." The travail of life may be transformed into opportunity.

If the libido [psychic energy] succeeds in tearing itself loose and pushing itself up into the world above, a miracle appears. The journey to the underworld has become a fountain of youth.³⁹

The tragic and the dramatic nature of life is reflected in the inescapable choice between the hazards of creative living and the perhaps more hazardous reversion to a participation mystique. To pursue the way of life invites breakdown. Yet to revert to the primitive security of the "cake of custom," to avoid creative venture, is to risk a permanent regression of psychic energy that may activate dangerous elements of the unconscious or lead to a "petrified in life" existence.

The cosmic drama is therefore--in this sense--resolved in the human field of action. Philistine eyes may not detect it here. Instead, the tragic burden of responsibility may be shifted to a scene of action beyond human ken--to an impersonal process wholly external to the human field of action or at

least beyond the influence of conscious will. Social, sub-conscious, biological, or geographical factors may be set forth as determinative. But it is the human protagonist who is the stricken one that must confront and transcend these challenges. Creative personality is "superhuman in a literal and not merely in a metaphorical sense."⁴⁰ Whereas the spiritual sluggard fails to venture to the "boundary situations" of life--to borrow Tillich's term--his more courageous fellow member of the creative minority moves forth to become an agent of progress. Creative living "is [therefore] not an incident, a brief interlude . . . [but] a new and perilous mode of living."⁴¹ The members of the creative minority are not distinguished by their race or circumstances but by the manner in which they transform the circumstances in which they find themselves. Psychic, social, or physical forces serve as stimulants rather than as coercive determinants.

If we examine further the psychological aspects of etherialization, we have additional reason to believe that personality realization is the ground of the creative process, for it is through what Jung calls the archetypal energy-transforming symbols pregnant with meaning that the creative psyche is able to come to terms with the circumstances in which it finds itself. It is through these symbols that the human situation is transformed and values come into being. The problem is existential. It involves the human situation as a whole. Values are not solely the product of intellectual endeavor, nor do they arise from social experience alone.

It is through the archetypal transforming symbols that consciousness comes to terms with non-conceptual experience, i.e., ultimate concerns.⁴² Consciousness cannot reduce the non-conceptual to the conceptual or the contents of the unconscious to the terms of the conscious. Yet it must come to terms with them in order to establish the significance which values require. The transforming symbols are the means whereby this is achieved. They are the means by which values are created in specific historical and cultural situations.

The [whole] creative process consists in an activation of the timeless symbols [archetypes] of humanity resting in the [collective] unconscious and in the development and refinement of them.⁴³

The values that etherialization produces are at once material and spiritual, objective and subjective. They center dialectically in the existential concerns of human personality, and become conscious concerns in a manner parallel to psychic functioning generally. Their wholeness or significance varies as their participation in these polar opposites of value concern. When they are oriented in terms of the archetypal and quaternary symbol of wholeness, they assume the following relationship.⁴⁴

In the conscious delineation of value in life, the human psyche functions in a manner similar to personality functioning. Differences of value lie in the degree of differentiation and emphasis of traits. Thus the ascetic imagines pure spiritual value when in fact he is suppressing the material aspect of that particular value. An absolutely spiritual or objective value is inconceivable; indeed, it is a contradiction in terms. It could enjoy no possible relation to the human situation. Likewise a purely subjective value is a contradiction in terms. To enclose value in a windowless monad would be to annihilate it. Having no relationship, it would possess no significance in any context. Similarly, purely material values would--in terms of the human situation--lack relevance. Food, for example, is a material value enjoyed as well as digested. Thus values--like personality to which they are linked--have their being in terms of wholeness, and their advance--upon which progress depends--is part and parcel of personality realization itself.⁴⁵ So long as individuated human personality is a possibility, progress through etherialization is a possibility. So long as individuated human personality is a reality, progress is a reality. Individuated personality is a process--a becoming--informed by an ideal. Kierkegaard understood this when he spoke, for example, of "becoming a Christian." Toynbee expresses it in the view that,

unstable spiritual equilibrium is the essence of Human personality. . . . The . . . salvation . . . to be found by Man is the peace, not of nerveless self-

annihilation [of Nirvana], but of taut-string harmony [of consciousness and subconsciousness].⁴⁶

In summary, therefore, Toynbee's etherialization and the psychic processes which form the matrix of its values alter the human situation in four ways. There is

a fundamental change in man's attitude to outer events; a fundamental change in relationship to others; a fundamental change in the springs of action; and a fundamental change in ultimate perspective.⁴⁷

The first is the attitude that says: "Let life happen to you." It is a reverent acceptance of the creative process--a process which has its own way and its dark as well as its light side. The second change is the development of social relationships in depth--one that surpasses the relative superficiality of role playing and links human psyches at their living centers. Social relationships have "little virtue so long as [they] remain merely at the persona level. Everything depends upon the relationship in depth."⁴⁸ This is the relationship by which values find their way from creative to less creative individuals. The third change effected by etherialization is the change in the springs of action, the qualitative alteration of the entire process of personality dynamics. It is essentially the emergence of personality itself, and it leads to the fourth change, a change of ultimate perspective wherein the psyche comes in touch with the universe through the

deep-seated but (in the present age) little-regarded opposition between time and eternity. . . . If . . . belief is that, both for the individual and eventually for the species, life offers no more than a fitful and

essentially empty awareness of existence, ending in oblivion, then, whether or not I am consciously aware of it, everything I am and do is subtly undermined and rendered meaningless. At the opposite extreme, if I have my eyes so firmly fixed on eternity that I think only of the heavenly kingdom beyond this life, I can help bring hell on earth. . . . Unless and until the living middle way is found between the opposites of time and eternity, life may be urbane, but for the individual, it will be essentially empty, for the collectivity chaotic.⁴⁹

No genuine theory of progress will be possible because values will lack objective support and human personality will be epiphenomenal to impersonal cosmic process. The psychic processes of man must therefore enjoy ontological anchorage if human life is to have significance, or, indeed, if it is to function at all as "human" life. Without these, there is no progress.

CHAPTER VIII

Footnotes

¹Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955.

²Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), p. 232.

³Ibid.

⁴Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 284.

⁵Percival W. Martin, Experiment in Depth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955), p. 217. For Toynbee's studies of the unconscious and its relation to rhythms and time see VIII, op. cit., 116, 293; and IX, op. cit., 48, 328, 336-37, 361, 469-71, 527, 596, 600, and 704.

⁶Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung, with a foreword by Dr. Jung, trans. K. W. Bash (Rev. ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 141. Cf. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 91.

⁷According to the New Testament use of the word, kairos means the breaking of the eternal into a temporal prepared to receive it. Tillich observes that kairos "provides a theonomous foundation for the creation of the new in history." (The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951], p. xx.) Cf. pp. xix, 38, 48, et passim; The Interpretation of History, trans. N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 124ff.

⁸Tillich, Protestant Era, op. cit., p. xvi.

⁹Jacobi, op. cit., p. 75. Cf. Carl Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology, trans. H. G. and C. F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1928), pp. 43f.; Martin, op. cit., p. 165 wherein he observes that "often though not invariably, the individuation process starts with a profound inward turning [withdrawal] of psychic energy."

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 34; and X, op. cit., 38.

¹¹Martin, op. cit., p. 167.

¹²Jacobi, op. cit., p. 75.

¹³Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 330f.: This reflects the profound "difference between the respective natures of the conscious personality on the surface of the Psyche and the subconscious levels of psychic life underlying it." Cf. VI, op. cit., 321-26 and V, op. cit., 13: "In the disintegrations of civilizations the perpetual variety [of values] which gives light and life to their growth is replaced by a merciless uniformity." Cf. also IX, op. cit., 329: "If the social laws current in the histories of civilization are indeed reflections of psychological laws governing some infra-personal layer of the Subconscious Psyche, they would also explain why these social laws should be as we have found them to be, so much more clearly pronounced and more exactly regular in the disintegration-phase of a broken-down civilization's history than in its foregoing growth phase."

¹⁴Martin, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁵Carl Jung, Psychological Types, trans. H. G. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), Chap. XI; Contributions, op. cit., p. 41; Jacobi, op. cit., p. 74. Besides performing the directive function, creative ego-consciousness is also able to counteract the natural entropy of psychic energy which follows from a "resting on one's oars." "In the psychic system it is the conscious that is able through its relative freedom of intervention to effect [the] reversal [of psychic energy]." (Jacobi, op. cit., p. 73.)

¹⁶Toynbee, A Study, I, op. cit., 454f.; III, op. cit., 223-30; and IX, op. cit., 169.

¹⁷Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 40.

¹⁸Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 291. Jung suggests that "man possesses a relative superfluity [of psychic energy] . . . which is capable of application over and above the merely natural flow [needed for survival alone]."

(Contributions, op. cit., p. 53.) Cf. Carl Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, trans. H. G. and Cary F. Baynes (London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1928), p. 71; and Carl Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1934), p. 242. Rushton Coulborn mistakenly speaks of the "exhaustion of the potential energy of . . . culture which is required by Toynbee's doctrine. . . . Toynbee borrows from Bergson [the] idea [that] . . . the formation of a religion is the process whereby the potential energy required for the rise of civilization is built up; a civilization once started on its career by this process, will flourish until the potential energy is exhausted, when it will break down and gradually disintegrate." ("Discussion: The Rise and Fall of Civilization," Ethics, LXIV (1954), p. 210.) In the light of Jungian propositions, this conclusion does not appear to be warranted. Indeed, to suggest an exhaustion of creative possibility would be to suggest the exhaustion of God Himself.

¹⁹Ira Progoff, Jung's Psychology and Its Social Meaning (New York: The Julian Press, 1953), p. 180.

²⁰Paul Eugen Pfeutze, The Social Self (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954), p. 204. Cf. p. 101. "With the individual who is well adjusted to the external [social] and to his own internal [unconscious] world alike, the persona is, so to speak, a necessary but elastic barrier that assures him a relatively natural, well-ordered and easy contact with his environment." (Jacobi, op. cit., p. 24.) Cf. Martin, op. cit., pp. 194ff.; and Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 199. The psychological basis of culture is also argued by anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser who says: "Culture, whether spiritual or material, counts only to the extent to which it is operative through psychic channels." (History, Psychology and Culture [New York: A. A. Knopf, 1933], p. 62.)

²¹Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 235.

²²Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 170. Progoff further observes that "the assumption that society is the natural and necessary condition of human life leads to the inference that it must correspond [in some sense] to some psychic process deeply embedded in the nature of the human being." (op. cit., p. 79. Cf. p. 176.) Etherialization has a social as well as individual meaning. It is not a "wholly individual movement" as James K. Feibleman charged, (The Revival of Realism [Chapel Hill: The University of North

Carolina Press, 1946], p. 183.) Values possess social as well as individual significance. See the letter of Arnold Toynbee to J. W. Friend and J. K. Feibleman quoted by Feibleman, op. cit.

²³Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 399; and Tillich, The Interpretation of History, op. cit., p. 58.

²⁴Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, op. cit., 39f.

²⁵Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 405. The desire to exorcise the contents of the unconscious is understandable in view of the fact that "we are always living upon a volcano and there is . . . no human means of protection against a possible outburst which will destroy everybody within its reach." (Carl Jung, Psychology and Religion [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938], p. 16. Cf. Modern Man, op. cit., Chap. X, "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man.")

²⁶Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁷Martin, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁸Jung, Psychology and Religion, op. cit., pp. 15f.

²⁹Toynbee, A Study, IX, op. cit., 334.

³⁰Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 154.

³¹Concerning the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption, see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Random House, The Modern Library, 1934).

³²Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 128. "Humanity," says Heard, "has always lived dangerously, dynamically, positively. . . . Human advance has been through raising to unanimal heights and to biological peril its psychic energy, rather than by reducing physical risks." (Social Substance of Religion [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931], p. 47. Cf. p. 63.)

³³Martin, op. cit., p. 207.

³⁴Jacobi, op. cit., p. 74.

³⁵Jung, Psychological Types, op. cit., p. 114.
Cf. Modern Man, Chap. X.

³⁶This erroneous interpretation is given by Feibleman, op. cit., p. 183, as well as by numerous reviewers of Toynbee.

³⁷Toynbee, A Study, IV, op. cit., 33.

³⁸Jacobi, op. cit., p. 38.

³⁹Carl Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, op. cit., pp. 330f.

⁴⁰Toynbee, A Study, III, op. cit., 232. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, op. cit., pp. 96f., 228, and 289.

⁴¹Martin, op. cit., p. 168.

⁴²Progoff, op. cit., pp. 72ff. For Jung, the energy transforming symbol is the "libido analogue." (Contributions, op. cit., p. 54.) Cf. Progoff, op. cit., p. 188ff. These symbols do not enter consciousness by force of reason but by direct "revelation or intuition" because they are archetypal. (Psychological Types, op. cit., 539ff.)

⁴³Jacobi, op. cit., p. 35. Cf. Jung, Contributions, op. cit., p. 248. These transforming symbols which are "pregnant with meaning contrast [with] the instinctive [material] functions that run their course according to natural law." (Ibid., p. 53.)

⁴⁴Concerning Jung's treatment of the mandala, see Integration of the Personality, trans. S. M. Dell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1940), p. 287, et. passim, and Jacobi, op. cit., pp. 178ff.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 287. Jung calls the dynamic relationship of personality integration, individuation. Individuation is a state of becoming: "The personality as a full realization of the wholeness of our being is an unattainable ideal. . . . Ideals are . . . signposts, never goals." (Two Essays, op. cit., p. 183.)

⁴⁶Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 508, n. 9.
Cf. III, op. cit., 209-12;

⁴⁷Martin, op. cit., p. 221..

⁴⁸Martin, op. cit., p. 236. Jung warns that "because of the ease with which one is able to conceal his real nature behind . . . [the persona], it becomes a danger . . . a mask" with which the psyche seriously identifies itself. (Jacobi, op. cit., p. 24.) Cf. Martin, op. cit., pp. 194-96. Any form of serious role-playing jeopardizes personality. In the participation mystique that may follow, the unassimilated shadow side of personality may be projected on some imagined enemy--the Jew, the capitalist, or the communist--whomever happens to suffer the misfortune of being the object of censure. On the other hand, the persona, i.e., the psyche's role, may be identified with some Siegfried, some superman whose ostensibly superior status or superior interests justifies or demands barbaric and inhuman deeds. The sense of community upon which mimesis of the creative minority depends is possible only when the participants in society have themselves acquired wholeness. One can be at peace with his neighbor only if he is at peace with himself. When community fails, it becomes a gang of impersonal entities contiguous in space and time but a "City of Destruction"--from which the psyche seeking to reenter the stream of life must withdraw.

⁴⁹Martin, op. cit., pp. 145f.

CHAPTER IX

TOYNBEE'S ETHERIALIZATION: CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION

Toynbee introduces the idea of etherialization as a criterion of progress in order to establish a basis for the growth of his civilizations. Etherialization differs, however, from conventional naturalistic criteria of progress. Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century belief in progress as the perfectibility of man in terms of This Worldly or Western touchstones of value. Instead he revives Augustine's belief that man is a citizen of two worlds whose ultimate destiny lies in the Civitas Dei rather than in the Civitas Terrena. "If we adopt this Augustinian Platonic Weltanschauung as our own," he says,

and attempt, in the light of it, to envisage terrestrial history sub specie aeternitatis, what significance shall we find in the idea of progress in This World? In the Age of Civilizations, progress, in so far as human minds had entertained this idea at all, had often been identified with the progressive improvement of some terrestrial institution: a tribe, a city-state, an empire, a church, a system of knowledge or "know-how," a school of art, a code of morals. . . .¹

In other words belief in progress customarily constituted an idolization of some ephemeral institution, technique, or the human self, per se. Toynbee does not reject the idea of progress as such, but he rejects the attempt to establish it

on naturalistic grounds. "The touchstone of the value of an institution," he argues,

is whether it helps or hinders Man to find his way back to his Maker, and an institution will become an obstacle to Man's true end . . . if it is taken as being an end in itself instead of being used as the mere means that is all that it truly is. . . : What is the significance and the purpose of the social heritage, far transcending the temporal and spatial limits of any single human life on Earth, which institutions embody, preserve, and transmit? . . . Improvements in this social heritage, which register social "progress," are to be estimated and valued according to their effect in increasing the possibilities for individual human beings in This World to live good lives.²

Progress, therefore, is spiritual:

The progress of individual souls through This World towards God, and not the progress of Society in This World [as such], is the end in which the supreme value is found.³

Yet individual transfiguration is not the sole end, for the prayer, "Thy Kingdom come," continues Toynbee, implies another kind of progress which transcends individual concerns:

The Lord's Prayer gives an answer, in the form of a spiritual act, to our perplexing question how, if spiritual progress in Time in This World means progress achieved by individual souls during their brief passages through This World to the Other World, there can be at the same time such a thing in This World as spiritual progress taking place on a Time-span far longer than that of individual lives.⁴

Toynbee is convinced that whatever may be their ephemeral worth, mundane achievements must possess spiritual significance for individuals and the destiny of Man if they are to be properly thought of as "progressive." "History wins meaning and value for Man," he says, only "in so far as Man cooperates in History with God, [and] this meaning and

value of History must be found in some mode of being which transcends that of Human Life on Earth."⁵

The value that transcends "Human Life on Earth" is, however, a distinctly human value as well, for it concerns the human actor in the creative drama of life. "All spiritual reality and therefore all spiritual value, resides in persons," says Toynbee.⁶ Yet he warns that the meaning of

history seen solely from the standpoint of each individual human participant in it is "a tale told by an idiot, signifying nothing". . . . This apparently senseless "sound and fury" acquires spiritual meaning when Man catches in History a glimpse of the operation of a One True God who is both transcendently infinite and intimately loving, and who has the power and the will to take up His human creatures in His own range of action and mode of existence, in so far as they respond to His challenging call to act in This World as partners in His divine [and creative] work.⁷

Human Nature . . . [is] a field in which there might be [as there has been] spiritual progress in Time extending over an unlimited number of successive generations of Human Life . . . [in which there is] a growing fund of illumination and of grace.⁸

Thus Toynbee's progress is the spiritual progress of mankind as a whole as well as the spiritual progress of an individual in particular. Moreover Toynbee does not exclude material values from the content of progress so long as they acquire and retain spiritual significance. The mechanism for the infusion of spiritual significance is etherialization, for it is through etherialization that values find their way into the otherwise meaningless processes of life.

Etherialization is unique to the human situation, for only in the human situation do values reside, and only in the

human situation could the idea of progress make sense.

Although he revives Augustinian convictions concerning the nature and destiny of man, Toynbee's dualism is not the Augustinian dichotomy of an essentially corrupt This World and a perfect Next, but a distinction between events in process of etherialization and an otherwise meaningless flux. Human events acquire significance insofar as they become infused with value, that is, insofar as they acquire a spiritual significance through etherialization. Value--as Whitehead put it--is the intrinsic reality of an event, that which links the event to the structure of the universe, to reality. In Toynbee this linkage is achieved through etherialization, for etherialization links the life of man to the Life of God. Etherialization is not escape from "This World" but a transformation of it in and through the miracle of human personality.

Thus for Toynbee, the dualism that confronts the human psyche is axiological and epistemological rather than ontological. The world "out there" is real; events--social and historical--are real; but they possess significance, that is, acquire value, only as they are brought into a meaningful relationship with the human psyche. In this manner they acquire a subjective relevance which enjoys universal significance as well. If value lies in a relationship--and Toynbee believes that it does--it is a relationship which links particular human concerns to objective reality..

Toynbee rejects the eighteenth century idea of progress for two reasons: (1) Through faulty axiology, ideals of perfectability were set up in terms of ephemeral--because culturally conditioned--value systems and imagined to represent genuine ideals. (2) A faulty view of the human situation failed to account for realities which the exaggeration of human rationality obscured. Perfection became, paradoxically, its own antithesis--an attenuation of the very factors which are the source of human creativity and progress.

Although Toynbee recognized these shortcomings and offered instead the basis for a more adequate theory of progress, he never actually developed a general theory of progress. This failure to develop a full-dress general theory of progress may be attributed to certain uncertainties on his part as to the nature of spiritual progress as well as to his distrust of the idea of progress in particular.

Two conflicting theories of spiritual progress are found in Toynbee. He presents spiritual progress as the restoration of souls as well as the creative emergence of transfigured personalities. In some respects his cliff climbers appear to become "less unlike God" in their efforts to become full partners with God in the creative process. In other respects the cliff climbers appear to return to heights from which they once fell rather than to gain new ground. In one passage Toynbee says:

In the higher religions . . . Man [has] been reendowed with the spiritual treasure that he . . . possessed in

the days of primeval inefficiency and . . . : jettisoned in his . . . scramble . . . [for] material progress.⁹

Elsewhere he speaks of the Subconscious

as one of those statically perfect works of creation that are the Creator's "stopping places" whereas the Conscious Human Personality is an infinitely imperfect approximation towards of Being of an incommensurably higher order.¹⁰

The difficulty arises from Toynbee's effort to buttress a nostalgic interest in orthodox interpretations of Original Sin and the Fall. He invokes the anthropology of Father Schmidt wherein the thesis is set forth that primitive humanity innocently worshipped a Supreme Being in a monotheism that was spoiled as men achieved technical progress and fell into the idolatrous worship of nature or themselves.¹¹ Yet if restoration is the goal of life, a cyclical theory is implied, for unless Toynbee is prepared to demonstrate that there will be no repetition of the Fall when Restoration is consummated, there can be no assurance that it will not occur again. Indeed, the idea of restoration is an awkward and essentially incongruous idea in the general context of Toynbee's philosophy of history.

Toynbee fails to recognize that Augustine is the basis for a genuine theory of progress as well as the basis for a fall and restoration theory. Augustinian creationism implies the notion that God is the continuous creator and sustainer of value and existence. This belief is germane to Toynbee, and his idea of etherialization suggests that man cooperates with and participates in a creative process which involves

the transfiguration of his own personality as well as of the world. The cliff climber struggles to gain new ground, not old. Transfiguration is an emergent reality which climaxes creative process--not a restoration. Original sin is overcome not by escape from This World but by a transfiguration of This World. Man does not become "less unlike God" by returning to noble savagery, for primitive man was neither noble nor innocent. Moreover, because "the Subconscious is nearer to God than the Conscious Self . . . as the channel through which the Soul is in communion with God," it does not follow that man "progresses" by "regressing" back to the primordial source of his being. This would constitute a withdrawal without a return, and hope for it would be--by Toynbee's own definition--a Romantic archaism. The original state of innocence and communion with Supreme Being which Toynbee ascribes to the first Homo sapiens merely describes metaphorically the unrealized potential of a Homo sapiens who had not yet confronted the challenge of "breakdown" or "schism of the soul" and who, for the same reason, had not yet created higher religion, nor in "learning through suffering" scaled the cliffs of spiritual progress.¹²

Toynbee's etherialization proposes a progressive transference of the arena of human action from lower to higher levels beginning with the realm of the Laws of Physical Nature and extending through the various levels of the realms of the Human Psyche to the spiritual goal of Life which is Transfiguration and communion with God Himself. By introducing Father

Schmidt's thesis, Toynbee jeopardizes his vision of etherialization as the creative emergence of transfigured personality. He suggests a real Adam perfect in innocence and characterizing the state of a primitive man who fell from grace and must now return to the privileged state he once possessed. Nowhere does Toynbee clearly reject this view. Nor does he fail to entertain it as a possibility. Hence there arises a certain ambiguity in his meaning of spiritual progress and the significance of etherialization.

He would incur less difficulty were he to embrace the hypothesis that original sin is the burden of every man because every man is--in a sense--Adam. He would be more persuasive were he to view the corruption of the human situation as the result of an emerging self-awareness mythologically portrayed as the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He could reconcile his belief in Original Sin with his theory of progress by etherialization were he to picture the former as the outcome of a sense of "separateness" or the anxiety which emerging self-consciousness brings and which issues in rebellion and pride. Indeed, Toynbee could profitably link original sin to his idea of the "schism of the soul." Psychic tensions encourage a "self" as well as "God" rejection.

Toynbee thus weakens his position by introducing a questionable anthropological theory for the purpose of supporting a nostalgia for orthodoxy. His position would be strengthened by the unequivocal affirmation of his belief in

genuine spiritual progress and his belief in the progress of a higher religion which parallels the progress of human personality. There is a "growing fund of illumination and grace" in the human partner of creative process, he argues. This conviction should give him the courage to set his eyes resolutely on the future.¹³

It is a curious and ironical fact that Toynbee unintentionally suggests a doctrine of inevitable progress. This is implied in the idea that "spiritual achievement and material achievement are antithetical" in the sense that etherialization proceeds in the spiritual when the material fails, and even as the spiritual advances material progress follows in its wake. Improvement of the material, however, encourages a breakdown because of the tendency to idolize the ephemeral, i.e., Original Sin, and breakdown further stimulates a revival of the spiritual. The creative process thus appears to be continuous and unyielding, and it is material as well as spiritual. What saves Toynbee from determinism is his repudiation of Saeva Necessitas and his theory of law as an approximate description of approximate uniformities whose probability is a matter of degree. Despite this clear suggestion of an inevitable dialectic of progress, however, Toynbee is unable to establish a theory of general material as well as spiritual advance.¹⁴

When Toynbee embraced the psychology of C. G. Jung, he acquired a tool whereby some of his seminal ideas might have become more clearly formulated. One of these was the

idea of etherialization.¹⁵ Had Toynbee returned to this idea and reconsidered it in the light of the psychology he subsequently adopted, his position might have been greatly clarified and strengthened. Jung's theory, for example, would have buttressed Toynbee's own recognition of the importance of the inner life of man in the life of society. It would have strengthened his conviction that this inner life of man is the source of a creative energy which links the human psyche to God rather than to the well-spring of a new barbarism.

Yet Toynbee's basic categories remained Bergsonian.¹⁶ The "cake of custom" is broken "by some privileged individual . . . [or] certain men."¹⁷ Bergson's closed and open societies are Toynbee's primitive and civilized societies. The essence of life is the creative activity of dynamic personalities who represent "God Himself moving upon the waters of the deep," and "the great mystic is the individual being capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species."¹⁸

Absence of a clearly articulated psychology not only inhibited the development of a more general theory of progress but failed to forestall Toynbee's extension of the idea of withdrawal-and-return to personified social entities. Toynbee's transference of a mechanism of etherialization from the arena of the human field-of-action to the life of a group offended friends and foes alike--to say nothing of its introducing psychological difficulties. He comes perilously close to a doctrine of the group mind--a theory patently

incompatible with his theory of man in particular and his theory of society in general.

While it is true that the human psyche is grounded in a social reality internally as well as externally, it is individual psychic energy which is the agent of action. Individuals and their fields-of-action are the channels through which the creative process must occur. A group is an interaction of these individual fields-of-action. Its life depends on the lives of the individual fields of action which comprise it. Withdrawal-and-return is an individual rather than a group phenomenon. In order to make it a group phenomenon, Toynbee must personify his group, and he must over-emphasize the life of his personified group. For example, he speaks of the isolation of the social entity, England, which withdraws with the accession of Elizabeth and, after passing through two stages, returns around 1870 or possibly 1914. "The whole of this suggestion of an isolation lasting from 1558 to 1914, or at least to 1870," laments Toynbee's formidable critic, Pieter Geyl, "is completely untenable."¹⁹ Toynbee's attempt to trace the withdrawal-and-return of groups provides his critics with ample opportunity to illustrate his "scandalous treatment of history." Toynbee himself recognizes his difficulty when he admits that,

there are, of course, creative individuals at the back of all creative minorities, [which withdraw-and-return] on the hypothesis that some individual human being is the ultimate author of every creative human act.²⁰

But he does not permit this difficulty in identifying the

creative members of the group that withdraws to deter him from outlining the rhythms of groups as a whole.²¹

So long as Toynbee writes of individuals in groups, his theory of the withdrawal-and-return of groups is less objectionable. This is illustrated in his view that,

the first step in any group-movement of Withdrawal-and-Return is the extrication of the potentially creative minority from the general life of the society to which it belongs. This step may be accomplished in any one of several different alternative ways. . . . The second stage in the movement is the stage of relative isolation in which . . . creative work is performed; and this stage is apt to fall into two distinct phases respectively. The first, or originative, phase is a youthful age of poetry and romance and emotional upheaval and intellectual ferment; the second or constructive phase is a comparatively sedate and "grown-up" age of prose and matter-of-fact and common sense. . . . The third stage . . . is the return of the creative minority [as a group] into communion with the general life of the society from which it has temporarily withdrawn in order to perform its work of creation.²²

By the constructive phase Toynbee means a preparatory or transitional stage prior to and in preparation for return to society in general. It is the means whereby creative individuals prepare to evoke a mimesis when the return is effected. So long as Toynbee maintains the locus of activity in individual fields-of-action as creative member agents of a creative minority, his theory is consistent. Otherwise it is fraught with difficulties because it is inconsistent with his theory of man and society.

Other difficulties appear as the result of his attempt to apply essentially psychological categories to group behavior. This is particularly true when the idea of breakdown is too closely identified with a group or civilization as such rather

than with the functioning of personalities whose behavior has social as well as individual implications. Professor Sorokin, for example, shows that there was a decided decrease of internal and external disturbances in Greece from the fourth through the second centuries B.C. immediately following the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization which Toynbee identified with the Atheno-Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C.

Sorokin submits evidence to show that scientific, philosophical and religious thought reached its peak of creative activity during and after the 5th century B.C. He assumes, to be sure, that the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus were more significant than those of the pre-Socratic philosophers excepting, perhaps, Heraclitus.²³ From a comparison of evidence submitted by both Toynbee and Sorokin, one suspects that the facts of history may be sufficiently complex to suffer the imposition of more than one plausible pattern if indeed they do not already carry with them an implicit pattern which the historian must impose in order to delineate them as historically significant facts. Appeal, therefore, must be made to criteria other than facts alone. An exact date for breakdown, for example, is in reality a contradiction in terms. Breakdown is not so much an event having simple location in space and time as a state of affairs in the life of men.

Toynbee's penchant for categories also aggravates his difficulties.²⁴ So long as he restricts himself to the behavior of specific human personalities and corollary group

phenomena his ideal type constructs serve as useful heuristic devices. When he deals with groups exclusively, however, one suspects that he strains his method. He finds, for example, that Universal Churches pass through three significant phases: the conceptive, the gestative, and parturient. In attempting to align data to illustrate these categories he is obliged to resort to elaborate explanations that burden rather than enlighten the imagination.²⁵

To the objection that Toynbee tends to personify group behavior may be added the objection that he does this to the neglect of highly relevant social and psychological theory.²⁶ This neglect of relevant social and psychological theory is one of the most persistent and legitimate grounds for negative criticism. It suggests a certain lack of balance. One wishes that "there were more Attic restraint and less Asiatic luxuriance" in Toynbee's "stiff-robed . . . monumental style," and that he had confined himself to exhaustive treatment of strictly relevant material rather than taking the liberty to digress freely into interesting but irrelevant poetic extravagances.²⁷

Finally, there is the objection that some crucial definitions are neglected. "What is culture?" asks Feibleman:

We are never told by Toynbee; although he insists that "the cultural element in a civilization is its soul and life-blood and marrow and essence and epitome."²⁸

To be sure, Toynbee carefully delineates the psychological significance of cultural planes in the life of individuals

and groups, but nowhere is there definitive treatment of his theory of culture. The problem of definition is not peculiarly his, but it is aggravated by his general approach and his poetic license.²⁹

These questionable aspects of Toynbee's treatment of history do not necessarily impugn his idea of etherialization as a valid criterion of progress. Yet there are legitimate questions about the value of the idea of etherialization as a criterion of progress. It does not provide a quantitative index. As Toynbee describes it, it is a qualitative phenomenon. But it stands for or isolates that qualitative character of growth that may be called progress. If progress means--in some sense--the increase and preservation of value, the idea of etherialization suggests the means by which progress is realized and more important, perhaps, the basis for a theory of value itself. Hence it may be thought of as a qualitative rather than a quantitative criterion. Moreover, by giving depth to the meaning of progress, it suggests the means by which the idea of progress itself may be more firmly reestablished as a sound and legitimate ideal for Western man.

Progress is not a matter of fact demonstrably true or false; it is a matter of value, and value is a special kind of fact that possesses its reality and status by virtue of its significance in the human situation and its ability to link human concerns to cosmic reality rather than by virtue of its measurable verifiability. Hence quantitative criteria of a general progress cannot be established. Only

the progress of particular aspects of life can be measured.

That there has been particular progress in this or that institution or technique may be a fact, but general progress can be affirmed only if other requirements are satisfied. The question ultimately reverts to the nature and the content of the human situation and the conditions by which values come into being. Yet the problem is not one of separating values out of verifiable facts. The distinction is not one of kind but of nature and degree of emphasis. Verifiable facts are not devoid of value nor are values devoid of relation to fact. The problem of progress directs attention to that end of the spectrum of human concerns wherein questions of value predominate and quantitative yardsticks are inappropriate. Hence Toynbee is justified in treating etherialization as he does--as a qualitative phenomenon that identifies the qualitative character of growth.

Since general progress implies a persistent qualitative improvement in time, only that value theory which can conjoin a theory of values relevant to the human situation with a theory of the independent status of these values in time can support a theory of progress.³⁰ A theory of progress must discover within the matrix of human experience grounds for a belief that values enjoy a significance extending beyond the limits of a solitary biological life-span or cultural situation. Moreover it must delineate an element of human history which is independent of the fluctuating rhythms that characterize human phenomena. Toynbee's criterion

of etherialization meets this condition. With assistance from Jungian psychology, the idea of etherialization is able to account for the nature, meaning, emergence, and preservation of value. In short, it provides a basis for a general theory of progress.³¹

Contemporary pessimism threatens the vitality of Western civilization. It issues from a failure of nerve, and this failure is the outcome of a breakdown and disintegration of fundamental Western ideals. No ideal so basically represents the character of Western ethos as does the ideal of progress, the idea and the belief that an amelioration of man's lot in This World is both possible and worthwhile. Fate of the ideal of progress parallels the fate of contemporary civilization itself. This is why the contemporary liberal clings to what he instinctively believes to be the necessary condition for its survival--devotion to the betterment of man by those twin instruments of reason and science which have demonstrably proven themselves.

Often overlooked in Toynbee is his essential optimism. Toynbee's exhaustive efforts to find a way back to solid ground have been viewed as the quest of a religious mystic. What is not fully appreciated is that the alternative to the "everythingness" of Toynbee's mysticism is liable to be the "nothingness" of the skeptic. Toynbee's optimism centers in his belief that human history is not meaningless and that creative advance is a universal human possibility anchored in the life of God Himself. He finds that creativity is an

individual and spiritual phenomenon having only incidental relationship to the particular level of material culture. In this respect Toynbee goes hard against the main stream of Western liberalism.

Contemporary social science is preoccupied with quantitative studies of human relations and achievements in the hope that the scientific method so applied will yield the felicitous results in the area of human relations that it has enjoyed in the mastery of physical nature. This has encouraged two general views of progress: (1) Progress is the measurable discovery by science of the growth or quantitative advance of this or that culture trait or the means to secure it. (2) When the inadequacy of this view of progress becomes evident, progress and the axiology which supports it become a purely subjective phenomenon unrelated to fact. Beneath this absolute relativization of value, however, there remains implicit the assumption that because the growth of material culture is an established fact, contemporary man is somehow superior to his predecessors in his thought and morals as well as in his tools and capacity for material culture.

Toynbee's great contribution is that he reexamines those intuitions which gave rise to Western civilization. He recognizes the basic role of religion in the life of man. This recognition restores a dimension to his thought which contemporary social thought tends to neglect. He demonstrates that the fate of man is linked to the quality of life within. His idea of etherialization suggests a basis for a

reconstruction of the ideal of progress. From the lessons of the past, he constructs a vision of the future. His view is forward rather than backward. Whatever may be his errors, his vision is sublime and his thoughts a lofty inspiration for a generation that has lost its way.

CHAPTER IX

Footnotes

¹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 561.

²Ibid., p. 562.

³Ibid., p. 564.

⁴Ibid., pp. 562ff.

⁵Ibid., p. 756.

⁶Ibid., p. 562.

⁷Ibid., pp. 512f. Cf. pp. 756-58.

⁸Ibid., p. 563.

⁹Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., pp. 401f. "It is not very easy to discover what Toynbee really does believe in: in progress, but not in 'the superstition of Progress';" (O. H. K. Spate, "Reflections on Toynbee's A Study of History: A Geographer's View," Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand [Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press], V [May, 1953], 330.)

¹⁰Toynbee, A Study, VII, op. cit., 498.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 761ff. Toynbee refers to Father Pater W. Schmidt, The Origin and Growth of Religion, trans. H..J. Rose (London: Methuen, 1921). In his later work, An Historian's Approach to Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), Toynbee expresses the view that mankind originally engaged in polytheistic nature worship followed by an idolatrous worship of Man as the parochial community, the ecumenical community, or the self-sufficient philosopher respectively. Yet a continued uncertainty characterizes Toynbee's observation that "what Man's original religion may have been is . . . still under debate. . . . The evidence existing . . . [does] not seem to warrant either the rejection or the adoption of Father W. Schmidt's theory." (Ibid., p. 20.) Toynbee sustains an

interest in Schmidt's hypothesis by suggesting that Man may not have begun Nature worship until he had acquired some measure of control or imagined control of Nature.

¹²Ibid., pp. 200 and 508, n. 3.

¹³Ibid., p. 563.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 701.

¹⁵Letter from Arnold J. Toynbee, December 15, 1955.

¹⁶Professor Edward D. Myers, however, is certain "that Toynbee would have arrived at about the same idea had Bergson never written [and] he would have expressed them differently had Jung never written." (Letter from Edward D. Myers, December 22, 1955.)

¹⁷Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Andra, Cloudesley Brereton, and Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935), p. 257.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 209. Cf. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911), p. 68. For an excellent discussion of Bergsonian influence, see Ernst Zahn, Toynbee und das Problem der Geschichte (Zürich: Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1954), p. 23. Bergson and Toynbee both envision a recalcitrant world whose challenges life must confront and surmount in order that creativity may continue. Both rewrite in dramatic terms the individualistic creationism in Augustine. In the perennial "struggle between Greek eternalism and Augustinian creationism," both choose the latter. Concerning a treatment of Greek eternalism vis à vis Augustinian creationism see Hugh Miller, An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 163f.

¹⁹Pieter Geyl, et al., The Pattern of the Past (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 35. Cf. pp. 31-36. Also cf. Toynbee's own treatment of the subject in A Study, III, op. cit., 250-63.

²⁰Toynbee, A Study; III, op. cit., 365, n. 1.

²¹Ibid., pp. 333-90.

²²Ibid., pp. 366-68.

²³Pitirim Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book Co., 1937-41), II, Chap. III. Toynbee views philosophers in general and Plato in particular as spokesmen of decadence.

²⁴This tendency to categorize encouraged one of Toynbee's outspoken dissenters to remark that Toynbee was "suffering from a hardening of the categories."

²⁵Hans Morgenthau, "Toynbee and the Historical Imagination," Encounter, March, 1955. If one wishes to extend Toynbee's use of "categories" to its ultimate application in his "carving out" of civilizations, the objection might be made that his delineation of civilizations is somewhat inconsistent; that for the Hellenic, for example, he uses language as the touchstone, for the Iranic, government; and for the Hindu, religion. The major characteristics which Toynbee--and Spengler as well--ascribe to a given phase of their civilizations, Northrop, Sorokin, Berdyaev, and Kroeber ascribe to certain types of culture. See Pitirim Sorokin, Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 216f., and 292; and Alfred L. Kroeber, Configurations of Culture Growth (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1944), 801ff. Kroeber refuses to delineate civilizations as such and limits his analyses to "configurations" of the superorganic in "fundamental patterns" in space and time. In some respects, Toynbee tends to develop a sociology of knowledge in which--as Sorokin puts it, "mental production is . . . conditioned, molded, and patterned by each civilization . . . in its own way." (Social Philosophies, op. cit., p. 306.) In short, he resorts to the use of Spengler's and Danilevsky's "prime symbol." Hellenic civilization becomes predominantly aesthetic, Indic, religious, and the Western, technological. Although Toynbee argues that "Civilization is not a thing in itself," (III, op. cit., p. 383), he follows this with a concession to Spengler that "a mechanical penchant is as characteristic of Western civilization as an aesthetic penchant is of the Hellenic Civilization or a religious penchant of the Indic and the Hindu." (III, op. cit., 387.)

²⁶This criticism may be found in the following: Zahn, op. cit., p. 20; Barnes, "Review of Toynbee's A Study of History," American Sociological Review, XII (1947), 480; H. E. Barnes and Howard Becker, Social Thought from Lore to Science (Washington: Harran Press, 1952), I, 764; Pitirim Sorokin, "Toynbee's Philosophy of History," Journal of Modern History, XII (September, 1940), 374-87; and Spate, op. cit., who objects that "such geographers as he does quote--they

number five--belong mainly to the determinist school whose findings are definitely not accepted by a great majority of modern geographers, yet the subject is not an esoteric one, nor are Humbolt, Reclus, Vidal de la Blache, Rebvre, Mackinder [whom Toynbee ignores] entirely obscure names," (*Ibid.*, p. 303) and although like Toynbee, Burckhardt tried to write history as "historical psychology," nowhere does Toynbee mention him.

²⁷Sir Ernest Barker, "Dr. Toynbee's Study of History: A Review," International Affairs, XXXI (January, 1955), p. 9. For other expressions of this negative criticism, see the various reviews collected by Montague F. Ashley-Montagu, ed., Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1956).

²⁸James K. Feibleman, The Revival of Realism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 172. Feibleman quotes Toynbee, A Study, VI, op. cit., 200. Edward Fliess also observes that "a long but profitable study could be made of the key terms in Toynbee's vocabulary." ("Toynbee as Poet," Journal of the History of Ideas, XVI [April, 1955], 278.)

²⁹See Ashley-Montagu, op. cit., for the best collection of contradictory evaluations of Toynbee. Some important theological critiques have been omitted, however, as, for example, those by Nichols and Harbison.

³⁰Indeed, if value is the intrinsic reality of an event, a limitation whose structure possesses an independent ontological anchorage, a limitation which finds its way into every realized actual occasion--as Whitehead believed--it would appear that the main burden of a theory of progress would be the establishment of an axiology which confirmed this doctrine.

³¹There are many value-coördinates that may be considered in relation to time. For a general theory of progress, however, that value must be isolated which evidences a persistent advance. Toynbee finds it in the relation of religion and human personality. Naturalistic theory cannot establish and sustain a general theory of progress. "Whether there is or is not a value on the whole in respect of which history on the whole can be said to move up or down is . . . highly questionable" (Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954], pp. 402f.) Perry does not find it in religion as does Toynbee and if he does not find it there, it is not to be found elsewhere.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

During the summer of 1955 when the writer was preparing a Toynbee bibliography, a parallel effort was being made by Miss Monica Popper. Miss Popper's work was published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the fall of 1955 with a foreword by Professor Toynbee dated August 10, 1955. It is available under the title: A Bibliography of the Works in English of Arnold Toynbee, 1910-1954.

When the writer studied this excellent bibliography, it became evident that little could be added except subsequent titles and a few relatively insignificant entries not included by Miss Popper. Because the published bibliography is almost complete and is, for all practical purposes, Toynbee's official bibliography, only those works cited in this dissertation are included. These are listed chronologically in the first section together with the entries missed by Miss Popper which are marked with an asterisk (*), one foreign work by Toynbee, and select works written after 1954.

The second section of this bibliography includes other relevant sources cited or used in the preparation of this dissertation. These are arranged alphabetically.

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